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Abstract 
Mitigating Biased Political Cognition through Friendship 
David Donley 
 
A growing body of empirical data on human cognition indicates that, despite self-
assessments of our reasoning as open-minded, disinterested, and motivated by 
accuracy, various psychological phenomena associated with our social identity and 
political ideology significantly bias our cognition when forming political beliefs and 
engaging in public discourse; such phenomena include motivated reasoning and the 
introspective illusion. Since these phenomena can undermine equitable, cooperative 
public discourse in a flourishing democracy, this dissertation focuses on developing 
practical means of diminishing our susceptibility to engage in such psychological 
phenomena. To this end, I argue that close friendships can serve as an important 
social context for cultivating intellectual virtues that support equitable, cooperative 
deliberation indicative of a flourishing democracy.       
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Introduction 
 
In a pluralistic democracy beset by contentious moral issues, deep political 
disagreement among a diverse citizenry is inevitable. When confronted with deep 
disagreement, ensuring the inclusion of diverse perspectives in the decision-making 
process presents a significant challenge. In facing this challenge, we can easily find 
ourselves focused on the structure of democratic decision-making practices and the 
epistemic and ethical ramifications of the processes and procedures used to secure fair 
representation. For example, one prominent issue concerns ensuring the inclusion of 
minority groups historically excluded from the decision-making process, such as 
women and people of color. Rightfully, this concern dominates scholarship in social 
epistemology and the epistemology of democracy. For example, I take this to be a 
concern looming large in Jose Medina’s Epistemology of Resistance and Miranda 
Fricker’s Epistemic Injustice, which are essential texts in social epistemology. While 
there are differing theories on how to best achieve the inclusion of diverse 
stakeholders in practice, the common goal is a flourishing democracy where all 
reasonable views are included.1  
 Though consideration of inclusion in decision-making practices is necessary 
to any discussion of a flourishing democracy, this point of focus has been well 
                                                 
1 Elizabeth Anderson, “The Epistemology of Democracy,” in Episteme: A Journal of 
Social Epistemology 3:1-2 (2006). Here Anderson considers three approaches to 
ensuring inclusion of diverse views, ultimately settling on what she calls an 
experimentalist approach, which was first proposed by John Dewey. The issues and 
concerns raised later are ones I take to be relevant to any of the three approaches 
examined by Anderson.   
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explored by philosophers like Miranda Fricker, Jose Medina, Elizabeth Anderson, 
Jason Stanley, and many others. The following dissertation is one that looks to 
expand upon such work by considering a related, yet different, point of focus. I take it 
to be that ensuring the inclusion of diverse perspectives in the democratic process 
requires considerations extending beyond structural elements of practice.  
Let us presuppose for a moment that we finally settle the matter of ensuring 
the inclusion of diverse perspectives in our pluralistic society in our decision-making 
procedures. Let us also presuppose that we figure out how to minimize and counteract 
overt, explicit expressions of bias aimed at marginalizing a group of people. To be 
clear, I am not asking us to engage in a purely theoretical hypothetical here. The 
hypothetical I am proposing raises genuine practical considerations that I take to be 
just as worthy of examination as inclusion in procedures and mitigating explicit bias. 
As such, let us imagine that we can construct, agree upon, and enact the institutional 
mechanisms needed for ensuring the inclusion of a diverse array of perspectives in 
the democratic decision-making process.  
To flesh this out, let us use the example of global climate change. Let us 
imagine that the decision-makers deciding policy concerning global climate change 
have adopted procedures that ensure the inclusion of the perspectives of all the 
stakeholders involved in this issue. The perspectives range from environmental 
groups to fossil fuel energy companies to government agencies to workers in both the 
renewable fuels and fossil fuels industry to the children whose world will be most 
shaped by global climate change and vulnerable populations at risk of environmental 
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injustice and so on. Let us say these decision-makers give serious and genuine 
consideration to the testimonials of all these stakeholders, the scientific literature on 
global climate change, the social science literature of its social, political, and 
economic impact, and carefully examine any other relevant evidence. The aim of this 
description is not to exhaust the list of perspectives and sources of evidence 
considered. Instead, it is to make it clear that our hypothetical decision-makers are 
making a good faith effort to be diligent, sensitive, and conscientious with respect to 
ensuring their decision accounts for the interests of all the people affected. For the 
sake of the point to be made with this example, let us call these folks democratically 
responsible decision-makers.  
Even following ideal epistemic procedures, we could still doubt that the 
decision arrived at concerning global climate change by these democratically 
responsible decision-makers fairly represents the diverse stakeholders mentioned. 
This doubt can be unrelated to the decision-making procedures themselves or telltale 
signs of bias against some of the stakeholders. Instead, this doubt concerns the unseen 
psychological mechanisms that may have manifested in the reasoning processes 
employed by our democratically responsible decision-makers. We might doubt that 
careful, objective consideration of a wide array of evidence itself sufficiently ensures 
the reasoning employed by our democratically responsible decision-makers 
impartially represents the interests of the diverse stakeholders. We can ask, “Is it 
possible that even though they examined many perspectives and sources of evidence, 
and we do not see overt signs of bias, that their examination may be biased?” Biased 
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in the sense that in their reasoning, they either intentionally or unintentionally give 
less weight and credibility to specific perspectives and sources of evidence. Biased in 
the sense that their conclusions favor beliefs they already hold that affirm their 
membership in social groups central to their identity and well-being.  
Moreover, what if the decision-maker or outside observers cannot easily 
detect these biases? Further, as a result of the difficulty in detecting these biases’ 
manifestation, the decision maker’s reasoning appears fair to them but is motivated 
by self-interest, as opposed to being motivated by the common interest. Admittedly, 
we would conclude that whatever decision adopted concerning global climate change 
by these democratically responsible decision-makers is unlikely to have guaranteed 
the common good of all its stakeholders.  
I see this concern about bias as a problem for any of the positions we can hold 
concerning the achievement of fair representation or any theory of democracy we 
might adopt. Similarly, I see this concern as a problem that likely besets the reasoning 
employed for any contentious moral issue where there exists deep disagreement about 
decisions to be made and policies to be adopted, not just global climate change. For 
many of us, our political beliefs often express our membership in social groups 
central to our identity and the emotional support network central to our well-being. 
The self-interested need to maintain our status within such groups can, without our 
awareness, impact our reasoning about contentious political issues. More specifically, 
this self-interested need can inhibit accuracy and the common good from being our 
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primary motivations when engaging in public discourse on contentious political 
issues. This is the central problem that will be examined in this dissertation.  
When examining cognitive science and psychology literature on political 
cognition from the past 50 years, there exists significant evidence that casts doubt on 
our ability to have accuracy and the common good be our primary motivations when 
reasoning about morally significant, contentious political issues. Despite our best 
efforts to be impartial and accurate, these studies make it evident that it is plausible 
that without our awareness, we can be engaged in biased cognition when thinking 
about political issues. The manifestations of biased cognition that I have in mind here, 
and explore in the first chapter, include motivated reasoning, confirmation bias, and 
the introspection illusion. Upon examination of these phenomena, I argue that we 
should be disconcerted by our susceptibility to engage in biased cognition regarding 
morally significant political issues, such as global climate change. We should be 
disconcerted because its effects are corrosive to efforts to resolve these pressing 
issues in ways that are inclusive of the members of our pluralistic society. Ultimately, 
the manifestation of these phenomena aid in undermining a flourishing democracy.     
After examining accounts of biased cognition from psychology and cognitive 
science, in the second chapter, we turn to considering recent accounts from 
philosophers examining the effects of biased cognition on public discourse, in 
particular, the account offered by Jason Stanley in How Propaganda Works and 
Joshua Greene in Moral Tribes: Emotion, Reason, and the Gap Between Us and 
Them. While the work of psychologists and cognitive scientists often focuses on 
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offering descriptions of the phenomena, the philosophical accounts considered in the 
second chapter offer possible remedies for mitigating the effects of biased cognition 
on our public discourse. I will analyze the standards of impartiality for contributions 
to public discourse offered by Stanley and Greene’s recommendation that utilitarian 
thinking guide our contributions to public discourse.  
In my analysis of Stanley and Greene’s proposals, I will contend that their 
proposals overlook a crucial feature of biased cognition. In the first chapter, our 
examination of political cognition will highlight how an individual’s social 
relationships contribute to their engagement in biased cognition. An individual is 
susceptible to expressing political beliefs that convey their membership in and loyalty 
to social groups that are essential to their identity and well-being. Moreover, given 
the self-interested need to have the emotional support of those within our social 
groups, individuals are unlikely to revise their beliefs in accordance with an accurate 
evaluation of information and the common good representative of the interests of all 
stakeholders, especially when doing so goes against the accepted political beliefs of 
their social groups. In this dissertation, this feature of biased cognition will be 
regarded as the social context of biased cognition. My analysis of Stanley and 
Greene’s proposals will show that their proposals do not adequately address this 
critical feature of an individual’s susceptibility to engage in biased cognition.  
To build upon current philosophical accounts in a manner that adequately 
addresses the social context of a susceptibility to engage in biased cognition, in the 
third chapter, I will contend that forming close friendships with those politically 
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different from ourselves can aid in mitigating a susceptibility to engage in biased 
cognition concerning contentious political issues. To support this contention, I will 
draw upon the philosophical accounts of close friendship articulated by Aristotle in 
the Nicomachean Ethics and Alexander Nehemas in On Friendship. In these 
accounts, we will find that the features indicative of close friendship lend themselves 
to cultivating a social context that alleviates a susceptibility to engage in biased 
cognition. More specifically, the reciprocated trust, intimacy, and goodwill toward 
one another that we find in close friendship provides a social context where friends 
can become more aware of their engagement in biased cognition and support one 
another to reduce their susceptibility to do so.  
In the first three chapters, a dominant theme that will emerge in my analysis is 
practical considerations of the ideas examined. The examination of psychological and 
cognitive science accounts of political cognition is intended to provide an 
understanding of how people in practice reason about political issues. Additionally, 
the primary motivation behind my criticism of Stanley and Greene’s proposals is a 
consideration of their success in practice. As such, in the fourth and final chapter, I 
explore real-life friendships that suggest it may be possible in practice for close 
friends to aid in reducing a susceptibility to engage in biased cognition. Though, 
given the authors of the accounts considered in the fourth chapter did not conduct 
their investigation of the friendships with my proposal in mind, there will not be 
sufficient evidence in the accounts to conclude that my proposal would be successful 
in practice. Nonetheless, those examples will suggest that there exist suitable 
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examples for studying my proposal’s effectiveness in practice. Thus, future research 
concerning my proposal is apt to be fruitful.  
In concluding the introduction, I want to note my motivation for writing on 
this topic. As an undergraduate, I often believed that most deep disagreements about 
political issues could be resolved through education. I had naively believed that if 
people were taught to critically think about political issues, in a manner that 
resembled the critical thinking I was being taught in my humanities courses, then 
people could more quickly arrive at a mutual agreement on how to resolve pressing 
issues of great moral significance besetting our democracy. In studying the topic of 
this dissertation, I have come to realize that resolving the pressing issues besetting our 
democracy is not merely a matter of education. People’s political beliefs are closely 
connected to their emotional support network and sense of identity, and these are a 
significant source of meaning in their lives. They are not about to abandon these for 
the sake of accuracy and the common good. They need for the very social 
relationships that have facilitated their engagement in biased cognition to become the 
social relationships that facilitate the improvement of their political cognition.  
I have always pursued philosophy with the belief that it can make the lives 
around me and my life better. It is my firm conviction that a love of wisdom 
ultimately benefits one’s life. It is through my love of wisdom that I sought to offer 
an analysis of a topic that could benefit our society. I hope that close friendship can 
aid in healing the political divides in this country and that such healing leads to a 
better future for us all.      
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Chapter 1 – The Psychology of Biased Political Cognition 
Introduction 
Since the 1970s, a growing body of empirical research on human cognition 
has well documented how subjective interest and bias can unconsciously impact our 
reasoning when forming political beliefs and participating in public discourse. 
Despite our best efforts and intentions to deliberately form political beliefs and 
participate in public discourse according to ideals of open-mindedness to diverse 
perspectives, equal consideration of available evidence, and fairness to those who 
disagree with us, we are susceptible to engaging in various psychological phenomena 
that without our awareness hinder us from achieving these desired ideals of a 
flourishing democracy.2 Since these ideals are integral to a flourishing democracy, 
this research should be disconcerting not only to scholars working in ethics and social 
and political philosophy, but for all people committed to a flourishing pluralistic, 
democratic society.   
 This chapter’s central goal is to understand how our engagement in biased 
cognition epistemically corrodes public discourse in a flourishing democracy. To 
achieve said goal, I will begin with explaining some of the psychological phenomena 
                                                 
2 The idea that a flourishing democracy requires open-mindedness to diverse 
perspectives, equal consideration of available evidence, and fairness to those that 
disagree with us is a notion that will be assumed in this dissertation. Other 
philosophers have argued in depth for this idea, notably John Dewey in The Public 
and Its Problems and “Creative Democracy: The Task Before Us.” More recently, 
Elizabeth Anderson has followed up on Dewey’s arguments in “The Epistemology of 
Democracy.” A summary of their arguments and their relevance to this dissertation 
can be found in the Appendix.  
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in cognitive processes that corrodes public discourse in a flourishing democracy; 
specifically, I will focus on several manifestations of motivated reasoning and the 
introspection illusion.3 Then, I will define what I intend to mean by my term biased 
political cognition. Through examining these phenomena, it will become clear how 
such phenomena of biased political cognition are troublesome for a flourishing 
democracy that aims at a fair representation of its pluralistic society in its public 
discourse.  
 Overall, the discussion of biased political cognition and its relevance to 
equitable, cooperative public discourse is grounded in an ethos of practical 
consideration of the political contexts in which we form beliefs, publicly deliberate 
with one another, and ultimately live our lives. In this vein, I will use a contentious 
political issue of great moral significance to our society as an example for 
understanding the psychological literature. To guide us through this chapter, let us 
consider two present-day Americans discussing global climate change. Casey self-
identifies as politically conservative and a member of the Republican Party. Landry 
self-identifies as politically liberal and a member of the Democratic Party. As we 
move through our discussion, a helpful way to remember their political affiliation is 
to think of them as Casey the conservative and Landry the liberal. Whereas Casey 
                                                 
3 Empirical studies on human cognition discuss a variety of heuristics and biases that 
are present in our reasoning about many types of beliefs beyond just political beliefs. 
As such, I specifically focus on motivated reasoning and the introspection illusion 
because they have a direct bearing on political beliefs (which should become clear by 
the end of the chapter) and in certain cases, actual studies focus on these phenomena 
with regard to political beliefs.  
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vehemently denies the existence of global climate change, Landry adamantly believes 
in the existence of global climate change. With these identities and beliefs in mind, let 
us imagine that Casey and Landry are engaged in deliberation concerning the 
existence of global climate change and what action, if any, should be taken in 
response by our society. This above description is intended to serve as the general 
description of the example being considered. More specific details of the nature of 
their beliefs and deliberation will be fine-tuned with respect to elucidating the 
psychological phenomena. As such, expect the specific details to shift through the 
course of the chapter.  
 
Psychological Phenomena Hindering A Flourishing Democracy 
 In this section, we will consider different manifestations of motivated 
reasoning and the introspection illusion that can hinder the achievement of fair 
representation of diverse perspectives in our political belief formation and public 
discourse. Motivated reasoning, the introspection illusion, and other related 
psychological phenomena (such as system justification theory and identity-protective 
cognition) that will be discussed in this chapter are all ways in which our ability to be 
open-minded to diverse perspectives, fair to those who disagree with us, and equally 
consider available evidence can become stymied, and thus render us unsuccessful in 
attaining these ideals of a flourishing democracy. These ideals of a flourishing 
democracy are integral to fostering a reasonable, equitable public discourse in a 
pluralistic society. These standards aim to achieve cooperative deliberation—
 12 
 
cooperative in the sense that such deliberation can aid us in arriving at decisions 
about collective actions and policies to be enacted by social and governmental 
institutions. We should be troubled by our engagement in biased political cognition 
that can inhibit the fair and cooperative deliberation that is essential to a flourishing 
democracy.   
 
System 1 and System 2 Cognition  
Throughout his academic career, Nobel Laureate and social psychologist 
Daniel Kahneman has argued for a distinction between two types of cognitive 
processes used in making decisions and forming judgments: System 1 and System 2. 
These neutral terms formalize a distinction between intuition and reasoning as forms 
of thinking. System 1 is characterized by operations that are fast, automatic, 
effortless, and often emotionally charged. Further, they are directed by habit, and as a 
result, they are difficult to control or change. In contrast, the operations of System 2 
are slower, serial, effortful, and deliberately controlled. These tend to be more 
flexible and can be rule-governed.4  
The distinction between System 1 and System 2 cognition is fundamental to 
understanding the psychological phenomena discussed in this chapter. As described 
in the introduction, despite our best efforts and intentions to explicitly reason 
following the ideals of a flourishing democracy, there are certain undermining 
                                                 
4 Daniel Kahneman, “Maps of Bounded Rationality: Psychology for Behavioral 
Economics,” The American Economic Review 93, no. 5 (Dec 2003): 1451.  
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psychological phenomena that without our awareness impact our reasoning. This 
description can now be further refined with notions of System 1 and System 2. At the 
level of System 2, we can be readily aware of our deliberate intentions. Using our 
guiding example, let us say Casey and Landry deliberately intend to fairly evaluate 
evidence of global climate change’s existence. Then, they form a political belief 
based on their evaluations. As a result, both Casey and Landry regard their political 
beliefs as based on the fair evaluation of evidence. All of this cognition occurs at the 
level of System 2.  
In the literature on human cognition, the mechanisms responsible for the 
psychological phenomena that I call biased political cognition often, but not always, 
occur at the level of System 1. Since the mechanisms responsible for these 
phenomena occur intuitively, automatically, and effortlessly, it can be rather 
challenging to be aware of instances of their occurrence. While at the level of System 
2 Casey and Landry can believe themselves to have fairly evaluated evidence for 
global climate change’s existence, at the level of System 1 there may be instances 
where they engaged in motivated reasoning and fell prey to the introspection illusion. 
If this were the case, they would not necessarily be able to possess an awareness of 
this having happened. As a result, they should consider the possibility that they have 
not achieved their intended ideal of fair evaluation when forming their political belief 
about global climate change. To better understand why we should consider this 
possibility, let us move on to specific explanations of these psychological 
phenomena.    
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Motivated Reasoning  
In her widely cited work on motivated reasoning, social psychologist Ziva 
Kunda distinguishes between being motivated by accuracy and being motivated to 
arrive at particular, directional goals.5 Kunda argues that both kinds of goals impact 
our reasoning by influencing our choice of beliefs and strategies we apply to a given 
problem. Nonetheless, “accuracy goals lead to the use of those beliefs and strategies 
that are considered most appropriate, whereas directional goals lead to the use of 
those that are considered most likely to yield the desired conclusion.”6 In other 
words, cognitive processes differ when reasoning aims at accuracy compared to when 
reasoning aims at directional goals.  
In sharpening this distinction between accuracy and directional goals, Kunda 
clarifies how reasoning differs in the respective situations. Kunda explains that when 
we are motivated to be accurate, we spend more cognitive effort on issue-related 
reasoning, more carefully attend to relevant information, and process it more deeply, 
often using more complex rules.7  When motivated by accuracy, there is a deep focus 
on issues at hand and attention to relevant information. In contrast, when motivated 
by directional goals, there is only a focus on issues and information that support the 
desired conclusion.  
                                                 
5 Ziva Kunda, “The Case for Motivated Reasoning,” Psychological Bulletin 108, no. 
3 (1990): 480. 
6 Kunda, “The Case for Motivated Reasoning,”481.   
7 Kunda, 481.  
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To deepen our understanding of this distinction, let us imagine that it is the 
early 1970s, and Casey and Landry are discussing whether or not lead should be 
banned from gasoline. Landry believes that lead should be banned from gasoline. 
Landry bases this belief on close consideration of many relevant factors. Landry 
reflects on the increased cost of gasoline that would result from needing to develop an 
alternative gasoline formula, and that this increase in cost further exacerbates the 
already increased cost that resulted from the OPEC oil embargo. Landry understands 
that there will be a financial pinch to be experienced by all, one that could lead to 
even more difficult financial choices amidst the current stagflation. Such financial 
hardship will affect those of lower socioeconomic status the most. These 
considerations are made along with an examination of the evidence of public health 
risks that result from lead’s toxicity. Empirical studies from the late 1940s and early 
1950s proved that lead has polluted the air, studies in the 1960s showed there exist 
abnormally high levels of lead in humans, and studies in the early 1970s are showing 
that higher levels of lead in children are correlated with decreased school 
performance. It is through careful consideration of all this evidence and possible 
ramifications of banning lead in gasoline that Landry arrives at the belief that it would 
be in the common interest to enact policy that reduces and eventually bans lead in 
gasoline. Landry can be described as motivated by accuracy in reaching this belief.    
In contrast, Casey believes that lead in gasoline should not be banned. Similar 
to Landry, Casey is quite worried about increased fuel costs amidst stagflation and an 
oil embargo. Already feeling financially strained, Casey does not want to have to pay 
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more for gasoline. Even though Casey is aware of empirical studies about the toxicity 
of lead being published by scientists working at universities, Casey finds more 
compelling the accounts of scientists and doctors working for the lead industry that 
has reassured the public that lead in gasoline does not pose a public health risk. When 
Casey is provided evidence that such scientists are most likely biased because the 
lead industry funds their research and that scientists whose work shows the dangers of 
lead are harassed and threatened by the lead industry, Casey still does not give much 
consideration to the toxicity of lead in gasoline, as this evidence does not support 
their desired conclusion. Casey is motivated by directional goals that influence their 
assessment of the credibility of evidence and the weight in their reasoning given to 
evidence challenging their viewpoint.8 In this case, the directional goals are related to 
financial self-interest.     
Even though directional reasoning involves a focus on the desired conclusion, 
we cannot justify any conclusion we desire. Kunda stipulates, “people motivated to 
arrive at a particular conclusion attempt to be rational and to construct a justification 
of their desired conclusion that would persuade a dispassionate observer. They draw 
the desired conclusion only if they can muster up the evidence necessary to support 
                                                 
8 Research on the public’s understanding of science has revealed that the biases in 
directional goals can affect a person’s understanding of science and in certain cases 
inhibit an understanding of scientific research. As one group of science literacy 
researchers put it, “the assessment of the credibility and weight of evidence may be 
biased in such a way that the evidence fits the recipient’s preexisting attitudes or 
moral convictions, or contrary evidence may be ignored or confuted.” See Gale 
Sinatra, Dorothe Kienhues, and Barbara Hofer, “Addressing Challenges to Public 
Understanding of Science: Epistemic Cognition, Motivated Reasoning, and 
Conceptual Change,” Educational Psychologist 49, no. 2 (2014): 123-138.    
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it.”9 Casey does not blatantly argue against banning lead because it does not coincide 
with their financial self-interest. Instead, Casey supports this conclusion by citing 
scientists who claim lead does not pose public health risks. I note this aspect of 
Kunda’s account because I think it is easy to mistake the distinction between 
accuracy driven reasoning and directional reasoning as meaning that when we engage 
in directional reasoning, we are not attempting to be rational. We may think that if 
accuracy is not the goal, then directional reasoning could entail any arbitrary goal 
without regard for evidence or logical inferences. In other words, we could construe 
directional reasoning as irrational. However, according to Kunda, when engaged in 
directional reasoning, we are attempting to be rational.10  
A crucial point of comparison is that accuracy goals often utilize cognitive 
processes focused on hypothesis testing, whereas directional goals often utilize 
cognitive processes focused on justification construction. I find this feature of 
                                                 
9 Kunda, “The Case for Motivated Reasoning,” 482-483. 
10 In discussing political beliefs and political deliberation, this point is particularly 
salient. It is common to observe two people disagreeing about a political issue and to 
witness one or both participants claim that the other is irrational for holding a certain 
belief about a contentious political issue. We can easily imagine Landry accusing 
Casey of being irrational for denying the existence of global climate change and 
Casey accusing Landry for being irrational for believing global climate change is real. 
We could then easily imagine that if Casey and Laundry were to learn about the 
psychological phenomenon of motivated reasoning that they might use this as an 
explanation of why the other is irrational for holding their respective belief. This is 
the situation I want to prevent before further explaining motivated reasoning. My 
intention in understanding the psychological phenomena discussed here is not 
contribute further to the polarization that characterizes our political culture. My 
intention is to understand these psychological phenomena to better cultivate more 
open dialogue between those that disagree with each other. I want Casey and Landry 
to have a productive, respectful dialogue about global climate change.    
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directional reasoning—providing a seemingly rational justification for belief—to be 
problematic concerning political beliefs. To better understand why I take this feature 
to be problematic, directional reasoning needs to be considered with respect to two 
contexts: the individual person and the broader social community. To this end, let us 
turn to the work of Dan Kahan, as his work focuses on directional reasoning about 
political beliefs. It should be noted that there is a terminological difference between 
Kunda and Kahan. For Kunda, motivated reasoning refers to both accuracy driven 
reasoning and directional reasoning. Whereas for Kahan, the phenomenon that Kunda 
refers to as directional reasoning, he calls motivated reasoning; as such, I will now 
refer to directional reasoning as motivated reasoning.  
 
Motivated Reasoning and Political Beliefs  
Kahan considers instances of motivated reasoning that can be characterized as 
benefiting the self-interest of an individual, but also ethically problematic for 
collective interests. To this end, he examines ideological conflicts over facts for 
which there is empirical evidence. In addressing disagreements between liberals and 
conservatives over the existence and cause of global climate change, waste from 
nuclear power plants, vaccinating young girls against HPV, and handgun violence, 
Kahan states, “Political polarization on empirical issues like these occur despite the 
lack of any logical connection between the contending beliefs and the opposing 
 19 
 
values of those that espouse them. It also persists despite apparent scientific 
consensus on the answers to many of these disputed questions.”11  
To elaborate on Kahan’s point, let us consider it regarding Casey and 
Landry’s disagreement over the existence and cause of global climate change. Kahan 
is claiming that questions of “Is global climate change happening?” and “Does global 
climate change have anthropogenic causes?” are questions for which there are not 
only empirical answers but scientific consensus on these answers as well. Given these 
are questions with empirical answers, it is not clear how Casey and Landry could 
regard such questions as politically debatable. Further, as scientific questions with 
empirical answers, it is not clear how answers to such questions are directly related to 
being ideologically liberal and conservative. There is no direct logical connection 
between the science of global climate change and political ideology. If Casey and 
Landry were motivated by accuracy, their beliefs about global climate change would 
not be connected to their political identities nor be a matter in need of political 
deliberation.12   
                                                 
11 Dan M. Kahan, “Ideology, Motivated Reasoning, and Cognitive Reflection,” 
Judgment and Decision Making 8, no. 4 (2013): 407. 
12 There is a subtle point worth noting here, though it is speculative on my part. I 
believe Kahan is correct in arguing that the question of global climate change’s 
existence and causes are empirical matters with answers that do not directly connect 
to a particular ideology. Nonetheless, an important related question is directly 
connected to one’s political ideology: how should our society respond to the fact of 
global climate change’s existence and anthropogenic causes? This is a question that in 
part can be answered empirically. For example, scientists have calculated estimates of 
specific amounts of carbon emission reduction that need to take place. At the same 
time, the answer to this question is also normative. There are concerns about quality 
of life for this and future generations, concerns about the value of nonhuman animals 
and the natural environment, concerns about equitable ways of sustainably organizing 
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In explaining ideological motivations that can underlie political beliefs, Kahan 
argues that the goal of protecting our identity and standing within a social group that 
shares fundamental values can lead to motivated cognition relating to policy-relevant 
facts.13  Despite the presence of empirical evidence for a belief, we might be 
disinclined to accept such a belief if it goes against the ideology that is commonly 
associated with our membership within a particular group. Conversely, even if 
empirical evidence supports our belief, we may not hold the belief based on the 
empirical evidence. We could accept the belief because it conforms to the ideology of 
our particular social group. In other words, we could be motivated by our political 
ideology, as opposed to accuracy.    
Let us return to Casey and Landry. Let us say that as a conservative, Casey’s 
family is conservative as well. Even Casey’s personal friends and close relationships 
at work are predominantly with those who identify as conservative. Casey recognizes 
that the intimate connection with these people is based in large part on shared 
political ideology. Further, Casey has witnessed occasions when some conservatives 
                                                 
the economy, etc. These are concerns for which there is ideologically motivated 
disagreement. More importantly, these are the more challenging concerns with 
complex answers that cannot be easily addressed by liberals or conservatives. Some 
research on scientific literacy views global climate change as a socio-scientific issue, 
meaning the public’s engagement with climate science does not occur in a purely 
scientific context. Instead, the public’s engagement with climate science is embedded 
in a complex social and political context where it is subject to economic, social, 
political, and ethical considerations. Collective decisions on socio-scientific issues are 
not simply inferred from a range of factual premises from scientific research, but are 
also reflective of a person’s ideological beliefs. See Gale Sinatra, Dorothe Kienhues, 
and Barbara Hofer, “Addressing Challenges to Public Understanding of Science” in 
Educational Psychologist 49, no. 2 (2014): 124.    
13 Kahan, “Ideology, Motivated Reasoning, and Cognitive Reflection,” 408.  
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have gone against the standard conservative position on global climate change by 
agreeing with the empirical evidence and asserting the existence of global climate 
change. From these occasions, Casey has seen how those who challenged 
conservative ideology jeopardized their intimate relationships by creating emotional 
distance between themselves and other conservatives. Casey has seen the detrimental 
impact that comes with the loss of an emotional support network that is integral to 
their life and sense of self. These experiences and considerations could be at play in 
motivating Casey to deny the existence of global climate change. Even if Casey is 
unaware of these considerations, Casey would most likely feel the deep-seated need 
to maintain the relationships that have taken years (and maybe even decades) to 
cultivate. Thus, even when Casey attempts to be rational in their denial of global 
climate change, it could be the case that, without Casey realizing it, this denial is 
motivated by self-interest.  
Let us say an analogous situation is true of Landry as well. Landry’s network 
of intimate relationships is predominantly liberal. Parallel to Casey, Landry has 
witnessed a few liberals challenge the truth of global climate change by questioning if 
climate scientists should be trusted and if the “liberal media” have exaggerated the 
consensus and abundance of empirical data. Landry has seen how many liberals have 
met these people’s reservations about the “liberal position” regarding global climate 
change with condescension and even some hostility. In some sense, Landry comes to 
accept that affirming the existence of global climate change is conducive to 
maintaining their network of close relationships. Unbeknown to them, Landry’s belief 
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in global climate change may not be motivated by accuracy, but rather by ideological 
commitments. It is in Landry’s self-interest to adhere to the liberal position regarding 
global climate change.    
Kahan’s analysis supports this characterization of both a liberal and a 
conservative being equally susceptible to engaging in motivated reasoning. Based on 
the results of his experiment, he contends, “when assessing evidence of the other 
group’s propensity to consider evidence in an open-minded and reflective way, 
liberals and conservatives were uniformly prone to ideologically motivated 
reasoning.”14 Thus, it is unlikely that holding a particular political orientation does 
not make us more or less susceptible to engaging in motivated reasoning.  
As seen with Casey and Landry, specific instances of reasoning directed by 
ideology can be beneficial to our self-interest. Kahan argues that ideologically 
motivated cognition is not necessarily “a reasoning deficiency, but is a reasoning 
adaptation suited to promoting the interest that individuals have in conveying their 
membership in and loyalty to affinity groups central to their well-being.”15 In a 
similar vein, John Jost and Orsolya Hunyady make a parallel claim when discussing 
ideology and what they call a system-justifying motive, “whereby people seek to 
maintain or enhance the legitimacy and stability of existing forms of social 
arrangements.”16 Jost and Hunyady argue, “system-justifying ideologies serve a 
                                                 
14 Kahan, “Ideology, Motivated Reasoning, and Cognitive Reflection,” 417.  
15 Kahan, 417-418. 
16 John T. Jost and Orsolya Hunyady, “The Psychology of System Justification and 
the Palliative Function of Ideology,” European Review of Social Psychology (2002): 
113. 
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palliative function in that they reduce anxiety, guilt, dissonance, discomfort, and 
uncertainty for people who are in positions that are either advantaged or 
disadvantaged.”17     
Though certain instances of engaging in motivated reasoning about politics 
can benefit our self-interest, it is problematic when zooming outward to the 
heterogeneous social landscape of a pluralistic society. Kahan observes, “if 
ideologically diverse individuals all follow this strategy simultaneously, they will be 
collectively worse off, since under these conditions, democratic institutions are less 
likely to converge, or to converge as rapidly as they otherwise would, on policies that 
reflect the best available evidence on how to protect everyone from harm.”18 In other 
words, the prescription that we should be motivated by ideology, as opposed to 
accuracy or the common good, concerning politics is not conducive to a flourishing 
democracy that requires a certain degree of cooperation for action to take place when 
addressing contentious political issues with significant ethical ramifications.   
Similarly, when a system-justifying motive directs reasoning, people tend to 
rationalize current social, political, and economic inequalities “as fair and legitimate, 
perhaps even natural and inevitable.”19 This rationalization of inequalities and the 
unjust social institutions supporting such inequalities undermines a flourishing 
democracy that values social justice, freedom, and equal opportunity for all people as 
                                                 
17 Jost and Hunyady, “The Psychology of System Justification and the Palliative 
Function of Ideology,” 114. 
18 Kahan, “Ideology, Motivated Reasoning, and Cognitive Reflection,” 420. 
19 Jost and Hunyady, 119. 
 24 
 
an ethical imperative. As Jost and Hunyady explain, “people’s remarkable ability to 
accommodate formerly unwelcome outcomes helps to explain why social and 
political systems are successful at retaining cooperation and consent and why social 
change is so difficult to accomplish.”20  
Let us consider Casey and Landry’s deliberation about global climate change 
with respect to these points. If Casey’s denial of global climate change and Landry’s 
acceptance of global climate change are beliefs motivated by an ideology that serves 
their self-interest, then how are they to arrive at a position where they both could 
consent to the government taking action or not taking action concerning global 
climate change? While these instances of motivated reasoning do stabilize Casey and 
Landry’s social relations, which are central to their well-being, this comes at the 
expense of their being able to engage in cooperative deliberation—cooperative in the 
sense of making headway on decisions about how we ought to collectively respond to 
empirical evidence of global climate change. The inability of those of opposing 
ideologies to cooperatively engage in political deliberation, to effectively participate 
in a dialogue that is needed for the government to take action concerning pressing 
political issues with significant ethical ramifications detracts from the health of our 
democracy. As such, the possibility we could be engaging in motivated reasoning 
when forming political beliefs should be disconcerting to us all. 
                                                 
20 Jost and Hunyady, “The Psychology of System Justification and the Palliative 
Function of Ideology,” 123. 
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With this possibility in mind, we could object to the above analysis by 
claiming that I may be engaged in motivated reasoning in my discussion of motivated 
reasoning. My political ideology could be motivating the evidence I have considered 
and the inferences I have made. It could even be directing how I explain examples 
with Casey and Landry. Given the empirical research on motivated reasoning, this is 
a real possibility. Further, since my engagement in motivated reasoning could be 
occurring at the level of System 1 cognition, it would be quite difficult for me to be 
aware of there being an instance of motivated reasoning in this analysis. Even if 
someone were to bring to my awareness an instance where I have engaged in 
motivated reasoning, it is not clear that such a discussion would necessarily lead to 
my recognition that I have engaged in motivated reasoning. There is a likely 
possibility that upon introspection of my thinking I would conclude that I have not 
engaged in motivated reasoning and that the person challenging me is most likely 
engaged in motivated reasoning when they bring up their concern—the likelihood of 
this sort of response will make more sense once we discuss the introspection illusion.  
While I cannot wholly relieve this worry, this is not a worry that concerns me 
nor do I believe it should concern us too much. Let us consider what is at stake when 
looking at motivated reasoning about political beliefs about global climate change. If 
ideological commitments motivate our reasoning about global climate change, and if 
such motivations are serving to undermine a cooperative, equitable public discourse 
needed for collective action, then our engagement in motivated reasoning contributes 
to our failure to respond appropriately. In the case of global climate change, if climate 
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change scientists are correct, then our failure to respond appropriately could 
contribute to the mass extinction of most forms of life on the planet. This is not meant 
to shock and awe, but to give an example of how there is a lot at stake ethically in 
discussing motivated reasoning concerning political issues like global climate change, 
structural racism, patriarchy, etc. In contrast, the stakes seem quite low in comparison 
to the worry about me being engaged in motivated reasoning in this analysis. There 
does not seem to be significant ethical ramifications if we conclude that I am engaged 
in motivated reasoning or am not engaged in it. 
Nonetheless, I do have a concern about a possible significance to be attached 
to the conclusion that I am engaged in motivated reasoning in this present analysis. I 
do fear that some people may see such a conclusion as warranting dismissal of this 
analysis. These people might doubt the accuracy of this analysis if there is an instance 
of motivated reasoning within it. It is not clear to me how the possibility of my being 
engaged in motivated reasoning should automatically dismiss what I have to say 
about it. I think the same applies to Casey and Landry. The possibility that the other is 
engaged in motivated reasoning should not be cause for dismissing each other’s 
beliefs. Cooperative deliberation cannot occur if this strategy is employed. Again, we 
should keep in mind the ethical ramifications of the political issues being deliberated. 
Given what is ethically at stake in many political issues, complete dismissal should be 
regarded as an uncooperative response.  
 
Confirmation Bias  
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In light of our discussion thus far, a reasonable response is to claim that we 
would be less susceptible to engaging in motivated reasoning if we regularly exposed 
ourselves to arguments and evidence that challenge our ideological commitments and 
push us to see the validity of political beliefs differing from our own beliefs. The 
more often Casey is exposed to liberal arguments and the evidence that supports 
them, and the more often Landry is exposed to conservative arguments and the 
evidence that supports them, the less likely that Casey and Landry would be 
susceptible to being motivated by their political ideology when deliberating with each 
other. While this may strike us as a reasonable suggestion, research on a particular 
manifestation of motivated reasoning known as confirmation bias shows us this 
strategy is inadequate. To be clear, since this concept can be defined in different 
ways, here confirmation bias refers to “the seeking or interpreting of evidence in 
ways that are partial to existing beliefs, expectations, or a hypothesis in hand.”21 
 To better understand the inadequacy of this suggestion, let us flesh out what 
is entailed by this strategy. This response assumes that exposure to multiple 
perspectives will lead us to reduce confidence in our own beliefs and be open-minded 
to the beliefs of others. Further, as this exposure continues, the hope is that we can 
fairly deliberate about politics and participate in cooperative public discourse 
indicative of a flourishing democracy. The more Casey and Landry become sensitive 
and familiar with each other’s political views, the more likely they will respect each 
                                                 
21 Raymond S. Nickerson, “Confirmation Bias: A Ubiquitous Phenomenon in Many 
Guises,” Review of General Psychology (1998): 175. 
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other’s positions and fairly account for each other’s position when deciding how our 
society should react to evidence of global climate change. This suggested response to 
evidence of our engagement in motivated reasoning is reflected in pedagogies that 
emphasize reasonable, respectful debate between two or more perspectives or when a 
teacher or a friend plays devil’s advocate to our position.  
While a well-intentioned suggestion, and possibly a necessary component to 
nurturing open-mindedness, it is not a sufficient strategy. When presented with 
evidence or arguments that differ from our own political beliefs and ideological 
commitments, it is not necessarily the case that we will reduce confidence in our own 
beliefs and come to recognize the validity of different perspectives. Instead, we are 
more likely to discount the perspectives of others and become more confident in our 
own beliefs. In other words, we are more likely to engage in confirmation bias.  
The likelihood of us engaging in confirmation bias when presented with 
evidence that differs from our beliefs was confirmed in a seminal experiment 
conducted by Charles Lord, Lee Ross and Mark Lepper in 1979 that investigated 
participants’ attitudes toward the legality of capital punishment.22 Participants in the 
experiment included capital punishment supporters and capital punishment 
opponents. They were presented with mixed evidence: evidence showing the 
effectiveness of capital punishment in deterring crime and evidence showing the 
ineffectiveness of capital punishment in deterring crime. It was found that participants 
                                                 
22 Charles Lord, Lee Ross, and Mark Lepper, “Biased Assimilation and Attitude 
Polarization: The Effects of Prior Theories on Subsequently Considered Evidence,” 
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 37, no. 11 (1979): 2098-2109. 
 29 
 
did not impartially process evidence relevant to a political belief. Lord et al. contend, 
“Instead, judgments about the validity, reliability, relevance, and sometimes even the 
meaning of proffered evidence are biased by the apparent consistency of that 
evidence with the perceiver’s theories and expectations.”23 In this way, we tend to 
interpret subsequent evidence in a manner that maintains our initial beliefs, as the 
initial belief directs the reasoning about the new evidence.  
In elucidating specifically how this biased assimilation process of new 
evidence occurs, Lord et al. explain, there is a “propensity to remember the strengths 
of confirming evidence, to judge confirming evidence as relevant and reliable, but 
disconfirming evidence as irrelevant and unreliable, and to accept that confirming 
evidence at face value while scrutinizing disconfirming evidence hypercritically.”24 
Given the biased assimilation process of new evidence, Lord et al. also find that the 
result of exposing opposing groups of people in a political dispute to an identical 
body of evidence supporting differing positions is that instead of a narrowing of 
disagreement, there is an increase in polarization of beliefs. These findings suggest, 
merely exposing us to perspectives, arguments, and evidence that differ from our own 
initial political beliefs makes us less open-minded and less likely to find common 
ground with our political opponents, and thus only intensifies political divisiveness 
and conflict.  
                                                 
23 Lord, Ross, and Lepper, “Biased Assimilation and Attitude Polarization,” 2099. 
24 Lord et al., 2099. 
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Merely exposing Casey to arguments and evidence supporting the existence of 
global climate change and Landry to arguments and evidence that deny the existence 
of global climate change would not lead to a more fair and cooperative deliberation 
between the two of them. Instead, it is more likely that Casey will become more 
convinced that Landry is wrong for affirming global climate change’s existence. 
Similarly, it is more likely that Landry will believe that Casey is wrong for denying 
global climate change’s existence. This result will not be conducive to getting Casey 
and Landry to respect each other’s views and work toward an agreed-upon position 
regarding what action, if any, should be taken by our society concerning global 
climate change.       
 
The Introspection Illusion  
Considering the pernicious effects of motivated reasoning on forming political 
beliefs, we might be tempted to think that an effective intervention to lessen our 
susceptibility to engage in motivated reasoning would be to educate ourselves about 
motivated reasoning, and in turn, evaluate our reasoning about politics in light of 
empirical studies. We might think, “Casey and Landry need to learn about motivated 
reasoning!” Upon learning about motivated reasoning, they could introspect about 
their reasoning process to detect instances in which they are engaged in motivated 
reasoning. This knowledge could aid in making them less susceptible to engaging in 
motivated reasoning in future deliberations. Unfortunately, according to Emily 
Pronin, Thomas Gilovich, and Lee Ross, it turns out that education about bias and 
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introspection is an insufficient means for us to learn to detect better and lessen our 
susceptibility to engage in motivated reasoning.25 Their argument relies on what they 
call the introspection illusion.  
Pronin et al. discuss an asymmetry in how we think about our cognition and 
the cognition of other people, and this asymmetry relates to what they call the 
introspection illusion. In describing this asymmetry, Pronin et al. contend, “we tend to 
treat our own introspections as something of a gold standard in assessing why we 
have responded in a particular manner and whether our judgments have been tainted 
by bias.” We see our beliefs as being influenced by objective concerns and our 
reasoning as free from bias. “By contrast, we treat the introspections of other actors as 
merely another source of plausible hypotheses—to be accepted or rejected as a 
function of their plausibility in light of what we know about the particular actor and 
about human behavior in general.”26 We tend to see beliefs that differ from our own 
as the result of bias and self-serving concerns on the part of the other person, and this 
judgment comes from our knowledge about how humans can be biased in their 
reasoning.  
This asymmetry renders introspection an inadequate means of discovering 
instances of engagement in motivated reasoning in our belief formation processes. In 
clarifying this point, Pronin et al. attest that most people “do not claim to be immune 
                                                 
25 Emily Pronin, Thomas Gilovich, and Lee Ross, “Objectivity in the Eye of the 
Beholder: Divergent Perceptions of Bias in Self Versus Others,” Psychology Review 
111, no. 3 (2004): 781-799. 
26 Pronin, Gilovich, and Ross, “Objectivity in the Eye of the Beholder,” 784. 
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to wishful thinking, overconfidence, defensiveness, and a host of other inferential and 
judgmental failings; we just don’t recognize that we are succumbing to them in any 
particular assessment we are currently making…”27 Thus, we can possess knowledge 
of motivated reasoning, know that we are capable of engaging in motivated 
reasoning, and yet not detect its presence in the processes of our belief formation. As 
Pronin et al. state, “Although people can accurately report on the contents of their 
thoughts and deliberations, the psychological processes and the true determinants of 
their behavior are often inaccessible to introspection.”28 This phenomenon is referred 
to as the introspection illusion because the faith that we tend to have in introspection 
to render our cognitive processes transparent to ourselves is misplaced.  
If Casey and Landry educated themselves on the phenomena of motivated 
reasoning and used introspection to discover when they are engaged in motivated 
reasoning, it would most likely lead them to become more confident in their ability to 
engage in unbiased deliberation and that confidence would be misplaced. At the same 
time, they are more likely to become less confident in the ability of the other to 
similarly engage in unbiased deliberation and such confidence would be misplaced. 
Moreover, it is quite possible that they could become more confident that the other is 
engaged in motivated reasoning when disagreeing with them about global climate 
change. In the end, we should not be too surprised if becoming educated about 
                                                 
27 Pronin, Gilovich, and Ross, “Objectivity in the Eye of the Beholder,” 783-784. 
28 Pronin et al., 784. 
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motivated reasoning only increased the degree of polarization between Casey and 
Landry and decreased the likelihood of productive dialogue between the two of them.    
 
Defining Biased Political Cognition 
Thus far, we have explored manifestations of what I am calling biased 
political cognition, but I have yet to define what I mean by biased for the purposes of 
this dissertation. Well, keep your chickens in the barnyard because I will offer a 
sketch of what I intend to mean for an instance of political cognition to be biased. I 
will largely be drawing from Dan Kahan’s account of ideologically motivated 
cognition in my sketch of biased political cognition, as it allows me to characterize 
bias in a way that shows it to be problematic for a flourishing democracy in a 
pluralistic society. Kahan “identifies ideologically motivated cognition as a form of 
information processing that promotes individuals’ interests in forming and 
maintaining beliefs that signify their loyalty to important affinity groups.”29 Affinity 
groups include political affiliations with shared ideological commitments and social 
identity groups with shared cultural commitments. For example, let us consider 
Landry, who identifies as politically liberal and sees themselves as belonging to the 
“liberal” political community. When Landry processes information about political 
issues, whether it be scientific evidence or the perspectives of those whom they 
disagree with (such as Casey), in ways that form and maintain the beliefs held by 
liberals that signify their loyalty to liberals, they are engaged in ideologically 
                                                 
29 Kahan, “Ideology, Motivated Reasoning, and Cognitive Reflection,” 407. 
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motivated cognition. Landry is biased in that they form identity-congruent 
assessments of information pertinent to political issues and perspectives on political 
issues different from their own. This bias is a form of information-processing suited 
to promoting the interest that Landry has in conveying their membership in and 
loyalty to affinity groups central to their well-being (in this case liberals).30 Let us 
consider this way of understanding bias with respect to Landry and global climate 
change. Say that Landry comes across a new climate change study whose findings 
largely support the current scientific consensus, but casts some doubt on the severity 
of the changes in climate to be expected in the coming years. When Landry processes 
the information in the study, let us say that they do so in a manner that maintains 
beliefs held by liberals about global climate change: Landry concludes they have 
further evidence that global climate change exists and drastic action must be taken to 
avert or at least reduce the severity of the coming climate collapse. While evidence in 
this study can be summoned to support this conclusion, Landry seems to overlook, or 
at least not give much weight in their reasoning to, the information in the study that 
casts doubt on the severity of the coming crisis. Landry may be inclined to process 
the information in the study in this biased manner because maintaining the belief that 
the coming crisis is severe and drastic action must be taken shows their membership 
in and loyalty to the “liberal” community. To express doubt of this liberal position 
could be perceived as a lack of loyalty to the liberal ideology by both Landry and 
other liberals.  
                                                 
30 Kahan, “Ideology, Motivated Reasoning, and Cognitive Reflection,” 418. 
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To assert that an instance of political cognition is biased is to assume that 
there are norms that ought to govern political cognition, that there is a normative 
standard of reasoning that should be followed when reasoning about politics. Our 
political cognition is biased when it deviates from such norms or otherwise fails to 
achieve the normative standard. With respect to processing information about 
political issues that is factual or otherwise evidential, the expected norms of reasoning 
are norms conducive to truth, such as objectivity and accuracy. For example, political 
cognition concerning global climate change means deliberating about the facts of 
global climate change that we have from climate change scientists. When examining 
those facts, our political cognition should adhere to norms conducive to truth. When 
Landry processes the information in the climate change study in a manner that 
confirms the liberal position on global climate change and does not account for the 
information that casts doubt on the liberal position, Landry fails to be accurate in their 
political cognition and in this instance is engaged in biased political cognition.  
Moreover, political cognition often entails thinking that relies not just on the 
facts about a political issue, but moral judgments about collective and individual 
action to be taken in addressing the political issue. Political cognition about global 
climate change entails deliberation about what ought to be done by each of us and as 
a society. We have to make judgments that involve a consideration of the value of 
human and non-human life and the value of future lives. For example, we would need 
to consider whether or not to focus on saving species in danger of extinction. Also, 
we would need to ask ourselves, “Should we prioritize protecting humans over 
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nonhuman animals from the ravages of global climate change being hypothesized by 
scientists? If so, which human populations should be given the highest priority?” 
Here our reasoning should be guided by norms of reasoning conducive to achieving 
the public interest or common good. There are multiple ways we might give an 
account of the norms of reasoning conducive to the public interest or common good, 
and we will consider two accounts, one from philosopher Jason Stanley and another 
from psychologist Joshua Greene, in the next chapter. Though for now, reasoning 
conducive to the common good should be seen as the normative standard that biased 
political cognition fails to meet. When individuals process information in a manner 
that promotes their interests in forming and maintaining beliefs that signify their 
loyalty to their important affinity groups, their political cognition privileges their self-
interest over the public interest and it privileges their affinity groups’ political beliefs 
at the expense of the political beliefs held by individuals belonging to social groups 
different from their affinity groups. A flourishing democracy’s capacity to be 
inclusive of all its members in achieving the common good is undermined by political 
cognition that favors self-interest over the public interest and when individuals favor 
their political and cultural affinity groups over consideration of the many social 
groups comprising its pluralistic society. With this in mind, unbiased political 
cogntion is political cognition that as much as humanly possible adheres to norms of 
reasoning conducive to truth and the common good with respect to political issues.           
 
The Takeaway from Psychological Evidence 
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Having reviewed the psychological literature on various manifestations of 
biased political cognition, we might pose questions of the following sort: are all of us 
equally susceptible to engaging in biased political cognition? Are those of us who are 
well-meaning, intelligent people who are aware of this phenomenon as vulnerable as 
others? How often do we engage in biased political cognition when it comes to 
political beliefs? These are difficult questions for which neither simple yes or no nor 
quantitative answers can be provided. To even attempt to answer such questions with 
a high degree of accuracy, the entire adult population would have to be administered 
tests for all the manifestations of biased political cognition for all of their political 
beliefs.  
Given the impractical nature of such a monumental undertaking, we may feel 
compelled to settle for extrapolating the results of these and other studies to the entire 
adult population of our society. While a seemingly practical response, it is not clear 
how we could extrapolate such results. To put it simply, empirical studies have 
concluded that in the experiments conducted a certain percentage of participants 
engaged in the psychological phenomena being examined and a certain percentage 
did not engage in the phenomena. I say a certain percentage because the exact number 
varies from study to study and the psychological phenomenon being studied. When 
extrapolating results, it is not clear how we could know if a particular person should 
be placed in the group that engages in the phenomenon or the group that does not 
engage in the phenomenon. If the results of confirmation bias studies are being 
extrapolated to Casey and Landry, how could it be determined if Casey or Landry fall 
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into the group that engaged in confirmation bias or the one that did not? Without 
testing everyone, it is not clear how there could be an accurate means of extrapolating 
the results.  
Now, let us consider what might happen if Casey and Landry claim that 
because they are well-meaning, intelligent people they are highly unlikely to be 
vulnerable to engaging in biased political cognition. It is not clear what they intend by 
such a claim. When examining the results of psychological studies, we do not come 
across any studies suggesting that participants who regard themselves as well-
meaning and intelligent are less likely to engage in the phenomenon being studied. A 
study with this result would be of much interest, as such a result could aid in 
developing a way to ameliorate our susceptibility to engage in biased political 
cognition. The most likely reason for why there are no studies that neither confirm 
nor deny that such characteristics have a bearing on our susceptibility is because 
researchers have not conducted tests with this variable in mind. Until such empirical 
data becomes available, we cannot conclude if our self-assessment of ourselves as 
intelligent and well-meaning is relevant or irrelevant to gauging our susceptibility to 
engage in biased political cognition. 
Though, even if such data existed, we should be skeptical of the findings. A 
self-assessment of us as well-meaning and intelligent is one that we would most 
likely conduct via introspection. Given the results from Pronin et al. about the 
introspection illusion, the reliability of this sort of self-assessment is questionable. As 
Pronin et al. explain, while we can accurately report the contents of our reasoning, 
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our cognitive processes are inaccessible to introspection. As such, we should question 
how we could know that us being well-meaning and intelligent impacts our cognitive 
processes in a way that reduces our susceptibility to engage in biased political 
cognition. Another way to understand this point is in relation to the distinction 
between System 1 and System 2 cognition. An assessment of us as well-meaning and 
intelligent relies on System 2 cognition, whereas the mechanisms responsible for 
biased political cognition can occur at the level of System 1. Given the significant 
differences in these types of cognition, System 2 cognition would not be of much help 
at informing us about our System 1 cognition.  
Considering the difficulties in completely ruling out the possibility that we do 
not engage in biased political cognition, it would be reasonable for us to seriously 
consider the possibility that we are susceptible to engaging in biased political 
cognition. Furthermore, it would be reasonable to explore the possibility that in 
certain instances we do engage and have in the past engaged in biased political 
cognition when forming our political beliefs and engaging in public discourse with 
others. Most importantly, given the necessity of cooperative, equitable deliberation to 
a flourishing democracy’s capacity to effectively respond to ethically pressing 
political issues and biased political cognition’s capacity to undermine such 
deliberation, the possibility we might be engaging in biased political cognition 
demands our serious attention.    
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Given the above discussion of biased political cognition, we may ask, where 
does this leave us concerning ameliorating our susceptibility?31 I think two 
conclusions are definite at this point: (1) a simple, straightforward means of reducing 
our susceptibility to engage in biased political cognition does not exist—it is not a 
matter of merely educating ourselves about diverse perspectives or the psychological 
phenomena in question—and (2) an adequate practical response to biased political 
cognition necessitates a broader focus beyond merely revising individual beliefs (one 
at a time) that have been formed through an engagement in biased political cognition. 
The mechanisms responsible for the psychological phenomena discussed in this 
analysis operate in cognitive processes that underlie belief formation, and thus an 
adequate practical response needs to account for this feature of biased political 
cognition. Having particular beliefs as the focal point of our practical response is too 
shallow and narrow of a focus. 
Two focal points are needed: us ourselves—our desires, motivations, and 
dispositions that impact the cognitive processes used in belief formation—and our 
social relationships that nurture our desires, motivations, and dispositions. Falling 
prey to motivated reasoning and the introspection illusion manifest as deeply 
ingrained habits of thought in the person that displays instances of them. As such, in 
                                                 
31 It should be noted that in this chapter I have not scrutinized the psychological 
experiments, nor the inferences made by psychologists. While this is something that 
should be done at some point, I will not be doing it in this dissertation and will leave 
it to a later work. For the sake of the arguments I will be making in later chapters, I 
am simply assuming that the inferences are correct. As a result, I do realize that I am 
asking the reader to put a lot of faith into what the psychologists claim that their 
studies show, but I am hoping the reader will bear with me. 
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some sense, a transformation in the person and how they are disposed to form 
political beliefs and participate in public discourse is needed.  
To facilitate this self-transformation, the social relationships supporting the 
habituation of biased political cognition also need to be transformed as well.32 The 
impetus for this suggestion comes from Kahan’s argument that the goal of protecting 
our identity and standing within a social group that shares fundamental values can 
lead to biased political cognition. If we are less likely to be motivated by accuracy 
(concerning ideological conflicts over facts for which there is empirical evidence) or 
the public interest (concerning issues affecting various stakeholders) because doing so 
could damage our vital social connections, then we should consider the nature of our 
vital social connections. We should ask, “Could my important social connections 
become ones that incentivize and reward my being motivated by accuracy and the 
common good concerning politics?” In the coming chapter on friendship, my aim will 
be to show how philosophical accounts of friendship from Aristotle and Alexander 
Nehamas show us that is possible for us to foster relationships characterized by 
reciprocated love, intimacy, and trust that nurture open-mindedness to diverse 
perspectives, equal consideration of available evidence, and fairness to those that 
disagree with us.    
                                                 
32 Although integral to more fully responding to the problematic features of biased 
political cognition, consideration of social structural transformation is beyond the 
scope of this chapter and should be considered a future avenue of analysis and 
research. 
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Before moving on to discussing friendship, let us consider responses from 
philosophers that grapple with the psychological phenomena I have been calling 
biased political cognition, as thus far we have only considered the work of 
psychologists and cognitive scientists. Examination of philosophical responses will 
not only deepen our understanding of how biased political cognition undermines a 
flourishing democracy, but it will also bring to light the limitations of these 
responses, thereby strengthening my case that friendship is a plausible, practical 
response to ameliorating our susceptibility to engage in biased political cognition and 
promoting a flourishing democracy.  
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Chapter 2 – Recent Philosophical Accounts of Biased Political Cognition 
Introduction  
From psychology and cognitive science research discussed in the previous 
chapter, we see that social identity and political ideology significantly bias our 
political cognition and thereby corrode an equitable, cooperative public discourse that 
is required for a flourishing democracy. A democracy cannot flourish when its 
participants struggle to engage in an equitable deliberation over pressing, contentious 
matters of public interest in a manner that genuinely recognizes the intelligibility and 
legitimacy of diverse perspectives held within their pluralistic society. This point will 
be more sharply illuminated in this chapter as we examine recent philosophical 
accounts of biased political cognition from philosopher Jason Stanley (How 
Propaganda Works) and philosopher/psychologist Joshua Greene (Moral Tribes).33 
While Stanley’s account scrutinizes the role biased political cognition plays in 
                                                 
33 Stanley and Greene are not the only philosophers whose work responds to the 
psychological phenomena that I have been calling biased political cognition. 
Philosophers working in the fields of virtue epistemology and epistemic injustice 
examine the role that psychological phenomena, such as motivated reasoning and 
implicit bias, play in intellectual vices, such as intellectual close-mindedness, 
dogmatism, and arrogance, and the epistemic exclusion and oppression of minorities. 
Two notable and influential accounts are those from Miranda Fricker in Epistemic 
Injustice and Jose Medina in The Epistemology of Resistance. A future avenue for 
extending the analysis in this dissertation would be to explore the connections with 
the work being done in virtue epistemology and epistemic injustice. I am presently 
focused on the Stanley and Greene’s accounts, as their work most directly relates to 
how I have framed my discussion of motivated reasoning in two critical ways: (1) 
similar psychological literature is used in constructing their philosophical accounts 
and (2) both their and my understanding of the problems arising for politics from 
these psychological phenomena do not rely on notions of intellectual vice or 
epistemic injustice.    
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perpetuating the exclusion of minority perspectives in our public discourse, Greene’s 
account underscores the role of biased political cognition in obstructing cooperative 
deliberation among politically diverse groups concerning contentious political issues.  
In these accounts, we find proposals aimed at diminishing the pernicious 
effects of biased political cognition on public discourse. I will argue that though these 
proposals provide us with goals we should aspire to achieve in public discourse, they 
provide limited practical guidance for achieving them. The main practical limitation 
that I will highlight concerns adequately addressing needed changes to the social 
contexts and conditions that support the perpetuation and habituation of engagement 
in biased political cognition. These proposals tend to place their primary focus on 
particular reasoning patterns that are characteristic of engagement in biased political 
cognition.34 However, as we learned in the last chapter, engagement in biased 
political cognition does not occur in a social vacuum: protecting our social status and 
ensuring our inclusion in social groups central to our well-being is integral to our 
susceptibility to engage in biased political cognition. Given this understanding of 
biased political cognition, I contend that proposals aimed at reducing our 
susceptibility would be more effective in practice if they addressed how to counteract 
                                                 
34 For example, as we will see later in this chapter with Greene’s proposal, there is a 
focus on individuals overcoming their automatic tendency to engage in intuitive 
thinking when participating in political discourse and a recommendation that people 
engage in active deliberation, in particular, utilitarian thinking about politics. While 
an intriguing proposal, it provides insufficient attention to how our social 
relationships encourage intuitive thinking and how the nature of our social 
relationships should change to encourage the kind of utilitarian thinking he 
recommends.  
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the social pressures and conditions that make it conducive to our self-interest to 
engage in biased political cognition. By highlighting this oversight in recent 
philosophical accounts, I aim to motivate the consideration of friendship as a 
beneficial practical aid for mitigating our susceptibility to engage in biased political 
cognition, as this will be the central topic in the forthcoming chapters.  
  
Biased Political Cognition and Social Injustice  
In How Propaganda Works, philosopher Jason Stanley investigates the 
prominent role of self-interest in political thought and how this undermines an 
equitable public discourse.35 He examines the connection between being engaged in 
                                                 
35 By equitable public discourse, I mean discourse that is fair to all cooperating 
members of society, regardless of their social identity (race, gender, class, etc.). 
An equal respect for the perspective of everyone subject to the issue under debate 
guides equitable public discourse. Equitable public discourse entails the inclusion 
of and responsiveness to the diverse political perspectives found in a pluralistic 
society. I follow philosopher Elizabeth Anderson on why inclusion and 
responsiveness is necessary for a democracy’s public discourse: “Most of the 
problems democracies are asked to solve are complex, and have asymmetrically 
distributed effects on individuals according to their geographic location, social 
class, occupation, education, gender, age, race, and so forth. Since individuals are 
most familiar with the effects of problems and policies on themselves and those 
close to them, information about these effects is also asymmetrically distributed. 
Surely an important part of the case for the epistemic merits of democracy rests on 
its ability to pool this asymmetrically distributed information about the effects of 
problems and policies so as to devise solutions that are responsive to everyone’s 
concerns. We therefore need a model of democracy in which its epistemic success 
is a product of its ability to take advantage of the epistemic diversity of 
individuals.” See Elizabeth Anderson, “The Epistemology of Democracy,” in 
Episteme: A Journal of Social Epistemology 3:1-2 (2006), 11. In the final section of 
this chapter, I will expand upon what equitable discourse would like using our 
running example of Casey and Landry. 
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motivated reasoning when deliberating about political issues and the perpetuation of 
social injustices, such as racism. Stanley focuses on instances where language 
associated with democracy and autonomy are used in a manner that conceals a 
thoroughly undemocratic reality of political and economic inequality. A running 
example Stanley employs in his discussion concerns characterizations of welfare and 
blacks in America. There are Americans that describe the United States as a 
democracy with equality of opportunity and as a meritocracy, where intelligence, 
skill, and hard work primarily determine an individual’s economic success. It is not 
uncommon for Americans who describe America in this manner to then explain the 
existence of welfare recipients as people who choose not to work hard and take 
advantage of opportunities. These people’s lack of success is the result of laziness, 
and their inferior status within the social hierarchy is a result of their actions, and 
thus, their social position is just.36  
Over the past several decades, through public and private political discussions 
and the media, this view of welfare recipients has been repeatedly associated with 
blacks to the point that now in our public discourse it is not uncommon for the term 
“welfare” to connote a lazy black person for many Americans. For example, the 
stereotype of the Cadillac driving welfare queen is still active in our political 
imagination. We have internalized such stereotypes in our political thinking to the 
point that even when confronted with factual counterevidence that many welfare 
                                                 
36 Jason Stanley, How Propaganda Works (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
2015), 156-158. 
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recipients are white, and many welfare recipients are victims of economic 
circumstances beyond their control, this association of “welfare” with blacks and 
laziness nonetheless persists in our society. As such, democratic ideals attached to a 
false racial stereotype help to perpetuate and normalize the political and economic 
marginalization of blacks.37      
One thing that stands out for Stanley in this example is how this political 
belief about welfare and blacks often resists revision in light of evidence proving that 
it is false. To frame this concern with respect to the motivated reasoning literature 
previously discussed, we can say that people holding this belief may be motivated by 
accuracy, but another competing motivation wins out when they are processing 
information related to this belief. As it is often privileged folks that hold such a belief 
about welfare, the motivation guiding political cognition here is likely the 
justification and legitimization of their privilege. As Stanley contends, “Because our 
ideologies are guided by a desire to retain a sense of normalcy, especially when 
normalcy is pleasant, they characteristically lead to beliefs that are connected to one’s 
positive self-image.”38 Believing welfare recipients are “lazy blacks” (as opposed to 
believing they are the victims of economic inequality) can justify the economic 
advantages enjoyed by privileged folks as legitimate (as opposed to believing their 
advantages are a result of economic inequality). The probable engagement in 
motivated reasoning in this instance is ethically problematic because such political 
                                                 
37 Stanley, How Propaganda Works, 158-163.  38 Stanley, 184. 
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beliefs help to maintain racial inequalities, and thus undermine an accurate public 
discourse that fairly represents blacks.39 It would be rather challenging (if not 
impossible) to deliberate about welfare in our society in a racially inclusive manner if 
many of us implicitly reason in a racist manner about welfare.40  
Stanley’s central explanation for political beliefs that resist rational revision is 
that such beliefs are often connected to our social identity. Stanley illuminates the 
problematic nature of ideology and social identity in a manner that parallels our 
preceding discussion of motivated reasoning:  
One main source of the unrevisability of certain beliefs is that they are 
connected to social practices. The beliefs are ones that I need to have to 
remain in those practices. Following Dan Kahan, I will argue that one central 
source of ideological beliefs is our social identities. We value our social 
identities. Social identities are constituted by the practices and habits in which 
we engage; those we engage with are our community. We must at least act as 
if certain propositions are true in order to engage in those practices. To 
abandon those beliefs is to abandon certain practices and habits that constitute 
our social identity. To abandon these beliefs is therefore to abandon one’s 
community, to leave everyone with whom you identify behind.41 
Think back to when we discussed why Casey and Landry would be hesitant to hold a 
belief about global climate change that challenges the prevailing belief in their 
                                                 
39 Stanley, How Propaganda Works, 178-181. 
40 It might not be evident why Stanley’s emphasis is primarily about language. In 
examining propaganda as problematic for a democracy, a central topic is how 
language employed in propaganda undermines productive deliberation in our 
democracy. In this case, the racist social meaning that has come to be associated with 
the term “welfare” undermines productive deliberation about our welfare system and 
racial inequality. Such racist social meanings in effect become obstacles to the 
realization of democratic ideals of inclusion and equality. For more, see Chapter 4, 
“Language as a Mechanism of Control” in How Propaganda Works.    
41 Stanley, 185-186. 
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respective social spheres.42 Stanley’s explanation captures well the difficultly Casey 
and Landry would face if their beliefs about global climate change were to be revised 
in light of the evidence. For Casey to successfully engage with their community, they 
must act as if global climate change is not real, and for Landry to successfully engage 
with their community, they must act as if global climate change is real. It could be 
detrimental to their self-interest to revise such beliefs about global climate change, as 
it could lead them to become disengaged from their community that is central to their 
social identity.   
For Stanley, political beliefs that resist revision are not in themselves 
necessarily beyond rational consideration. We may perhaps retrospectively catch 
ourselves having reasoned or acted based on such beliefs. Nonetheless, merely 
recognizing them after the fact is insufficient to change how those beliefs shape our 
intuitive reasoning and guide our judgments in public discourse in real-time. In real-
time, such ethically harmful ideological beliefs can be habituated implicit 
assumptions, a result of acculturation in a society with structural injustice, and as a 
function of our identity are integral to how we understand ourselves and relate to 
others in the world.43 In other words, such reasoning tendencies are often beyond our 
awareness in real-time,44 and we do not easily detect our engagement in them. Any 
                                                 
42 See Chapter 1, pgs. 13-14. 
43 Stanley, How Propaganda Works, 197. 
44 With the term real-time concerning our cognition, I mean its standard definition: 
the actual time during which one’s political cognition takes place. At the actual 
moment that we are forming a judgment when engaged in political discourse, it is 
challenging to be aware of the psychological mechanisms influencing our reasoning, 
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practical response aimed at reducing our susceptibility must keep in mind this feature 
of an engagement in biased political cognition.   
While we all have political beliefs that are connected to our social identity and 
the community we are rooted in, this connection alone does not make those political 
beliefs inherently problematic for ensuring a public discourse that is fair and 
responsive to all participants. Instead, such beliefs become problematic if they 
prevent us from perceiving significant parts of social reality (such as the oppression 
of marginalized groups).45 Our inability to perceive social reality leads to a further 
problem. Stanley contends that adherence to self-serving political beliefs “becomes 
democratically problematic when it affects political judgment about policies that 
might address the injustices” perpetuated by self-serving political beliefs.46  
Stanley arouses concern over these issues by discussing them in terms of 
legitimizing myths and identity-protective cognition, both of which can be regarded 
as manifestations of motivated reasoning. Legitimizing myths are social expectations 
that serve as the “…means by which an ascendant group assigns to themselves 
positive social value while representing others as justifiably possessing lower 
standing. Without legitimizing myths, hierarchy is merely stratification. With 
legitimizing myths, hierarchy becomes grounded in superiority and inferiority and 
formal distinctions become laden with norms.”47 These social expectations, which are 
                                                 
as some of them operate automatically without our awareness, such as motivated 
reasoning.   
45 Stanley, How Propaganda Works, 182, 202.  
46 Stanley, 182. 
47 Stanley, 195. 
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familiarly known to us as stereotypes, frame our understanding of the world and our 
experiences in it. They render the world to be a seemingly well-ordered, knowable, 
dependable, and comfortable place. As such, attacks on our legitimizing myths—
counterevidence that reveals the gaps between our democratic ideals and our 
undemocratic reality—feel like an attack on the foundations of the world and our life. 
Nonetheless, by avoiding the pain and discomfort of disillusionment that would come 
from revising our political beliefs that aid in perpetuating social injustice, we 
contribute to preserving a desirable situation for privileged groups of people.48 In 
other words, for those in privileged groups, maintaining their social identity comes at 
the expense of disregarding the social justice concerns faced by underprivileged 
groups.  
The need to protect ourselves from perceived attack is also involved in 
another manifestation of motivated reasoning known as identity-protective cognition. 
Here Stanley cites Kahan: “Identity-protective cognition is motivated reasoning with 
the goal of ‘affirming one’s membership in an important reference group.’”49 While 
Stanley disagrees with Kahan’s assertion that all cases of motivated political 
reasoning can be explained by identity-protective cognition, Stanley nonetheless 
believes that it is clear that deep attachment to our social identity has a profound 
influence on the ideologies that inform our political beliefs and dispositions. This fact 
in itself is not problematic; instead, what is problematic is holding ideological beliefs 
                                                 
48 Stanley, How Propaganda Works, 199. 
49 Stanley, 230.  
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that unjustifiably normalize the exclusion and oppression of those with ideologies that 
differ from our own.  
Let us illustrate these points by considering them with respect to Casey and 
Landry. Let us imagine that Casey is a petroleum geologist employed by an oil 
company and living in a city whose economy is primarily supported by the extraction 
of oil. Additionally, a clear majority of the folks in Casey’s community deny the 
existence of global climate change and strongly disagree with global climate change 
believers that advocate for policies that will lead to a drastic reduction of oil 
production. When engaged in public discourse, Casey’s reasoning is not explicitly 
partial to their social identity. Instead, they articulate reasons that are not explicitly 
related to their social identity by citing evidence that disputes the existence of global 
climate change.50  
                                                 
50 The framing of this hypothetical is not entirely speculative on my part. According 
to science literacy researchers Gale Sinatra, Dorothe Kienhues, and Barbara Hofer, 
“A sizable body of literature has shown that having a stake in the outcome, self-
interest, personal relevance, ego-involvement, or what is more broadly called “vested 
interest,” motivates information processing. The pattern over many studies that 
explore variations of these constructs indicates that the presence of 
‘meaningful personal consequences’ related to the issue significantly increases the 
predictive relationship between attitudes and behaviors. Not surprisingly, when 
individuals perceive a direct personal consequence of supporting or not supporting a 
policy, they tend to behave in a manner consistent with those consequences. To 
consider how this influences perceptions of science, individuals whose livelihood 
depends on oil production would be considered to have a vested interest in climate 
policy that influences the industry and are expected to be less likely to support a 
policy they perceive as unfavorable to their livelihood.” See “Addressing Challenges 
to Public Understanding of Science: Epistemic Cognition, Motivated Reasoning, and 
Conceptual Change,” Educational Psychologist 49, no. 2 (2014): 123-138. 
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Nonetheless, given that Casey’s way of life and community’s survival 
depends on oil production, it is plausible that Casey, even though they might not be 
aware of doing so, deliberates about global climate change in a manner where the 
motivation to protecting these aspects of their identity wins out over the motivation to 
be accurate. At the same time, we can see how Casey coming to believe in the 
existence of global climate change would bring about pain and discomfort for it 
challenges integral aspects of their identity. Moreover, publicly voicing such a belief 
could threaten their status within their community: how would Casey reconcile 
believing in the existence of global climate change with their career choice? How 
would Casey retain their emotional support network if they come to believe that oil 
production should be severely curtailed? These would be gut-wrenching questions to 
answer, and it is plausible that avoiding such painful questions unknowingly guides 
Casey’s reasoning concerning their beliefs about global climate change.    
At the same time, let us imagine that Landry’s family lives in a coastal town 
and has lived there for several generations, and this town’s residents are projected to 
be dislocated by rising sea levels in the future. Most people in Landry’s community 
believe that global climate change is real and is the reason their community will 
eventually be displaced. As such, most of the town’s residents actively favor enacting 
policies that reduce fossil fuel production in the hopes of minimizing global climate 
change’s effects on their community and other communities expected to be displaced 
by rising sea levels in the future. When engaged in public discourse with Casey, 
Landry does not provide reasons that are explicitly motivated by protecting their 
 54 
 
identity when arguing for the existence of global climate change. Rather, Landry 
provides reasons that make use of evidence from studies conducted by climatologists. 
Nonetheless, given that global climate change threatens Landry’s family and 
community’s survival, it is plausible that Landry, even though they might not be 
aware of doing so, deliberates about global climate change in a manner where the 
motivation to protect these aspects related to their identity wins out over the 
motivation to be accurate. Like Casey, Landry revising their belief about global 
climate change could similarly challenge their identity and status within their 
community: if Landry were to come to believe that global climate change is not real, 
then how is Landry to maintain their emotional support network, especially when all 
of Landry’s meaningful connections believe global climate change will devastate 
their community? This similarly would be a gut-wrenching question to answer, and it 
is plausible that avoiding such a painful question unknowingly guides Casey’s 
reasoning concerning their beliefs about global climate change.     
Despite Casey and Landry’s intentions to deliberate with one another about 
global climate change in a manner that is fair to each other’s perspective, it is 
plausible that each face, without their awareness, the pressure to reason in ways that 
are not fair to each other’s perspective. Also, when they do so, such bias preserves 
their identity and status within the communities they are rooted in. While this self-
interested reasoning is understandable, it is nonetheless problematic: If each is 
primarily motivated by protecting their own social identities, how are Casey and 
Landry to arrive at a decision that fairly represents each other’s perspective and is 
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inclusive of both their self-interests? Moreover, if what is happening in this example 
for Casey and Landry can be extrapolated to some of the deep disagreements that 
persist when deliberating about many of the pressing political issues that face our 
society, how can our democracy flourish? Hopefully, it is now evident that we cannot 
expect a democracy to flourish under such conditions, and that we should aim to 
reduce our susceptibility to engage in biased political cognition.51           
In this account of ideologically motivated reasoning, the importance of social 
conditions and pressures that maintain our susceptibility to engage in motivated 
reasoning comes into clear focus: our vital social relationships can unknowingly 
encourage our susceptibility to being motivated by ideological commitments that 
maintain our membership in and loyalty to our social groups, and discourage, albeit 
not intentionally, our being primarily motivated by accuracy and the common good. If 
indispensable to our susceptibility to engage in biased political cognition is our self-
interested need to maintain our vital social relationships (our emotional support 
network), then this aspect of biased political cognition should push us to think more 
deeply about the nature of our significant social relationships. In particular, we should 
wonder what kinds of social relationships would be needed to encourage us to be 
more motivated by accuracy and the common good and help to discourage us from 
being motivated by ideological commitments and partisan interests. The relevance of 
                                                 
51 This point is made mainly for the benefit of a skeptical reader that might not regard 
biased political cognition to be as pernicious to a flourishing democracy as I believe it 
to be. I hope that most readers could agree on this point and are looking forward to 
the forthcoming discussion on how to reduce our susceptibility to engage in biased 
political cognition.  
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this suggestion will become clear later when I highlight an oversight in Stanley’s 
proposal for reducing our susceptibility to engage in biased political cognition and 
propose close friendship as the social context needed to encourage our being 
motivated by fairness, accuracy, and the common good. 
   
Recent Proposals for Mitigating Our Engagement in Biased Political Cognition 
Beyond explaining various manifestations of biased political cognition that 
hinder a flourishing democracy, there are proposals for how a democratic society 
should respond to evidence of its participants’ susceptibility to engage in biased 
political cognition. We will consider proposals offered by Jason Stanley and Joshua 
Greene. Having characterized instances of us engaging in biased political cognition as 
undermining an equitable, cooperative public discourse, in response, both Stanley and 
Green articulate theoretical ideals for fostering a public discourse indicative of a 
flourishing democracy. These theoretical ideals provide clear goals and appropriate 
standards to aim for as we seek to mitigate our susceptibility to engage in biased 
political cognition. These ideals provide a benchmark for assessing our success and 
failure to reduce our susceptibility and promote an equitable, cooperative public 
discourse.  
While Stanley and Greene articulate ideals to strive for in practice, neither of 
them articulates the practical means or strategies for achieving their ideals in practice. 
In other words, if Stanley and Greene were medical doctors, then we could say that 
they have provided us with a sensible diagnosis of our illness and have provided us a 
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standard of health, but they have not explained what we would need to do to achieve 
that healthy state. Concerning the ideals they articulate, we could still ask, “How do 
we successfully practice such ideals in real-time while participating in public 
deliberation?” Moreover, we could ask, “What social conditions or relationships are 
conducive to our attainment of such ideals in practice?” This question is significant, 
as it has been noted that our current social relationships are ones that can support our 
susceptibility to engage in biased political cognition. As such, Stanley and Greene are 
useful to our discussion since they help us to understand what ideals we need to aim 
for in seeking to reduce our susceptibility, but the practical means for achieving these 
ideals and the social conditions that facilitate their achievement remain open 
questions in need of attention. Before turning to these pertinent questions in the final 
two chapters, let us acquire a sense of the ideals we should strive for in political 
deliberation in public discourse and a more precise sense of the limitations to their 
formulations.  
 
Standards of Impartiality  
In How Propaganda Works, Jason Stanley regards motivated reasoning about 
politics (in particular, its close connection to our identity), as a failure to be impartial 
in our reasoning about politics. As such, he proposes standards of impartiality for 
deliberation in political forums.52 For Stanley, political forums include not only 
formal political discussions within the government, universities, or the media, but 
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everyday conversations about politics between participants in a democracy.53 These 
standards of impartiality are theoretical rationality, practical rationality, and 
reasonableness.54 As we discuss each standard, we will raise concerns about 
achieving each standard in practice.  
For expressions of political beliefs to meet the standard of theoretical 
rationality, they must be “legitimately justified claims (ones ‘backed up by evidence’) 
that contribute to the rational resolution of the debate.”55 As an example, Stanley 
considers deliberation over whether or not to invade Iraq was the right decision. A 
belief contributing to such a discussion would meet the requirement of theoretical 
rationality if it were “justified and provided evidence for or against the wisdom of 
invading Iraq.”56 Additionally, theoretical rationality is not merely met by providing 
rational contributions to a debate, but such beliefs must also be rational contributions 
that appeal to our rational faculties. Instances where a rational contribution appeals to 
nonrational faculties (such as our passions) tend to end rational debate on a topic. 
Here, Stanley has in mind polemic rhetoric, which often uses rational claims to 
purposefully evoke strong emotional responses and thus effectively end rational 
deliberation between the present deliberating parties. 
Concerning the reduction of our susceptibility to engage in motivated 
reasoning, this standard is of little aid in practice, as engagement in motivated 
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reasoning does not always violate Stanley’s conception of theoretical rationality. 
When engaged in motivated reasoning, we often do provide claims backed up by 
evidence that contribute to the rational resolution of the debate, and we do so in a 
manner that appeals to the rational faculties of those with whom we are engaged in 
public discourse. To understand this point, it is helpful to recall Kunda’s account of 
motivated reasoning from the previous chapter57: “people motivated to arrive at a 
particular conclusion attempt to be rational and construct a justification of their 
desired conclusion that would persuade a dispassionate observer. They draw the 
desired conclusion only if they can muster up the evidence necessary to support it.”58 
Engagement in motivated reasoning entails rational justification by us mustering up 
necessary evidence and appeals to rational faculties by us aiming to persuade a 
dispassionate observer. Thus, exhorting us to express political beliefs that meet the 
standard of theoretical rationality does not necessarily reduce our susceptibility to 
engage in motivated reasoning.  
Stanley’s account could overcome this objection if he means something more 
nuanced than is immediately evident by the term “legitimately” when he writes 
“legitimately justified claims.” We could grant that even though when engaged in 
motivated reasoning our claims are backed up by evidence and appeal to rational 
faculties, our claims are not legitimately justified if directional goals related to our 
social identity and ideological commitments have significantly guided the reasoning 
                                                 
57 See pages 14-18 for the details of Kunda’s account of motivated reasoning. 
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for them, notably if such directional goals inhibited our ability to be impartial. If this 
is the case, then legitimacy here would involve more than mere rational justification 
and appeal to rational faculties. I think it could be fair to assume that this might be the 
case given Stanley’s explanation of the next standard of impartiality, practical 
rationality. 
Stanley asserts that impartiality requires that political deliberation should be 
“guided by reasons that bear on whether or not a particular policy is for the common 
good, or in the public interest.”59 In other words, the common good and the public 
interest should be primary directional goals guiding political cognition in public 
discourse. Satisfying this norm requires practical rationality, a form of means-end 
reasoning where, given a goal, we consider the most rational way to achieve said 
goal, in light of our beliefs.60 As stated, such reasoning does not rule out expressions 
of self-interest in public discourse. To ensure impartiality in such a process, given it 
would be near impossible to completely remove our self-interest from our reasoning 
process, Stanley proposes that expressions of self-interest only be regarded as 
“relevant insofar as they bear on reasons that are compelling to all. The impartialist 
conception of public reason forces the elimination of any claim that has its source in 
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60 Though Stanley does not explicitly mention the following point in his account, it 
can be assumed from the context of where this idea is explained that means-end 
reasoning also requires reasoning about ends, in particular, ends that are in the 
common interest. Relatedly, Stanley never specifies what is meant by rational in this 
point, though in preceding passages rational contributions to public discourse are 
discussed as being claims that are backed up by evidence. Thus, practical rationality 
entails the consideration of proposals that are supported by evidence.  
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self-interest that does not contribute to impartial reasons.”61 This exclusion is 
significant because claims that are self-interested, but do not contribute to impartial 
reasons, are often the type of claims used by particular groups in illegitimate attempts 
to gain political power. As an example, Stanley asks us to imagine a senator seeking 
to receive a campaign contribution from an oil company and thus gives a speech 
endorsing a piece of legislation that will benefit that oil company. For those of us not 
benefiting from the campaign donation, the reasons provided by the senator in their 
speech are ones coming from their self-interest in a way that fails to meet the 
impartialist norm of public reason; they are reasons that could not be compelling to us 
because we are not the ones to benefit from the campaign contribution.62     
For Stanley, the ability to provide reasons compelling to all involves 
supplying reasons that would be intelligible from the position of anyone in society. 
The reasoning must be inclusive of the many different ideologies (religious, cultural, 
and political) that one finds in a pluralistic society as our own. To this end, Stanley 
invokes Rawls’ conception of reasonableness. For Rawls, we are reasonable when, 
among other participants in public discourse, we are ready to propose principles and 
standards as fair terms of cooperation and to abide by them willingly, given the 
assurance that others will likewise do so. These are terms we regard as reasonable for 
everyone to accept and therefore as justifiable to all of us. At the same time, all of us 
are ready to discuss the fair terms that others propose.63 This standard reflects a 
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commitment to cooperation, negotiation, and empathizing with those whose beliefs 
and worldviews are different from our own.  
Regarding reducing our susceptibility to engage in motivated reasoning, 
practical rationality and reasonableness are practically useful standards. They focus 
on a central feature of motivated reasoning that corrodes equitable, cooperative public 
discourse: our tendency to be motivated by directional goals related to our social 
identity and ideological commitments in a manner that significantly inhibits our 
ability to be impartial. These standards are practically useful in that they do not 
expect us to sanitize ourselves of political cognition related to the interest we have in 
conveying our membership in and loyalty to affinity groups central to our well-being. 
As social creatures that derive significant meaning from our social connections, it 
would be impractical to expect us to rid ourselves of all political cognition influenced 
by our social identity. Thus, it is more feasible to encourage us to examine the 
influence of our social identity on our political cognition and to frame our 
contributions to public discourse stemming from our social nature in a manner that 
provides reasons that would be intelligible to all participants and that has a bearing on 
the common good.  
Let us apply these points to our scenario with Casey and Landry. Practical 
rationality and reasonableness do not require their participation in public discourse 
about global climate change to be sanitized of expressions of their self-interested 
motivation to convey membership in and loyalty to their community. Casey is not 
expected to deliberate with Landry in a way where their reasoning is uninfluenced by 
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their self-interested motivation to protect the economic viability of their community 
supported by oil production. Similarly, Landry is not expected to deliberate with 
Casey in a way where their reasoning is uninfluenced by their self-interested 
motivation to protect their community from the predicted devastation of global 
climate change. Instead, both Casey and Landry should actively seek to uncover when 
this motivation of their political cognition has a bearing on their contributions to 
deliberations on global climate change. More importantly, they are to be sure to frame 
their contributions in a manner that has a bearing on the public interest and promoting 
the common good.  
For example, if Landry was to express their political belief about global 
climate change’s existence as not just being based on scientific evidence, but arising 
out of concern for the many communities across the United States that will be 
displaced by rising sea levels and extreme weather events, then such a reason could 
be seen by Casey as intelligible and having a bearing on the common good. When 
framed in this manner, it is not just Landry’s community that has a stake in this issue, 
but many other communities as well.  
Similarly, Casey’s concerns about their community being economically 
devastated by a severe reduction of fossil fuel emissions could be framed as a public 
interest concern for the viability and stability of all the folks whose livelihood and 
communities are supported by the fossil fuel industry. Casey could further insist that 
any policy decision regarding global climate change needs to account for those 
economically displaced by a drastic reduction in fossil fuel consumption. Likewise, 
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Landry can insist that any policy decision needs to fairly account for those whose 
communities will be displaced by the changing climate. In this manner, both Casey 
and Landry account for the possible engagement in motivated reasoning and do so in 
a way that is more conducive to equitable, cooperative public discourse.64   
Nonetheless, there remains an important question: even if Casey and Landry 
successfully frame their political beliefs about global climate change as having 
reasons that bear on the common good and the public interest, how do Casey and 
Landry deliberate with one another in a manner that is fair to one another? How do 
they come to understand each other’s perspective as intelligible and legitimate? In 
other words, how does Casey decide on policy on global climate change in a manner 
that is fair to Landry’s perspective? Similarly, how does Landry decide on policy on 
global climate change in a manner that is fair to Casey’s perspective?  
Relatedly, what sort of social context for political deliberation is needed to 
facilitate Casey and Landry deeply understanding one another’s perspective to such a 
degree that they can genuinely be inclusive of one another’s perspective in their 
reasoning about policy decisions regarding global climate change? Answers to these 
questions cannot be found in Stanley’s conception of impartiality, and in all fairness, 
exceed the scope of Stanley’s examination. Nonetheless, it is a relevant practical 
consideration for reducing our susceptibility to engage in biased political cognition. It 
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achieving a more equitable, cooperative public discourse and should not be mistaken 
as a full account of how to achieve an equitable, cooperative public discourse; more 
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is these sorts of questions that underlie my argument in the next chapter that the 
intimacy of close friendship should be regarded as an important social context for 
cultivating impartiality in our reasoning about perspectives that differ from our own.     
If we share similar commitments with Stanley, we should find ourselves 
receptive to his analysis of biased political cognition and the goal of impartiality he 
sets forth. We as well should share a similar sense of urgency to achieve his proposed 
ideals. To achieve such ideals, we should find it essential to give serious attention to 
how to move from theory to practice, to strategizing how to enact these ideals in our 
contributions to public discourse. While Stanley himself does not give sustained 
attention to this concern, it is worth elaborating on a couple of useful suggestions that 
Stanley offers us, as they can help with providing some starting points for further 
consideration.  
The first suggestion relates to systematic openness. Stanley contends,  
In the face of the complexities we have discussed, perhaps a reasonable way 
to adhere to ideal deliberative norms, for example, the norm of objectivity, 
may be to adopt systematic openness to the possibility that one has been 
unknowingly swayed by bias. If so, the mark of a democratic society is one in 
which participants in debates regularly check themselves for bias, and subject 
their own beliefs and unthinking use of language to the same critical scrutiny 
as they do the beliefs and utterances of others.65 
This requirement of systematic openness should strike us as necessary, especially 
when considered regarding the introspection illusion. When we fall prey to the 
introspective illusion, we are partial to our thinking in a way that makes us 
overconfident about our ability to be free from bias and less confident that others 
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could be similarly impartial. Stanley’s suggestion presses us to be equally vigilant 
and mindful of our and others’ susceptibility to engage in biased political cognition.  
Nevertheless, this proposal needs further elaboration concerning how to 
achieve it in practice. Specifically, given that the psychological phenomena involved 
in biased political cognition can occur without awareness when participating in public 
discourse, we can ask, “How do we adopt systematic openness on an intuitive level? 
How can systematic openness become more of an automatic tendency in our 
reasoning process when participating in public political deliberation?” Unfortunately, 
Stanley offers this excellent suggestion at the end of the chapter, and thus, there was 
not enough room to expound on this sort of practical consideration. Nonetheless, 
systematic openness is a crucial element of a strategy that aims at reducing our 
susceptibility to engage in motivated reasoning. This point serves as part of my 
motivation for arguing for the necessity of close friendship as a social context for 
aiding us in habituating impartiality, such that it can become an automatic tendency in 
our political cognition when participating in public discourse.  
Of further interest, there is a point in the above quote that relates to a concern 
raised in the previous chapter. As mentioned before, one response to the 
psychological literature is for a well-meaning, intelligent person to sincerely claim 
they are less susceptible to engaging in motivated reasoning and thus do not feel 
compelled to seek to reduce their susceptibility. Though, for Stanley, it does seem 
that such a person should still be concerned. As he says above, in a democratic 
society, each of us must be just as critical in examining our own beliefs for bias as we 
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are of the beliefs of others. In some sense, a flourishing democracy requires we 
equally hold ourselves to the same expectations that we hold others.      
Let us turn to a second suggestion Stanley offers about the efficacy of a 
psychological strategy targeting individual beliefs of a person on a sort of case-by-
case basis. Stanley argues that because particular ideological beliefs are linked to 
social identities and ideologies that are shared by groups of people, it would be 
ineffective to focus on changing the individual beliefs of a person. Such a scope is too 
narrow, and thus a broader scope of what needs to be changed is required. As Stanley 
argues,  
I am skeptical about the search for a psychological strategy individuals can 
use to “protect themselves” from problematic ideological belief on a case-by-
case basis. The distinctive feature of ideological belief often arises from being 
embedded in a practice together with people like you, your friends, and 
family. What is needed to eliminate problematic ideological belief is to 
change the practice of a large group of people simultaneously over time, to 
alter a social identity people share. It would be hard to see how this would 
work by assigning to individuals individual psychological curatives to 
employ.66  
In light of how our susceptibility to engage in biased political cognition in 
public discourse is strongly connected to our social identities that are shaped by 
systemic features of our culture, it would not make sense for our strategy to reduce 
our susceptibility to be merely psychologically focused on individual beliefs. In some 
sense, transformation at the level of individuals themselves and their social 
relationships is needed. This as well motivates my proposal of close friendship in the 
coming chapters, as thinking about friendship pushes us not to be narrowly focused 
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on a particular action or belief, but more broadly on our habits of mind and our social 
relationships influencing our habits of mind. In other words, a consideration of close 
friendship as an ameliorative social context aims at examining and transforming the 
social dimensions that facilitate our engagement in biased political cognition.   
 
System 1, System 2, and Utilitarianism  
Similar to Stanley, in Moral Tribes, Joshua Greene explains the pernicious 
effects of biased political cognition on public discourse and offers ideals that aim to 
mitigate such effects. Greene’s account of our political cognition centers on the 
distinction between System 1 and System 2 cognition that we encountered in the 
previous chapter. In his explanation of this distinction, he uses a camera metaphor: 
System 1 is called automatic settings, and System 2 is called manual mode. As 
Greene explains,  
The moral brain’s automatic settings are the moral emotions… the gut level 
instincts that enable cooperation within personal relationships and small 
groups. Manual mode, in contrast, is a general capacity for practical reasoning 
that can be used to solve moral problems, as well as other practical 
problems…moral thinking is shaped by both emotion and reason and how this 
dual process [works] reflects the general structure of the human mind.67 
Along with the distinction between System 1 and 2, a central element of 
Greene’s analysis is his assertion that there are two types of contexts in which public 
political deliberation occurs: (1) between individuals belonging to the same cultural, 
political, social, and/or religious group and (2) between different cultural, political, 
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social, religious groups. The inability to achieve cooperation and resolution in the 
first context he terms the tragedy of the commons, and the inability to achieve 
cooperation and resolution in the second context he calls the tragedy of commonsense 
morality.68 Greene believes the automatic settings (System 1 moral cognition) is an 
evolutionary adaptation that allows for cooperation between individuals to ensure the 
survival of the group; automatic settings allow for us to resolve the tragedy of the 
commons. Further, as an evolutionary adaptation, we find ourselves predisposed to 
using System 1 cognitive processes in forming political beliefs.69   
While intuitive moral thinking can achieve cooperation within a group, such 
thinking undermines cooperation between groups; intuitive moral thinking contributes 
to the tragedy of commonsense morality. The main reason for this is that groups 
exhibit incompatible intuitive moralities that lead to incommensurable political 
judgments and thus significantly inhibit the chances of achieving cooperation and 
resolution.70 Considering these points concerning Casey and Landry, we can better 
understand why consensus regarding political beliefs about global climate change 
exists within Casey and Landry’s respective communities, but deep disagreement 
arises in deliberation between Casey and Landry. The conservative ideology that 
pervades Casey’s community can be regarded as the intuitive political thought among 
its members and serves as a strong basis of cooperation for deliberation about global 
climate change. Similarly, liberal ideology in Landry’s community can be regarded as 
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the intuitive political thought among its members and serves as a strong basis of 
cooperation for deliberation about global climate change. When Casey and Landry 
deliberate about global climate change, we see the clash between two incompatible 
intuitive belief systems and incommensurable political judgments, as Landry 
decidedly affirms the existence of global climate change and Casey vehemently 
denies its existence.           
 Since we cannot rely on our automatic settings when forming political 
judgments as we deliberate with members of different groups than our own, Greene 
believes we need to switch into manual mode.71 Once in manual mode, our political 
reasoning needs to be guided by what he calls a metamorality: “…a moral system that 
can resolve disagreements among groups with different moral ideals…”72 For such a 
moral system to effectively provide the framework for deliberation and cooperation 
between groups, the moral system must be based on core values that all groups could 
agree upon.  
Greene believes that utilitarianism contains elements of the metamorality we 
need. He argues that utilitarianism contains two core values whose moral significance 
could be agreed upon by anyone when thinking in manual mode: impartiality and the 
capacity for positive and negative experiences. Greene concludes,  
What we’ve established, first, is that if all else is equal, we prefer more 
happiness to less happiness, not only for ourselves but for others. Secondly, 
we’ve established that, when it comes to others, we care not only about the 
amount of happiness within individuals but also the number of individuals 
affected. And finally, we’ve established that we care about the sum happiness 
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across individuals, taking into account both the amount of happiness for each 
person and the number of people affected. If all else is equal, we prefer to 
increase the total amount of happiness across people.73  
Akin to Stanley, a sense of impartiality that takes the interests of others to be of equal 
concern to our interests is central to ensuring cooperative, equitable deliberation. 
Another similarity to Stanley’s proposal is the uncertainty of how to achieve such a 
goal in practice. We should be skeptical of the feasibility of everyone agreeing to a 
utilitarian framework for deliberating contentious political issues. For example, we 
could easily imagine that defining happiness (even minimally defined as “positive 
experience”) could prove just as divisive as the political issues that we would be 
seeking to achieve cooperation on through using a utilitarian framework.74  
 Nonetheless, given our discussion thus far, we can agree with Greene that 
impartiality and regard for the quality of everyone’s life should be guiding ideals for 
public discourse in a flourishing democracy. However, I have a more foundational 
concern about Greene’s proposal that goes back to the psychological assumptions 
underlying the distinction between automatic settings (intuition) and manual mode 
(deliberate reasoning). If we are predisposed to making political judgments based on 
intuition and habituated dispositions and beliefs, how do we switch from automatic 
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74 For example, we could imagine religious folks having a conception of happiness 
that secular folks would find disagreeable. If a group of conservative Christians 
believed happiness in a utilitarian framework entailed maximizing to the greatest 
extent social interactions that accorded with biblical decrees, then we could easily 
imagine that secular humanists would not only find such a conception of happiness 
disagreeable, but offensive. It would not be hard to imagine such a debate proving to 
be as intractable as the abortion debate proves to be between these two groups. 
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settings to manual mode in real-time? When deliberating with one another about 
global climate change, how do Casey and Landry switch to manual mode, given they 
are disposed to forming judgments influenced by their political ideologies and loyalty 
to their communities? Remember, our goal is to find ways of diminishing our 
susceptibility to engage in biased political cognition that could be feasibly practiced 
by us while engaged in public deliberation about contentious political issues. 
 In response, Greene asserts, “we can also use our manual mode to override 
those automatic settings, provided we are aware of the opportunity to do so and 
motivated to take it.”75 This assertion raises points that need further elaboration in 
light of psychological realities that already have been established. In real-time, how 
do we get ourselves to be aware of the need to override our intuitive cognitive 
machinery that is susceptible to engaging in motivated reasoning, especially since the 
use of such machinery tends to occur automatically without our awareness? Further, 
in light of deeply held convictions tied to our social identity, how do we get ourselves 
to be motived to override our automatic settings connected to our social identity and 
go into manual mode to start deliberating within a utilitarian framework? In other 
words, how do we counteract influences tied to our motivation to protect our social 
identity to more reliably reason in terms of accuracy and the common good? My 
assumption here is that deeply held convictions central to our sense of identity are 
something not typically nor easily overcome or overridden in real-time. 
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 As Stanley and Kahan have mentioned, it is not reasonable to expect us to 
abandon our identity or group affiliation. Nor is it reasonable to suddenly expect us, 
having been habituated to conducting ourselves in public discourse based on intuitive 
judgments, to easily recognize the need to switch to manual mode and be motivated 
to do so. These concerns need to be addressed before we can determine if 
utilitarianism would indeed be a fruitful means for achieving cooperation on 
resolving pressing, contentious political issues facing our society.   
However, Greene’s analysis of System 1 cognition does attune us to an 
important practical consideration. If our habituated beliefs and intuitive judgments 
can undermine cooperation with groups of people that are different from us, then it 
seems we should strongly consider changes in our cognitive dispositions that enhance 
our ability to engage in cooperative deliberation with members of social groups 
different from ourselves. Concerning the transformation of our cognitive dispositions, 
we should aim to reduce our reliance on automatic settings, System 1 cognition, and 
become more disposed to switching to manual mode when participating in public 
discourse. Relatedly, we should consider the social context of public discourse, in 
particular, the kinds of social contexts that could enhance deliberation between 
members of different social groups that disagree about politics. Ideally, it should be a 
social context that disincentivizes a reliance on automatic settings and encourages us 
to exhibit impartiality in our reasoning when deliberating with individuals whose 
political judgments disagree with our own. In forthcoming chapters, I will argue that 
impartiality in our political cognition can be more effectively developed in the 
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context of close friendships with people of different social identities and political 
commitments than our own. 
A further concern about Greene’s proposed solution is that, in some sense, it 
seems that Greene believes that when our manual mode overrides the automatic 
settings that somehow the automatic settings no longer affect the political judgments 
that are made in manual mode.76 It is as if we can wholly, or at least to a significant 
degree, override our intuitions, emotions, and habituated patterns of thought to 
engage in utilitarian reasoning purely directed by impartiality. Given the 
psychological literature, it seems such a demand for compartmentalization of our 
psychology is an unreasonable demand. While we exhibit two types of cognitive 
processes, it is not clear that such processes necessarily occur independently of each 
other. It seems that there is an interaction between the two systems. For example, 
beliefs and judgments arrived through deliberate reasoning can, over time, become 
habituated to the point of being intuitive assumptions.  
                                                 
76 For example, let us consider a climate change denier whose reasoning about global 
climate change is influenced by a bias against scientific information. It is not clear 
that merely switching from automatic settings to manual mode would mean that a 
climate change denier’s bias against scientific information is diminished to the degree 
that it no longer influences their thinking about global climate change. This point can 
be elucidated by way of contrast. When operating in automatic settings, let us say 
their bias against scientific information manifests as a hasty rejection of scientific 
information about global climate change. Though, when switching to manual mode, a 
bias against scientific information could still manifest, but instead of a hasty rejection, 
they could give careful attention to the limitations and weaknesses of the evidence 
presented in climate change studies, meanwhile giving significantly less sustained 
attention to the merits and strengths of the evidence presented.  
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To elucidate this point further, let us consider Greene’s assertion that three 
factors shape our automatic settings: genetics, cultural learning, and personal 
experience.77 Given this claim, our failure to be impartial towards others with 
differing intuitions in their political thinking is not necessarily beyond our control. It 
would be beyond our control if we believed this psychological reality was purely 
based on genetics. Setting that consideration aside, let us start with the more plausible 
assumption that there is at least some genetic basis to our tendency to engage in 
biased political cognition that impacts our intuitive judgments, but that cultural 
learning and personal experience have amplified such genetic predispositions. In 
large part, we have acquired intuitive habits of thought that ultimately undermine a 
flourishing democratic public discourse characterized by inclusiveness and 
impartiality. If we entertain this plausible assumption, then it seems there is much we 
can do to reduce our susceptibility to engage in biased political cognition. Through 
transformation at the level of society (cultural learning) and the level of the individual 
and their relationships (personal experience), our intuitive judgments can be shaped in 
ways that are more impartial, attentive to our own self-interested motivation to 
protect our identity, and empathetic to the interests of others. It is attending to 
ourselves and our social relationships that primarily motivates the consideration of 
the transformative potential of close friendship on our political cognition in the 
following chapters.  
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Equitable Public Discourse Between Casey and Landry 
 Much of this chapter has been dedicated to a discussion of the ideals to be 
strived for in public discourse, in particular, impartiality as the proper aim of political 
cognition. As such, we might be wondering how Casey and Landry would proceed if 
they both achieved impartiality. We could ask, “How would their disagreement about 
climate change proceed? Would there ultimately be an agreement?” Considering such 
questions pushes us to think more deeply about what makes for equitable public 
discourse.  
 In considering how their disagreement about climate change would proceed, 
Casey and Landry would be mutually supportive in holding one another accountable 
for adhering to the standards of impartiality in their contributions to public discourse. 
This entails not only being mindful of the standards, but openness to receiving 
feedback from each other concerning whether or not they have adhered to the 
standards. This as well means they have to be willing to offer constructive feedback. 
Constructive in the sense that each does not merely point out how the other failed to 
achieve the standard in question but exhibits charity to their point of view by helping 
them to revise their contribution such that it could achieve the standard in question. In 
the form of constructive feedback, Casey and Landry would have the opportunity to 
address any false beliefs expressed—beliefs failing to adhere to norms of reasoning 
conducive to truth.  
For Casey and Landry to engage in equitable public discourse, they would 
need to be fair to one another in their deliberation of global climate change. 
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Fairness to one another entails being inclusive of each other’s perspective in their 
reasoning behind a mutually agreed-upon policy decision. This means that Casey and 
Landry’s reasoning must be responsive to how global climate change and the 
proposed policy under consideration affects their lives. Their reasoning is inclusive 
when it regards each other’s concerns and interests as voiced by them as equal in 
determining a mutually agreed-upon policy decision. It is through reasoning 
inclusively that their political cognition is more closely guided by the public interest, 
as opposed to their self-interested motivation to maintain their membership in and 
loyalty to their community and political party affiliation.   
Underlying this sense of inclusion is a recognition by Casey and Landry 
that equitable public discourse is responsive to the diverse political perspectives 
found in a pluralistic society. They realize that most of the problems that our 
democracy must solve are complex and have asymmetrically distributed effects on 
individuals according to their geographic location, social class, occupation, 
education, gender, age, race, and so forth. Since individuals are most familiar with 
the effects of problems and policies on themselves and those close to them, 
information about these effects is also asymmetrically distributed. A flourishing 
democracy possesses the ability to pool this asymmetrically distributed 
information about the effects of problems and policies so as to devise solutions 
that are responsive to everyone’s concerns.78 Casey and Landry expressing their 
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concerns and interests to one another facilitates them pooling information about 
the effects of global climate change and proposed policies for addressing it.   
 Through equitable public discourse, there are many paths by which their 
deliberation could arrive at a point of agreement. To provide a sense of the 
possibilities, I will outline three ways here. One way could be that Landry maintains 
their position, while Casey abandons their position by converting to Landry’s position 
or vice versa. One means of arriving at this outcome would be that through the course 
of their deliberation, one of them experiences a significant revelation that leads them 
to conclude their initial position was misguided and is no longer tenable. For 
example, Casey could conclude that their political cognition was not being guided by 
norms conducive to the truth when they were processing the information from climate 
change studies and concluded that global climate change does not exist. However, 
now that Landry has helped them to have their political cognition be motivated by 
accuracy, they now believe that Landry is correct in believing that global climate 
change is real and drastic action must be taken to avert the predicted devastating 
consequences to the environment. 
 A second way that an agreement could be achieved would be that, upon 
deliberation of each other’s position on global climate change, each revises their 
judgment about what collective action ought to take place. The extent of this revision 
is enough to reduce the severity of disagreement, such that they arrive at a mutually 
acceptable, although possibly not preferred solution. Part of what makes for a 
mutually acceptable solution (in the absence of the solution being a preferred one by 
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either Casey and Landry) is that there is a commitment by both to revise the solution 
if it proves ineffective or unforeseen consequences arise. For example, they may 
agree on adopting a policy that sets standards to tax carbon dioxide emissions and 
fossil fuel production and to use the money generated from the taxes to fund 
investment in renewable, sustainable energy sources. While a mutually acceptable 
policy decision, Landry would have preferred legislation that phased out fossil fuels 
altogether, and Casey would have preferred to have no taxes on fossil fuel production. 
If this policy fails to protect the interests of either of their community, they agree to 
revise the policy as needed.    
 A third possibility for reaching an agreement is that neither one of them 
revises their position, but one of them no longer believes it is worthwhile to oppose 
the other publicly, and thus they agree not to oppose the preferred solution of the 
other. We could imagine that Casey believes it is more worthwhile to seek out other 
ways to support the economic viability of their community than publicly opposing 
Landry’s efforts to mitigate the devastating effects of global climate change. 
Nonetheless, Casey privately denies the existence of global climate change. One 
motivation Casey may have for supporting Landry’s position is Landry agrees to 
support policies that would help create other avenues of economic viability for 
Casey’s community when a reduction of fossil fuel consumption and a switch to more 
renewable energy sources displaces them. In this case, agreeing with Landry allows 
for Casey’s self-interest to be accommodated within the solution seeking to be 
representative of both of their interests and concerns. Arriving at any of these types of 
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agreement requires both Casey and Landry to transcend their self-interested 
motivation to express political beliefs that maintain their membership in and loyalty 
to their communities and to be motivated to secure a common good that accounts for 
the concerns and interests of both of their communities.      
 
Conclusion       
 Through delving into the accounts of biased political cognition offered by 
Stanley and Greene, we have examined its corrosive effects on a public discourse that 
aims at equity and cooperation. Stanley’s account of biased political cognition shows 
us how our engagement in biased political cognition can contribute to the 
perpetuation of social injustice. Legitimizing myths and identity-protective cognition 
can lead our reasoning to be partial to ourselves in ways that render us unresponsive 
to the oppression and marginalization of others, notably underprivileged folks that are 
often victims of exploitation and discrimination. Just as well, engagement in biased 
political cognition can impede the revision of our beliefs in the face of evidence 
challenging the accuracy of our beliefs; this is all the more disturbing when it occurs 
concerning beliefs that maintain marginalization and discrimination. Moreover, the 
engagement in biased political cognition can undermine efforts between diverse 
groups to achieve cooperation in working towards the common good concerning 
pressing, contentious matters of public interest.  
To reduce these pernicious effects on our public discourse, we need to 
accomplish a measure of impartiality that aims at ensuring that our collective, public 
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decision-making fairly represents the differing interests of all social groups in our 
society.79 Impartiality entails us countering biases towards our personal preferences 
or the ideological commitments of our social group that we do not often recognize, 
especially when such biases render us less impartial in our consideration of 
preferences and commitments of those who disagree with and differ from us. 
Moreover, Stanley urges us to relate our interests and preferences in a manner that is 
intelligible and responsive to the diverse social groups in our society. Meanwhile, 
through the utilitarian principle, Greene exhorts us to engage in public discourse that 
equally considers the well-being of all involved in deliberation.  
While impartiality is a needed, helpful guiding ethos for our participation in 
public discourse, the social context of public political deliberation needs to be one 
that encourages us to embody that ethos. It would be rather challenging for the 
reasoning in our contributions to public discourse to be better guided by the public 
interest and the common good if our vital social relationships are ones that incentivize 
reasoning that always expresses the political beliefs of those who share a similar 
identity and ideological commitments with us. It should be evident that we should 
look to cultivate the kind of social relationships that are conducive to a flourishing 
democracy, that aid us in impartially reasoning towards the common good. In the next 
chapters, I shall contend that close friendships are the kind of needed social 
relationships that can aid us in reducing our susceptibility to engage in biased 
                                                 
79 For more on the nature of collective, public decision-making see the appendix 
entitled “Considerations for Democratic Public Discourse.” 
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political cognition and help move our public discourse closer to one conducive to a 
flourishing democracy. 
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Chapter 3 – Friendship and Public Political Deliberation 
Introduction 
 
 Our discussion started with an account of biased political cognition, 
specifically psychological mechanisms that can inhibit our ability to achieve an 
accurate consideration of available evidence and fairness to those that disagree with 
us. Next, we examined recent philosophical accounts of biased political cognition that 
underscored its corrosive effect on public discourse and urged impartiality in our 
reasoning. Given that contentious political issues with significant ethical 
ramifications beset our society, we have motivated the need to seek out practical 
means of reducing our susceptibility to engage in biased political cognition. While 
fostering impartiality provides us with a goal to achieve in practice, there remain 
essential considerations in need of exploration: our engagement in motivated 
reasoning and falling prey to the introspection illusion often occurs without our 
explicit awareness, and social relationships tend to support our susceptibility. As 
such, to help counteract these features of biased political cognition, we need to look 
beyond ourselves for assistance. Ideally, the nature of this assistance needs to embody 
a way of relating to people that builds upon the development of impartiality and 
creates an interpersonal context that enhances our cognitive ability to participate in a 
public discourse indicative of a flourishing democracy. In other words, surprising as it 
may sound, we need to cultivate terrific friendships to help us in this endeavor.  
More specifically, we need to cultivate friendships characterized by a depth of 
intimacy and vulnerability whereby our friends possess knowledge of our reasoning 
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tendencies, there exists a reciprocated trust that each other’s best interests motivate 
each of us, and a nonjudgmental openness that permeates discussion of each other’s 
susceptibility to engage in biased political cognition. To better understand how 
friendships characterized by these features can aid in reducing our susceptivity to 
engage in biased political cognition, we will look to philosophical models of 
friendship characterized by such features: Aristotle’s notion of complete friendship in 
the Nicomachean Ethics and Alexander Nehamas’ model of close friendship from On 
Friendship. 
 
Aristotle’s Complete Friendship 
For Aristotle, friendship is necessary for a flourishing existence and leading a 
virtuous life. Early in his discussion of friendship, Aristotle distinguishes between 
three types of friendship: pleasure, utility, and complete friendship. He characterizes 
pleasure and utility friendships as similar to each other, as both are self-regarding 
types of friendship. Aristotle explains,  
Those who love one another for utility love the other not in himself, but only 
in so far as they will obtain some good for themselves from him. The same 
goes for those who love for pleasure; they do not like a witty person because 
of his character, but because they find him pleasing to themselves. So those 
who love for utility are fond of the other because of what is good for 
themselves, and those who love for pleasure because of what is pleasant for 
themselves, not in so far as the person they love is who he is, but in so far as 
he is useful or pleasant.80  
                                                 
80 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, trans. and ed. Roger Crisp (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2000), 146. 
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In these types of friendship, our consideration of the utility or pleasure derived from 
our friend concerns ourselves. With the primary concern being ourselves, our friend 
does not interest us beyond the narrow scope of utility and pleasure. Specifically, the 
character, beliefs, and dispositions of our friend are not of much concern to us. 
Imagine that Casey and Landry are college study buddies who help each other to do 
well on midterms and final exams, but outside of studying together do not interact nor 
give much thought to each other.  
In contrast to the self-regarding nature of utility and pleasure friendships, 
Aristotle considers what he calls a complete friendship. Aristotle contends, 
Complete friendship is that of good people, those who are alike in their virtue: 
they each alike wish good things to each other in so far as they are good, and 
they are good in themselves. Those who wish good things to a friend for his 
own sake are friends most of all, since they are disposed in this way towards 
each other because of what they are, not for any incidental reason.81 
A complete friendship is an other-regarding relationship. Our primary concern is the 
well-being of our friend; we desire to see them flourish. Our friend is not merely a 
means for pleasure or utility but is someone that we love and care for because of who 
they are as a person, specifically their character. In other words, unself-interested 
goodwill is the basis of complete friendship. An expert on ancient philosophy, John 
Cooper describes this aspect of Aristotelian friendship, “Each wishes for him 
whatever is good, for his own sake, and it is mutually known to them that this well-
wishing of this kind is reciprocated. They enjoy one another’s company and are 
                                                 
81 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 147.  
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benefited by it.”82 Friends of this sort engage in shared activities and live their lives 
alongside each other. As such, the intimacy of these relationships allows for friends to 
become quite knowledgeable of each other and to trust each other’s judgment of one 
another. Aristotle believed that the knowledge we gain from a deep intimacy with 
complete friends makes these friends better able to judge our character more 
accurately than ourselves. Here Aristotle is explicit that friends are necessary for 
gaining a more accurate estimate of our character because humans by their nature are 
fallible and vulnerable.83 
With Aristotle’s characterization of complete friendship, we could argue that 
complete friends can help us to detect instances of us engaging in biased political 
cognition more effectively. Since many of us cannot easily notice our cognitive 
processes involved in belief formation, and since the intimacy of friendship allows for 
a complete friend to know how we act and think, a complete friend would be in a 
better position (than ourselves) to notice when we engage in motivated reasoning or 
fall prey to the introspective illusion. A complete friend’s assessment should be taken 
seriously because a complete friend is someone we trust and who has our best interest 
in mind when making such evaluations of our thinking. 
Further, since such a friend has spent enough time with us to know our 
patterns and habits of thought, this friend could not only better detect when we 
                                                 
82 John M. Cooper, “Aristotle on Friendship,” in Essays on Aristotle’s Ethics, ed. 
Amélie Oksenber Rorty (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1980), 308-
309. 
83 Cooper, “Aristotle on Friendship,” 330-331.   
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engage in motivated reasoning, but also could also help bring to our awareness what 
particular goals influence the formation of our political beliefs. Moreover, such a 
friend could help us with strategizing about how to develop more impartial and open-
minded habits of mind and encourage and support us in this endeavor. In agreement 
with this point, in his essay “On Friendship,” Francis Bacon asserts that the continual 
self-awareness and self-examination of people who share their lives as close friends 
provides the context for seeing ourselves in vivid and unexpected ways. This is why 
he deems the communication exhibited in friendship, more than any other, “maketh 
daylight in the understanding, out of darkness and confusion of thoughts.”84 Our 
friends can help illuminate aspects of our thinking that are not immediately aware to 
us. This kind of intervention by complete friends would be more effective at reducing 
our susceptibility to engage in biased political cognition than us seeking to cultivate 
impartiality on our own.  
Looking back at Kahan’s understanding of motivated reasoning, he does not 
explicitly indicate that social relationships in the form of complete friendship are 
needed to ameliorate our engagement in motivated reasoning when participating in 
political deliberation. However, he alludes to the need for such a social connection in 
his comments about how to reduce occurrences of engaging in motivated reasoning:  
What is needed instead are interventions that remove expressive incentives 
individuals face to form perceptions of risk and related facts on grounds 
unconnected to the truth of such beliefs. Extending the analysis of previous 
                                                 
84 Neera Kapur Badhwar, “Introduction: The Nature and Significance of Friendship” 
in Friendship: A Philosophical Reader, ed. Neera Kapur Badhwar (Ithaca, NY: 
Cornell University Press, 1993), 8. 
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papers, this one has suggested that ideologically motivated reasoning is 
expressively rational at the individual level, because it conveys individuals’ 
membership in and loyalty to groups on whom they depend for various forms 
of support, emotional, material, and otherwise.85  
In other words, it seems that love, trust, and genuine well-wishing for one another 
may not always constitute social relationships in ideologically similar groups, but 
rather a conformity of beliefs serves as a basis for emotional connectedness. 
Implicitly, these relationships, in part, are grounded in fear and coercion. We might 
find ourselves unable to form beliefs that differ from the group we identify with 
because we fear the loss of those social connections and our emotional support 
network. As such, to fulfill our need for human connection, we might find ourselves 
coerced into holding beliefs accepted by our respective ideological group.  
 But what if a complete friendship was the basis for social relationships in 
ideologically similar groups? In such relationships, we would not have to fear the loss 
of emotional support or social connection because we hold beliefs that differ from 
others who belong to the same group. We would feel more confident in letting 
empirical evidence (where possible) and the common good guide our political beliefs 
because we would trust that mutual love, respect, and genuine concern for each 
other’s well-being underlie our social connections. Further, because in complete 
friendships our friends as well are working toward being more impartial, they as well 
would be motivated by accuracy and the common good.    
                                                 
85 Kahan, “Ideology, Motivated Reasoning, and Cognitive Reflection,” 419. 
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There are two slightly different, but related, suggestions being offered 
concerning friendship. The first suggestion is that some of our social relationships 
with those whom we share similar social identities and ideological commitments 
ought to take on the form of complete friendships.86 Complete friendships foster a 
social context that supports fairness to different perspectives and the motivation for 
accuracy and the common good. The second suggestion is that once such friendships 
have formed, we ought to regard our complete friends as possessing a vantage point 
that allows us to know more about our reasoning than we can know (given the 
unreliability of introspection). These suggestions are the upshot of complete 
friendship for reducing our susceptibility to engage in biased political cognition.   
The Need for Diversity In Our Friendships. One objection to seriously 
examine concerns the prescription that we form complete friendships with those who 
are similar to us in terms of social identities and ideological commitments. If we form 
complete friendships with those who are socially and ideologically similar to us, then 
as a result of these similarities, it is highly likely that biased political cognition 
manifests in similar ways for our friends as us. Moreover, if our friends as well are 
not consciously aware of their engagement in biased political cognition, then how 
would they necessarily be in a better position to catch incidents where we engage in 
motivated reasoning? Put another way, how could our friends be better at detecting 
                                                 
86 I write “some” of our social relationships, as opposed to “all,” because for those of 
us with large social circles it would be unreasonable to expect us to develop complete 
friendships with all of the people in our social circle that share similar social identities 
and ideological commitments.  
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incidents of us engaging in motivated reasoning if they are most likely similarly 
engaged in motivated reasoning? Even worse, what if because they are similarly 
engaged in motivated reasoning, they only confirm and thereby encourage our 
cognitive bias?87 Ostensibly, this objection undermines the potential for complete 
friendships to reduce our susceptibility to engage in biased political cognition.   
While this objection points to a substantial limitation for the account of 
complete friendship offered thus far, it does not necessarily undermine the upshot of 
complete friendship. We should concede that only having complete friends with those 
who are socially and ideologically similar to us inhibits the amelioration of our 
susceptibility to engage in motivated reasoning, but this alone does not undermine the 
potential of complete friendships. Instead, this limitation should lead us to believe 
that we should strive for social and ideological diversity in our friendships. When 
opportunities arise, we should cultivate complete friendships with people of different 
social identities and ideological commitments. I say when opportunities arise because 
I think it is rare for us to recognize the potential for a close friendship when we first 
meet someone and thus intentionally pursue a complete friendship with them. Rather, 
over time, as we get to know someone better, we grow into such a friendship with 
them. As such, it is not a matter of us purposefully interacting with others with the 
explicit intention to diversify our friendships.88   
                                                 
87 Badhwar, “Introduction: The Nature and Significance of Friendship,” 9. 
88 Philosopher of friendship Laurence Thomas argues that friendship is not 
consciously pursued, but instead, friendship is something we find we have grown into 
gradually. Thomas contends, “There is a very clear sense in which we grow into 
friendships; indeed, we can even be surprised that our interaction with someone has 
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Nonetheless, we should be more open to the opportunities that exist in our 
social lives to form complete friendships. As cities, schools, college campuses, and 
workplaces become increasingly diversified places, we find ourselves more and more 
in social contexts where we encounter people of diverse social identities and 
ideological commitments. Further, since we spend much of our day in these social 
contexts, there exist opportunities to form close friendships. We should become more 
disposed to being open to these opportunities to cultivate friendships with those that 
differ from ourselves.  
By cultivating diversity in our friendships, we can gain friends whose 
reasoning is influenced by motivations different than our own. As such, it is more 
likely that we will have different intuitions about politics and implicitly reason toward 
beliefs in different ways. The difference in intuitions and implicit judgments could 
situate each of us in a vantage point to better comprehend our engagement in 
motivated reasoning. In cases where we do not share similar intuitions, we most 
likely are going to find ourselves in a state of disagreement, and because we are close 
and trusting friends that care about each other’s well-being, we can endeavor to 
impartially understand the nature of each other’s reasoning that contributes to our 
disagreement. In developing an understanding of each other’s reasoning, we have an 
opportunity to develop an awareness of the motivations influencing our political 
                                                 
given rise to such companion friendship. It might never have occurred to us that so 
deep a friendship would have developed. Thus, on the other hand, there is a sense in 
which friendships happen to us.” See Laurence Thomas, “Friendship and Other 
Loves” in Friendship: A Philosophical Reader, ed. Neera Kapur Badhwar (Ithaca, 
NY: Cornell University Press, 1993), 49. 
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beliefs and hopefully gain a more profound sense of how those motivations influence 
our cognitive processes. Put another way, the friction of disagreement could aid in 
sharpening and refining our awareness of how biased political cognition manifests in 
our reasoning.  
To elucidate this point further, let us turn to Elizabeth Telfer’s article that led 
to a resurgence of philosophical interest in friendship in the 1970s and 1980s. She 
argues that friendship has a transformative potential to change how we think about 
the world and ourselves. Through our interactions with friends of diverse viewpoints, 
we can learn to look at our beliefs from a different point of view, to understand and 
feel in new ways, and thus realize the immense potentiality for different ways of 
experiencing the world. As Telfer contends,  
…friendship can enlarge our knowledge throughout the whole gamut of 
human experience, by enabling us in some measure to adopt the viewpoint of 
another person through our sympathetic identification with him. Through 
friendship, we can know what it is like to think or feel or do certain things 
which we do not feel, think or do ourselves.89  
The enlargement of our knowledge of the world in this manner could help increase 
our awareness of the motivations present in our political cognition. This can be 
especially the case when our friends notice motivations in our thinking that may not 
be apparent to us. For Nancy Sherman, empathy is an aspect of complete friendship 
necessary for contributing to each other’s flourishing. Sherman contends, “…we want 
to understand ‘from the friend's point of view’ what she is going through and how 
                                                 
89 Elizabeth Telfer, “Friendship,” in Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 71 
(1970), 240. 
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things look to her. Imagining how she must feel ultimately aims at coming to see 
things from her point of view. Thus, it is not that I bypass my imagination, but that it 
ultimately transports me to her feelings.”90 Understanding our friend’s point of view 
would include understanding our friend’s point of view about our political cognition. 
If part of our friend’s point of view on us includes their awareness of specific 
motivations influencing our political cognition, then through empathizing with our 
friend, we could come to greater awareness of the specific motivations as well.  
Though, given the discussion about confirmation bias in the first chapter, we 
could dispute this suggestion by insisting that we would most likely only integrate the 
knowledge gained from our friend to confirm beliefs we already hold to be true, in a 
similar manner to most subjects that participated in Lord et al.’s experiment. 
However, there is one relevant difference between this suggestion about friendship 
and Lord et al.’s study on confirmation bias: knowledge gained by merely reading 
about beliefs that differ from our own is considerably different from knowledge 
gained through relating to and loving a person whose beliefs differ from our own. In 
comparing the difference between reading about people whose lives are different 
from our own and being their friend, Telfer employs the distinction between 
knowledge by description and knowledge by acquaintance.91 This distinction seems 
relevant here. Knowledge gained from a friendship can have a profound impact on us 
that differs in comparison to knowledge gained from reading. This is because “friends 
                                                 
90 Nancy Sherman, “Aristotle on the Shared Life” in Friendship: A Philosophical 
Reader, ed. Neera Kapur Badhwar (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1993), 100. 
91 Elizabeth Telfer, “Friendship,” 240. 
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are not just objects of contemplation or analysis, but other selves who interact with 
us, responding to us and requiring that we respond to them in appropriate ways.”92 It 
is these rich dimensions of interpersonal interaction that enable the knowledge gained 
from friendship to affect us in more profound ways than knowledge merely 
experienced only as an object of analysis. It is this profound impact that hopefully can 
aid in diminishing our susceptibility to engage in confirmation bias.          
I intend for this description to serve as a broad sketch of how we can envision 
diversity in our friendships aiding us in reducing our susceptibility to engage in 
biased political cognition. As such, it is not meant to be exhaustive nor provide a 
complete picture. Here, I think it is essential to be mindful of Aristotle’s advice to be 
as precise as the subject matter allows.93 In specific situations, how two friends 
explore disagreement between each other can play out in a multitude of ways that are 
relative to each person’s habits of mind, their state of mind when this exploration 
occurs, history of personal experiences, the particular political issue in question, etc. 
Given these contextual variables, it is not clear how precise we can be in outlining 
exactly how it will look when two friends help each other in reducing each other’s 
                                                 
92 Badhwar, “Introduction: The Nature and Significance of Friendship,” 10. 
93 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 5. To provide some indication of how this advice is 
relevant, here is the context in which Aristotle offers the advice. When discussing 
how what we regard as noble, just, and good “admits of a good deal of diversity and 
variation,” he recommends “we should be content, since we are discussing things like 
these in such a way, to demonstrate the truth sketchily and in outline, and because we 
are making generalizations on the basis of generalizations, to draw conclusions along 
the same lines. Indeed, the details of our claims, then, should be looked at in the same 
way, since it is the mark of an educated person to look in each area for only the 
degree of accuracy that the nature of the subject permits.”   
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susceptibility to engage in biased political cognition. Instead, at this point, it may be 
more fruitful to look to deepen our understanding through careful experimentation; 
we should seek to gain practical wisdom on this matter through experiences with our 
friends. Although, such experimentation with our friends does bring up a significant 
concern: do we risk losing our close friends by discussing contentious issues of 
politics in conjunction with our engagement in biased political cognition?   
The Jeopardizing Friendships Objection. While diversity in our friendships 
can provide us with friends that can better help us to reduce our susceptibility to 
engage in biased political cognition, we can still question whether or not friendships 
are a well-suited social context for reducing our susceptibility. We might ask 
ourselves, “Don’t we risk losing or alienating ourselves from a friend by pointing out 
and insisting on discussing how their reasoning is biased, especially about political 
beliefs connected to their identity? Is it not more likely that our friend will become 
resistant and frustrated when discussing something as sensitive and emotionally 
charged as political beliefs and convictions?” The answer to these sorts of questions 
in part depends on the type of friendship we have with our friend. If the friendship is 
a self-regarding friendship where our friend values us primarily in terms of the 
pleasure or utility we provide them, then it seems likely that we risk losing a friend 
when engaging them in a discussion about biased political cognition. It can be painful 
to learn about our shortcomings and errors, and thus, our friend may judge that there 
is little pleasure or utility to be derived from our friendship. As such, we should not 
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view self-regarding friendships as a suitable social context for reducing susceptibility 
to engage in biased political cognition.    
On the other hand, if it is a complete friendship, then this worry should not 
weigh as heavily on us. I would contend that if a friendship dissolves or experiences a 
significant rupture as a result of an earnest attempt to discuss instances when our 
friend engages in motivated reasoning, then it is quite likely that a complete 
friendship did not exist in the first place. Consider that in a complete friendship the 
primary concern is the other person and their well-being, and this concern is mutually 
shared and known by both friends. Thus, we should not perceive discussion of 
shortcomings or errors as threatening, but rather as a continued expression of our 
mutually shared love and well-wishing for one another. In other words, the level of 
trust exhibited in a complete friendship is one that should not worry us about 
incurring the loss of friendship when bringing up ways our friend is biased in their 
reasoning about politics.94  
                                                 
94 Though, we might think that most people’s friendships are ones that would 
dissolve, or at least experience a significant rupture, as a result of one of the friends 
feeling frustrated, if not angered and hurt, by a discussion of their susceptibility to 
engage in biased political cognition. If we think this is the case, then my argument 
here might mean that complete friendships are exceedingly rare, and, as a result, the 
remedy on offer remote. Speculation on this matter is difficult, as the kinds of 
friendships people possess vary widely. Some people lack any close friendships that 
could be described as complete friendships, and who struggle to form close 
friendships; I would say my proposal does not apply to them at all. On the other hand, 
there are people, like me, who have several close friendships that could be described 
as complete friendships where biased political cognition could be safely discussed. 
People like me could describe their close friendships in this manner because of past 
experiences of discussion of emotionally challenging topics, where such discussion 
did not threaten the friendship, but deepened intimacy between the friends. 
Nonetheless, in complete friendships, it is plausible that two friends would have to 
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More specifically, honest mutual self-disclosure should be a feature of 
friendship with the depth of intimacy and trust indicative of complete friendship. In 
discussing what he terms “companion friendship,” philosopher Laurence Thomas 
(who has written extensively on the topic of friendship) believes complete honesty 
between close friends is central to a friendship’s ability to “contribute to each other’s 
flourishing, where the emphasis here is upon the improvement of character and 
personality.” Further, it is through honest self-disclosure that friends show that they 
value each other’s perspective on their life.95  Adding to Thomas’s point, philosopher 
Neera Badhwar believes that honest self-disclosure is such a necessary condition that 
its absence means a genuine friendship does not exist at all. She asserts a friendship 
that “would not survive the light of truth is not a friendship at all. For if the basis and 
object of friendship is the friend as she is, it must be in the nature of friendship that 
friends see and love one another as they are, and not as creations of their own 
fantasies.”96 With all this in mind, our friends and we should not perceive discussions 
of biased political cognition as threatening to our friendship, but rather as a further 
expression of the honest self-disclosure that is indicative of the intimacy of our 
friendship. Such discussions should be regarded as deepening the intimacy of the 
                                                 
work through threatening, deeply disturbing, damaging near-ruptures or even 
temporary ruptures from which they must recover. In a genuine complete friendship, 
the two friends persist in working through such situations and can move past them, as 
opposed to the friendship dissolving. 
95 Laurence Thomas, “Friendship and Other Loves” in Friendship: A Philosophical 
Reader, ed. Neera Kapur Badhwar (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1993), 57. 
96 Badhwar, “Introduction: The Nature and Significance of Friendship,” 7. 
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friendship and doing so can contribute further to each other’s development of 
impartiality in their political cognition.     
Nonetheless, in these situations, we should be cautious and tactful. We should 
be careful to not frame our discussion as a personal attack or a form of intimidation 
and embarrassment. It may even be prudent to begin and end discussions of biased 
political cognition with friends by reassuring them that we intend to support them in 
becoming a more impartial participant in public discourse. 
Another way to approach this worry about rupturing friendships and losing 
friends is to consider what philosopher Dianne Rothleder calls the work of 
friendship.97 If a friendship is to persist over time and continually enhance the lives of 
both friends, then both friends must actively work to maintain the health of the 
friendship. Part of this work of friendship entails interpreting and evaluating each 
other. Sometimes explicitly, and other times implicitly, we are interpreting the 
meaning of verbal expressions and physical actions of our friends. From these 
interpretations, we form evaluations of our friends. When we start to talk to our 
friends about their engagement in biased political cognition, this process of 
interpretation and evaluation is going to be taking place. For example, our friend 
could be questioning in their mind, “What do you mean I am biased in my reasoning? 
Why are you bringing this up in the first place? What is it you want me to do about 
this? Do you not like me as a friend? Are you saying I’m a bad person?” Our friend is 
                                                 
97 Dianne Rothleder, The Work of Friendship: Rorty, His Critics, and the Project of 
Solidarity (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1999), 117. 
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going to be evaluating us, determining whether or not we can be trusted and have 
good intentions.  
For us to have a more fruitful discussion with our friend about biased political 
cognition, we need to communicate and be mindful of each other’s emotional states, 
desires, and abilities.98 We need to pay attention to if our friend becomes angry, 
frustrated, or is unable to fully process the concerns we are raising about their biased 
thinking. We need to determine when it might be best to back off and wait for a better 
time when our friend is in a more receptive emotional state to listen to our concerns. 
Further, we should consider the depth and extent to which we should discuss their 
engagement in biased political cognition in one discussion. We are not going to get 
our friends to reduce their susceptibility to engage in motivated reasoning after one 
conversation. Since ingrained habits of thinking are not going to be transformed 
suddenly, we need to think about having several, if not many, conversations to ignite 
the process of self-transformation towards becoming more impartial and motivated by 
accuracy and the common good. It is these sorts of suggestions that should factor into 
our approach for effectively and compassionately facilitating our friend’s recognition 
of their susceptibility to engage in biased political cognition and encouraging them to 
take action to reduce this susceptibility.  
The Takeaway from Aristotle’s Account. In considering how to reduce our 
susceptibility to engage in biased political cognition, the distinction between self-
regarding and other-regarding friendships is pivotal. The mutual love, trust, and 
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concern for each other’s wellbeing found in other-regarding friendships foster a depth 
of intimacy needed for us to empathize with our friends of different perspectives and 
thereby enhance an impartial understanding of others’ political beliefs. It creates an 
emotionally secure space whereby we can nonjudgmentally explore our engagement 
in biased political cognition and reduce our susceptibility. Nonetheless, two concerns 
arise with Aristotle’s account that should prevent us from completely adopting his 
account of friendship and thus prompt us to extend our analysis by exploring an 
alternative model that builds off the aspects just noted. One concern is that Aristotle’s 
account of friendship is tied up with his ontological notion of humans as purpose-
driven creatures; such ontological considerations are beyond the scope of our current 
discussion, and thus there is no need to be committed to them.  
 Another consideration for refusing to adopt Aristotle’s full account concerns 
the character state of both friends: a genuine complete friendship requires that both 
friends be virtuous people. As virtuous people, they should reason similarly to one 
another when determining the right action in a particular situation and agree on what 
counts as the virtuous action for that situation. This requirement seems to commit us 
to believe that both friends need to be like-minded. Concerning political issues, as 
they involve determining the right action for the common good, this requirement 
would mean that both friends need to be like-minded in their reasoning about how to 
address matters of public interest. However, this requirement seems too rigid and sets 
the bar to an unreachable high. It does seem unlikely, especially if in light of our 
prescription that we have friends with diverse political viewpoints, that our friend and 
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we would be like-minded enough to achieve consensus about how to address matters 
of public interest. Although, maybe the bar need not be set so high regarding like-
mindedness.99 
 In discussing the like-mindedness concerning virtue that is necessary for 
friendship, Nancy Sherman makes a distinction between means and ends and 
discusses consensus as developing throughout a friendship, as opposed to being 
initially present. In Sherman’s view of Aristotle’s account, the consensus present in 
an intimate friendship is less about similarly enacting specific virtues in specific 
ways, but rather more about what sort of life is to be lived together and how to go 
about doing so. Sherman agrees that we could interpret consensus about what sort of 
life should be lived to mean consensus about beliefs to be held and actions to be taken 
in practical matters, but she also believes that consensus here could take a looser 
form.  
                                                 
99 Though, for the sake of ameliorating their susceptibility to engage in biased 
political cognition, two friends should possess a shared understanding of the 
psychological phenomena occurring in biased political cognition. This does mean that 
in order to ameliorate susceptibility to engage in biased political cognition within the 
context of close friendship, the friends should know about and understand how 
manifestations of motivated reasoning and the introspection illusion work. Depending 
on how confident we are that we do not engage in biased political cognition, it could 
be challenging for us to believe that we are susceptible to engaging in biased political 
cognition and learn about the associated psychological phenomena to improve our 
political cognition. It does take a degree of humility and vulnerability to be open to 
accepting that we can be fallible in our reasoning about firmly held beliefs connected 
to our social identity. The hope is that the emotional support of complete friends will 
aid in facilitating the process of acceptance and willingness to learn about the 
psychological phenomena to improve our and our friend’s political cognition.     
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Sherman holds, “Equally consensus may express only a looser agreement 
about general ends…Their shared commitment is to an end rather than a specific way 
of achieving it.”100 She gives an example of how two friends may hold that 
temperance is a crucial conviction in the lives of two friends, but each friend enacts 
this virtue differently in their respective lives. For one, it may mean a healthier diet, 
and for the other, it may mean refusing to participate in gossip. The same could be 
true of our friend and we regarding political cognition. We may achieve consensus 
concerning impartiality as desirable ends for our political cognition, but following 
such an ideal could necessitate us thinking in different ways given the ideological 
commitments that already guide our thinking. Thus, like-mindedness is less about our 
friend and we reasoning in a manner that yields similar political beliefs, and more 
about us being like-minded about the values that ought to influence our reasoning 
process.   
 Furthermore, the consensus exhibited in a friendship does not have to be 
something initially present when the friendship forms, but can develop over time. 
Sherman puts forth, “There may nevertheless be a particularly characteristic sort of 
consensus in friendship. In true friendship, we might say, friends realize shared ends 
which develop through the friendship and which come to be constitutive of it. 
Specific common interests are thus a product rather than a precondition of the 
relationship.”101 Through our continued discussions about politics, our disagreements 
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about policies to be enacted, and our exploration of our engagement in biased 
political cognition—all of which occur as we share our lives—over time we would 
come to agree on the importance of impartiality. Further, given enough time, as we 
come to empathize more with each other’s point of view and expand each other’s 
horizons of perspectives and understandings of the world, we may develop a shared 
sense of how to best reason in accordance with accuracy and the common good. The 
likelihood of such a possibility is probably rare, but it nonetheless is a possibility to 
be mindful of as we cultivate close friendships.  
 Nevertheless, Sherman’s explanation should remind us that ultimately we 
should not necessarily conceive of friends as alike in virtue in terms of them 
reasoning about political issues in precisely the same manner, where their political 
cognition mirrors one another. She asserts, “Now individuals that come together as 
character friends might be similar yet different in the above sense that while they 
share virtue as an overall end, they often express it in ways that are distinct yet 
complementary. They are not mere lookalikes of one another.”102 In the end, what is 
essential is that our friends share a similar goal of impartiality for political cognition, 
and even if we do not converge on how to achieve impartiality in every situation 
correctly, we nonetheless are striving for impartiality.  
 At this point, we might be inspired to pursue complete friendships more than 
we have been on account of how it can aid in improving our political cognition. 
Though, we might be hesitant to do so because of the following concern: if we start 
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pursuing complete friendships more than we have been for the sake of improving our 
political cognition, would that not make those friendships a form of utility-based 
friendships and, thus, not complete? Indeed, if we are intentionally motivated to 
pursue complete friendships for the sake of improving our political cognition, then 
those friendships are likely to be a form of utility-based friendships. One reason this 
would be the case is that a complete friendship is not an instrumental good, whereas 
utility-based friendship, such as pleasure and advantage friendships, are instrumental 
goods. Utility-based friendships are good for the pleasure and advantage they bring 
about for the friend and are intentionally pursued with this ulterior motive. In 
contrast, complete friendship is not sought out with an ulterior motive.  
Though, even this characterization is misleading for it would not be accurate 
to characterize complete friendship as something which is intentionally sought out. 
Typically, we do not go out into the social sphere intentionally looking for people 
with whom we could form close friendships resembling a complete friendship. It is 
challenging, if not impossible, to know beforehand or in an initial encounter with 
someone if it is highly probable that a complete friendship will form over time. After 
an initial encounter, we might sense the possibility that a complete friendship might 
form over time, and we may continue to spend time with the person hoping that such 
a friendship will form. Nonetheless, we often recognize that a close friendship is 
something that takes time to develop and is the result of both friends nurturing the 
friendship’s development. It is not something that is a result of a deliberate choice on 
the part of one friend. Instead, through an accumulation of experiences that have 
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deepened intimacy and trust and led to a shared life together, an individual finds that 
their friendship has developed into a complete friendship. As such, this cannot be 
achieved through sheer will alone on the part of one friend.  
Thus, it is unlikely that our intentionally being motivated to pursue complete 
friendships for the sake of improving political cognition would yield a genuine 
complete friendship. Such a friendship with this intention would be a form of utility-
based friendship, where the utility is the improvement of one’s political cognition. 
However, one thing to keep in mind is that utility-based friendships often lack the 
depth of intimacy and trust and shared life needed to bring about the improvement of 
one’s political cognition. As such, we should not regard utility-based friendships as 
suitable for improving our political cognition.      
However, by contending that we cannot pursue complete friendships to 
improve our political cognition, I seem to be implying that we could only improve 
our political cognition with friends we happen to be or become complete friends with 
in the future. This implication raises two problems: 1) these people are perhaps 
unlikely to hold substantially different views from us on contentious political issues 
(like global climate change), and this may limit my account considerably; 2) the 
implication that my proposal applies only to those we are or happen to become 
friends with would seem to be in tension with my assertion that there exist 
opportunities to diversify our friendships in terms of social identities and ideological 
commitments. Admittedly, these problems are damning for my account. While I 
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cannot adequately address them here, it is relevant to call attention to them and 
consider how they might be investigated in the future.  
One response is to retreat on the requirement of complete friendships. My 
main hesitation in retreating on this requirement is that I worry that friendships 
pursued solely for the improvement of one’s political cognition is that such 
intentionality may be counterproductive. In the next chapter, we will consider real-
life examples of friendship. In one of the examples, we will encounter two friends 
that intentionally pursued their friendship intending to diversify their friendships; they 
wanted to befriend someone with whom they would disagree on most contentious 
political issues. After years of friendship and discussion, neither friend reports any 
improvement in their political cognition. While there is insufficient evidence to 
conclusively determine why this is the case, I do wonder to what degree their having 
pursued their friendship to diversify their friendships, and thus confined their 
friendship to politics, has hindered the development of their friendship. Hindered in 
the sense that it could have developed into a productive context for improving their 
political cognition. I wonder if their friendship had developed beyond political 
discussion, then maybe they could have come to know more about each other’s lives 
in ways that extended beyond their political beliefs, and knowing each other in such 
ways could have cultivated the needed context for them to aid each other in the 
improvement of their political cognition. For example, if they had found common 
ground and learned to empathize with each other concerning non-political aspects of 
their lives, they may have developed the kind of trust and intimacy needed to help 
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each other improve their political cognition. This thought is inspired by the 
consideration of another example we will encounter in the next chapter.   
In this other example, we will find friends that discussed politics only after 
having formed close friendships centering on non-political commonalities. In this 
example, one of the friends will report that being friends with someone politically 
different from themselves has improved their political cognition. As such, I cannot 
help but wonder if complete friendship must first develop around non-political 
aspects of the friends’ lives to have the potential to aid the friends in improving their 
political cognition. It is the consideration of these examples that makes me hesitate in 
backing off on the requirement of complete friendship pursued without the intention 
to improve one’s political cognition.  
Nonetheless, I am unsure how to avoid the implication that such a requirement 
severely limits my account. I would think the consideration of more examples of 
friendship would be needed to address this concern adequately. Keep in mind, I am 
basing my hesitation off of two examples. I would revise my position if we were to 
find examples of friendships where complete friendship developed between two 
people intentionally seeking to diversify their friendships and their political cognition 
improved because of the friendship. I would then believe that complete friendship can 
be something intentionally pursued and result in the improvement of the friends’ 
political cognition.     
 
Nehamas: Friendship’s Love and The Good of Friendship 
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Even if we adopt a looser standard for like-mindedness and consensus, there 
remains at least one significant lingering concern: how are we to regard intimate 
friendships in which the ends we share for our lives are not intentionally virtuous? Is 
there any value for our political cognition in friendships with people that do not 
cultivate impartiality as we do? This concern is significant because even though there 
exist opportunities to diversify our friendships in terms of social identities and 
ideological commitments, such opportunities do not always lead to friendships with 
people that are seeking to cultivate impartiality. Actively working to become more 
impartial and motivated by accuracy and the common good are not ideals that 
everyone strives for in the places where they have opportunities to make close 
friends.103 In such cases, it is worth exploring what value intimate friendships without 
this shared basis possess for our political cognition—meaning friendship where only 
we aim to improve our political cognition, but not our friend. Using Alexander 
Nehamas’ recent work on friendship, I will contend that close friendship can still 
have a positive impact on our political cognition, despite our friend not sharing the 
amelioration of susceptibility to engage in biased political cognition as a personal 
goal. The positive impact on us comes from the friendship, in particular with those 
socially different from our ourselves, providing experiences that enrich our 
understanding of the interests and concerns of those socially different from ourselves. 
                                                 
103 To be clear, this does not mean that most people do not value such ideals, but 
rather it seems plausible that they might not regard their friendships as the context for 
cultivating such ideals. It is easy to imagine that folks might avoid politics in their 
friendships, or that the common interests shared in a friendship are non-political.  
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Through this understanding, we can better reason in accordance with the common 
good when participating in public discourse.       
In On Friendship, Alexander Nehamas articulates a contemporary notion of 
friendship that is reflective of intimate friendships found in present-day Western 
culture. He believes that our understanding of close friendships retains aspects of 
Aristotle’s notion of complete friendship noted above: an enduring love of one 
another, a deep concern for each other’s well-being, and reciprocity of such 
sentiments. Where Nehamas thinks our contemporary notion of close friendships 
departs from Aristotle is concerning our friends possessing virtuous character traits. 
While we may tend to agree with Aristotle that we love our friends for features of 
their character that we admire, we do not think that these features “must be only 
virtues of morality or even the broader range Aristotle had in mind.”104 Nehamas 
believes that often the character traits that attract us to our friends are not ones that 
would necessarily be independently acknowledged as virtuous by others, but are 
regarded by us as admirable traits. Nehamas brings up an example of how we may 
regard a friend’s sense of humor as a character trait crucial to our friendship, but 
neither Aristotle nor others may regard this as a virtuous quality—it is not a morally 
relevant quality and others may disagree with our assessment because they prefer a 
different sense of humor.105 One reason for why we may not be drawn to our friends 
for their moral virtues is that much of modern friendship occurs in everyday, ordinary 
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 110 
 
situations, as opposed to critical emergencies or dramatic occurrences that call upon 
our moral qualities. As such, we find ourselves drawn to qualities that our friends 
exhibit in commonplace circumstances, such as humor.106  
Nehamas’ assessment of friendship seems applicable to political cognition: in 
many cases, it might be that the character traits that attract us to a friend are ones that 
do not seem to have direct significance for improving our political cognition. Nor do 
we often find ourselves spending most of our time together with our friends 
deliberating about political issues; much of the time spent with our friends is in 
nonpolitical, or at least overtly nonpolitical, situations. In such cases, we might 
wonder whether or not these friendships can still aid us as we strive to better adhere 
to an impartial ethos for our political cognition. To explore this point further, let us 
consider how Nehamas believes that friendship is a nonmoral good that enhances the 
quality of our lives.      
   For Nehamas, understanding why we love our close friends is central to 
understanding the good of friendship, as the good of friendship is the result of the 
reciprocated love. In explaining why we love our close friends, the most 
straightforward answer to offer is one we have already mentioned: character traits we 
find admirable. This answer is only a start. Upon further reflection, we will most 
likely find that listing all the qualities we find admirable does not fully capture nor 
provide an exhaustive explanation of why we love a close friend. In some sense, the 
love we have for a close friend exceeds a list of specific qualities. With this in mind, 
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we then might want to say that our love for our friend has to do with who they are in 
themselves, but such talk seems to suppose an essential nature to our friends, which 
could commit us to ontological assumptions we might not necessarily hold.  
Though even if our close friends did have a definable essential nature, this still 
would not capture why it is we love our friends. To understand why this is the case, 
imagine if one of your close friends passed away, and afterward, you met someone 
else that possessed the same essential nature as the friend you lost. Would you 
automatically love that person the same way you loved your friend? Could this person 
replace the lost friend? I take it to be the case that most of us are inclined to think that 
our close friends are not replaceable in that sort of way, and thus an explanation of 
the love we have for a close friend is not exhausted by an appeal to an essential 
nature. The role that a particular close friend plays in our life is one that can only be 
played by them.107 
Given that appeals to a list of character traits or an essential nature under-
explains why we love a particular close friend, we might be wondering by what other 
means could we more clearly and fully account for why we love a specific close 
friend. To illuminate our understanding, Nehamas believes we should look to 
Montaigne’s classic essay on friendship. Responding to Montaigne’s analysis of his 
friendship with his closest, most cherished friend, Nehamas asserts, “Montaigne 
brilliantly redirects our attention from this or that distinguishable aspect of both his 
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friend and himself to the irreducible experience of the two of them together.”108 Let 
us unpack this assertion. The reason we cannot fully capture why it is we love a 
friend when listing their characteristics is because we need to expand the scope of 
consideration to include not just our friend, but ourselves as well, and to consider 
both of us within the context of our friendship itself. We love our close friend, not for 
the person they are in themselves, but for the person they are when they are with us, 
and for the person we are when we are with our close friend. Our love of our close 
friend and their love of us is highly specific to the particular ways in which we relate 
to one another and the character traits that are present as the result of us being 
together. This also explains why a person who possesses similar character traits as our 
friend cannot automatically replace our friend. Friendship is not merely two people 
possessing certain traits, but rather it is the relational context and experiences that 
emerge from the two unique sets of personal character traits and personal histories 
interacting with one another over time. As Nehamas sums up, “every friendship is a 
unique combination of two souls, impossible to duplicate.”109  
While focusing on both friends within the relational context of the friendship 
itself more fully explains our love of our close friends, consideration of time even 
more fully explains our love of them. When we feel and say that we love our friend, it 
is not just an expression of how we feel at the present moment as a culmination of 
past experiences, but it is also prospective: our love of our friend reflects our hopes 
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for the future. When we love our friend, we hope that as we continue to get to know 
one another better and form new experiences together, we will enrich each other’s 
lives for the better. We know that as a result of us being a part of each other’s lives in 
a profoundly intimate way that we will come to acquire new desires and interests, and 
perhaps even adopt new values. Since neither of us can know the future with any 
certainty, we cannot know the specific ways in which we will impact one another’s 
life.  
Nevertheless, we hope that the love that constitutes our friendship promises a 
better future for both of us. Nehamas believes, “That commitment to the future—the 
hope for a better life that remains unknown for now—is exactly what every one of 
our efforts to explain the grounds of our friendships always and necessarily leaves 
out. This is why every explanation is so disappointingly thin. They all contain an 
implicit ‘And so on,’ an open end or ellipsis that reveals the friendship is still 
alive.”110  
Now that we have a more precise, fuller understanding of our love for our 
close friends, we are ready to see how a close friendship can still have a positive 
impact on our political cognition, despite not being grounded in ameliorating our 
susceptibility to engage in biased political cognition. As a result of this deep, 
enduring love that intimately binds our lives together, our close friend and we create 
an emotionally secure space where our differences can provide a lasting impact on 
our sense of ourselves and how we inhabit the world. Through our differences, “we 
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develop characteristics and capacities that emerge only because of our interaction: a 
new friend means a new way of approaching both oneself and others—a new way of 
approaching life itself.”111 As a result, “our interactions with our friends often lead us 
into novel and unanticipated directions.”112 For this reason, our understanding of 
ourselves and the world around us is provisional, contestable, and incomplete.  
The ways in which differences between friends lead each friend to revise and 
change their understanding of each other and the world seem applicable to differences 
in ideological commitments and political cognition. Political differences between 
friends could lead to novel and unanticipated changes in our political cognition. Thus, 
the upshot of this discussion of Nehamas’ account is that even friendships where our 
friends are not actively seeking to improve their political cognition are ones that can 
benefit our goal of improving our political cognition. Through political deliberation 
with close friends, our political beliefs could be revised to account for evidence more 
accurately and more fairly represent the interests of other social and ideological 
groups. Improvements in our political cognition could continue to occur throughout 
our life as our friendships with those politically different from us deepen and as new 
friendships are added.  
It is this transformative potential of friendship that gives the everyday, 
ordinary situations in which friendships occur and develop their significance. As 
Nehamas quite eloquently states,  
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During our seemingly idle conversations and pointless activities, within the 
safety zone that mutual trust creates, we confront desires, ideas, hopes—
aspects of what we are—that we hide from others and sometimes even from 
ourselves. And we try out ways of being—still perhaps inarticulate, perhaps 
embarrassing if revealed to a larger group, sometimes of dubious benefit—
some of which we pursue and some of which we discard. Friendship has its 
own mortars and pestles, its own alembics and retorts: it comes closer to 
transmuting the self than any alchemist ever came to transmuting metals.113  
For Nehamas, friends have this privileged role in our lives not necessarily because 
they embody moral virtues, but rather this role and influence results from the love 
that we have for them.114 Nehamas’ moving remarks seem applicable to political 
cognition as well. The safety zone of mutual trust for self-experimentation is one that 
can extend to political deliberation. Friendship can be the place where we confront 
the desires, hopes, fears, and assumptions that bias our political cognition towards 
beliefs that protect our social identity. Just as well, friendship can be the place where 
we try out new ways of thinking politically, knowing that we have the emotional 
support of our close friend.  
Nehamas further supports the notion that close friendship provides a trusting, 
supportive space for experimenting with political beliefs and transforming our 
political cognition with an additional claim. He believes that it is with our close 
friends that we can freely “reveal aspects of ourselves of which we may be 
suspicious, unsure, or even ignorant and which, once revealed can be cultivated, or 
eradicated, as the case may be.”115 This claim as well can directly apply to political 
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cognition. The motivations influencing our political cognition are ones that we may 
be suspicious, unsure, and ignorant of, and once revealed, we may decide that they 
are ones that should be cultivated or eradicated. All in all, despite not explicitly 
seeking to ameliorate our susceptibility to engage in biased political cognition, a close 
friend can play a vital role in developing impartiality by providing us an 
understanding of ourselves that takes the form of “an interpretation of who we are to 
them that we can use—not uncritically—to guide our self-formation.”116 
 While there is much potential for friendships that do not share ameliorating 
susceptibility to engage in biased political cognition as an end, there is at least one 
concern to be mindful of as such friendships form. When we form friendships with 
people that are not actively seeking to become more impartial, we run a higher risk of 
developing friendships with people that inhibit the improvement of our political 
cognition than we do when developing Aristotelian complete friendships. As such, 
when ameliorating our susceptibility is not a shared end for the friendship, we should 
be more mindful of the possibility that such a friend might inadvertently encourage 
biased political cognition. A general case I have in mind is a friend whose ideological 
commitments differ from our own and who at the same time tends to be less humble 
about the certainty and correctness of their beliefs. Political deliberation with such an 
individual could without our explicit awareness prompt a defensive response from us, 
leading us to exhibit a much lower degree of impartiality than what we are striving to 
achieve for our political cognition. Political deliberation in such circumstances can 
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quickly devolve into displays of frustration and anger. In the end, such experiences 
inhibit rather than cultivate a public discourse indicative of a flourishing democracy. 
At the same time, it is possible to have friends who do not actively cultivate their 
intellectual character but are for other reasons able to confidently hold their beliefs 
and engage in respectful, reasonable dialogue. Interactions with friends of this 
temperament can contribute positively to ameliorating our susceptibility to engage in 
biased political cognition. As such, we should be mindful of both possibilities, and 
more actively pursue the latter one.  
 
Conclusion 
 In considering Aristotelian complete friendship and Nehamas’ ideas of love 
and the good of friendship, we find that close, intimate friendships offer much 
potential to ameliorating our susceptibility to engage in biased political cognition. 
Following the suggestion of Kahan, it provides a social context that explicitly seeks to 
“remove expressive incentives individuals face to form perceptions of risk and related 
facts on grounds unconnected to the truth of such beliefs.” Instead, when both friends 
are actively seeking to cultivate impartiality, friendship fosters a social context that 
values these ideals. In doing so, friendship can promote political cognition and public 
deliberation indicative of a flourishing democracy. In a political culture that is 
becoming ever more sharply divided and where political deliberation between those 
of differing ideologies becomes increasingly strained, and at times hostile, friendships 
can serve as an atmosphere where people express political differences within a 
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context of love, trust, and mutual concern for each other’s well-being. Within this 
context, our ability to fairly understand political viewpoints that differ from our own 
deepens and the range of our understanding of the various viewpoints comprising our 
pluralistic society is expanded. These goods of friendship can aid in bringing the 
motivations of our political cognition more in line with accuracy, impartiality, and the 
common good.   
 A major theme of this dissertation has been for its inquiry to be guided by 
practical considerations. This major theme appears in the previous chapters through 
my use of the hypothetical example of Casey and Landry deliberating global climate 
change. It as well appears in my critique of both Jason Stanley and Joshua Greene’s 
proposals for how we might mitigate our susceptibility to engage in biased political 
cognition. In contrast, in this chapter, we have examined friendship theoretically—in 
the sense that we have given insufficient attention to practical considerations as we 
examined the accounts of Aristotle and Nehamas. As such, we might be thinking, 
“David, this is an intriguing proposal, but does it work in practice? Is there any 
evidence to suggest that friendships characterized by the features of Aristotle’s notion 
of a complete friendship and Nehamas’ account of close friendship aid in reducing 
friends’ susceptibility to engage in biased political cognition?” To address these 
critical concerns, in the next chapter, we will turn our attention to the practice of 
friendship. Though, instead of continuing with our hypothetical example of Casey 
and Landry, we will examine real-life friendships, where the friendship played a role 
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in changing how the friends think about politics. We will aim to see if there exists 
evidence to support the proposal detailed in this chapter.      
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Chapter 4 – Friendship in Practice 
 
Introduction 
In the last chapter, I proposed that close friendship could aid in mitigating our 
susceptibility to engage in biased political cognition. At this point, we might wonder 
what evidence, if any, exists to support my proposal. We could ask, “Are there close 
friendships (that we could point to) where the friends have helped each other to 
ameliorate their susceptibility to engage in motivated reasoning when participating in 
political discourse?” As mentioned in the first chapter, a significant concern of this 
dissertation is to ground its arguments in practical considerations of the ideas and 
arguments asserted. Thus far, we have only considered the hypothetical example of 
Casey and Landry deliberating global climate change. As such, consideration of real-
life examples would make my proposal more compelling if they could provide 
evidence of its plausibility. It also would allow for exploring the practical 
considerations of my proposal more directly.  
 My central aim in this chapter is to outline some of the challenging issues that 
beset a search for existing empirical evidence of my proposal. I will sketch these 
problematic issues by discussing examples that raise several intriguing and significant 
questions. At first glance, these examples might seem to lend support to my proposal, 
but ultimately, they are only the beginnings of evidence for my proposal. As such, we 
should not regard these examples as conclusive evidence. Relatedly, we should note 
that it may be impossible to find conclusive evidence for my proposal. As will 
become evident by the end of the chapter, due to the complexity of the issues raised 
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in our discussion, the prior question of how to study friendships as a means of 
mitigating our susceptibility to engage in biased political question is still a work in 
progress. Nonetheless, an examination of the following examples yields crucial 
considerations for future empirical investigations.   
 
Friendships Between Klansmen and Black Anti-Racist and Civil Rights Activists 
 In the previous chapter, I argued that diversity in our close friendships (having 
friends of different social identities and ideological commitments than ourselves) 
would better aid in diminishing our susceptibility to engage in biased political 
cognition (in comparison to only having close friends of the same social identity and 
ideological commitments). Underlying this argument is the idea that it would be more 
difficult for close friends to recognize instances of each other’s engagement in 
motivated reasoning if the ideological commitments influencing their political 
cognition were too similar to one another. Whereas the differences in ideological 
commitments influencing the political cognition of close friends of different social 
identities and ideological commitments would allow close friends to better recognize 
instances of each other’s engagement in motivated reasoning.117  
Given the deepening polarization of our current political culture, we might be 
skeptical of the plausibility of close friendships forming between two people who 
profoundly disagree about politics. Alternatively, even if we think the formation of 
such friendships is possible in this political climate, we might still be skeptical that 
                                                 
117 See pages 89-95 for more details.  
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such friendships could be effective in reducing our susceptibility to engage in biased 
political cognition. We might think such friendships are likely to fall apart and 
ultimately be unproductive. It seems likely that political discourse between two 
friends of different social identities and ideological commitments would proceed in a 
combative manner. Each discussion could be contentious to the degree that it is 
unproductive in yielding the depth of intimacy and insight into each friend’s political 
cognition that is needed for them to aid one another in reducing their susceptibility to 
engage in biased political cognition. For example, imagine if Casey and Landry were 
to repeatedly debate global climate change in a combative manner. If their 
discussions are quite strained, it seems likely that they would never come to 
understand each other’s political cognition well enough to aid each other in mitigating 
their susceptibility to engage in biased political cognition. 
To address this kind of skepticism of my proposal, we will examine the 
friendships of Daryl Davis (an anti-racism activist) with Klansmen and the friendship 
between C.P. Ellis (a Klansmen) and Ann Atwater (a civil rights activist). These 
friendships show that friendship can form between people of different social identities 
and opposing political commitments. From these friendships, we do gain valuable 
insights about the formation of friendships between people that profoundly disagree 
about politics.  
Furthermore, through exploring the details of these friendships, it will become 
apparent that friendship had a role to play in the friends changing some of their 
beliefs about racial politics in America. At first pass, we might be tempted to infer 
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from this change in their beliefs that their susceptibility to engage in biased political 
cognition was reduced. However, upon closer examination, it will become evident 
that sufficient data does not exist to conclusively draw such an inference. 
Nonetheless, through examining why this inference cannot be conclusively drawn, we 
will discern that a search for existing examples of my proposal will have to contend 
with complicated issues that make it challenging to support my proposal with 
empirical evidence.   
 
Daryl Davis and Klansmen 
 Daryl Davis has made it his life’s mission to understand racism in America. 
For the past 30 years, he has carried out this mission by befriending members of the 
Ku Klux Klan; Davis documents his friendships in his book Klan-Destine 
Relationships: A Black Man’s Odyssey in the Ku Klux Klan. From his book, we 
glimpse the formation of his friendships and instances of cooperative dialogue 
between friends of different social identities and opposing political beliefs. I say 
glimpse because Davis focuses on pivotal moments and first encounters, and he does 
not go into great detail about the development of any one friendship.  
Moreover, Davis actively seeks out friendships with strangers who regard him 
as their political enemy; one effect of this intention is that Davis and his friends 
discuss their political beliefs early on in their friendship, often in the first encounter. 
Nevertheless, this contrasts with my proposal in the previous chapter that we allow 
friendships to develop spontaneously through our normal social activities. Relatedly, 
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using his friendships as examples to support my proposal runs into an issue raised in 
the previous chapter: intentionally seeking out complete friendships to improve our 
political cognition runs the risk of those friendships being a form of utility 
friendships, and thus, not complete friendships. Since Davis has intentionally sought 
out friendships with Klansmen, we cannot be sure that the friendships he forms are 
complete friendships.  
When considering this aspect of Davis’s friendships, it does raise the 
following question regarding a search for existing examples of my proposal: how 
likely are we to find complete friendships that formed unintentionally where the 
friends initially held opposing political beliefs? While such friendships may exist, it 
does seem highly likely that most friendships we would find would be friendships 
where the friends share similar political beliefs and ideological commitments. For this 
reason, a future search for existing friendships to support my proposal would have to 
contend with the rarity of relevant examples.    
 Setting aside this concern for the moment, we might be surprised by the nature 
of Davis’s activism and ask, “Why would someone intentionally seek out friendships 
with their political enemies?” To understand why Davis (as a black antiracist activist) 
befriends Klansmen, we must understand the ethos informing his endeavor. Davis 
credits certain dispositions cultivated by his parents as paramount to the ethos 
informing his work: seeking the inherent good in all people, withholding judgment 
about someone based on their social identity, and appreciation of diverse cultures and 
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peoples.118 Additionally, from examining his conversations, it can be inferred that 
Davis brings an open-minded curiosity to his dialogues with Klansmen. When 
reflecting upon his engagement with Klansmen, he remarks, “To them, because of my 
skin, I am the enemy, and I must know why.” For Davis, curiosity and understanding 
are not ends in themselves, but instead, he regards them as necessary for white and 
black participants in American democracy to move forward from a history of racial 
injustice and intolerance to finding common ground.119 To put this in terms of this 
dissertation’s analysis, Davis believes an open-minded curiosity is needed for people 
of political differences to engage in a cooperative, equitable public discourse that 
promotes the common good.    
 With this context in mind, let us shift to examining Davis’s friendships. Two 
close friendships he forms are with Roger Kelly and Bob White, prominent leaders of 
Klan organizations in Maryland.120 These friendships are notable in that, after years 
of friendship with Davis, both Kelly and White change their beliefs about racial 
politics to the degree that they resign from the Klan. Surveying Davis’s first meetings 
with Kelly, White, and other Klansmen reveals a critical feature to how Davis 
maintains a cooperative dialogue: Davis goes into the first meeting aiming to 
understand his interlocutor’s beliefs (not to aggressively criticize their beliefs and 
                                                 
118 Daryl Davis, Klan-Destine Relationships: A Black Man’s Odyssey in the Ku Klux 
Klan (Far Hills, NJ: New Horizon Press, 1998), xii. 
119 Davis, xxv, 5, 8. 
120 The Ku Klux Klan is not a unified group existing across the country or even within 
a state. In many states, it is common that there exist multiple Klan organizations. 
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undermine their worldview) and to establish common ground between his interlocutor 
and himself.121     
 For Davis, finding common ground means discovering how his friend and 
himself can regard each other in terms of their similarities, not just their 
differences.122 In discussing a range of political issues with Kelly, they discover that 
they are “very much opposed to the recreational use of drugs.” Having found a 
political issue where their beliefs converged, Davis asks Kelly if he would consider 
engaging in a joint effort with blacks and whites that are not Klan members to address 
drug abuse. To Davis surprise, Kelly had already reached out to his local NAACP 
chapter “about having a parade in which the Klan and the NAACP would march 
together in an anti-drug crusade through the streets of the low-income projects to 
denounce drugs.”123 Unsurprisingly, the NAACP turned down his suggestion.  
                                                 
121 In an interview with NPR, Davis explains the significance of finding common 
ground with someone possessing opposing political beliefs, “If you spend five 
minutes with your worst enemy — it doesn't have to be about race, it could be about 
anything...you will find that you both have something in common. As you build upon 
those commonalities, you're forming a relationship, and as you build about that 
relationship, you're forming a friendship. That's what would happen. I didn't convert 
anybody. They saw the light and converted themselves.” Here we can ascertain two 
points: (1) Davis does not aim to convert his friends and (2) the conversion 
experience cannot be pinpointed to a single moment, but rather is a cumulative 
experience with each interaction between friends building upon the previous one. See 
Dwane Brown, “How One Man Convinced 200 Ku Klux Klan Members To Give Up 
Their Robes,” Race, NPR, August 20, 2017, https://www.npr.org/2017/08/20 
/544861933 /how-one-man-convinced-200-ku-klux-klan-members-to-give-up-their-
robes.  
122 Davis, Klan-Destine Relationships, 71. 
123 Davis, 44. 
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His efforts to reach out to the NAACP extend beyond his suggestion: Kelly 
was a member of the NAACP for a year, and his membership was not renewed 
because he was a Klansman.124 This point seems worth noting because maybe it 
should not be too surprising that Davis forms a close friendship with Kelly, given that 
Kelly has a previous history of reaching out to his political enemies. In comparison to 
other Klansmen that Davis meets, Kelly exhibits an immediate openness to a 
friendship with Davis, and this openness might be a result of his previous attempts to 
connect with his political enemies.  
 After their initial encounter, Davis reflects on their discussion. Based on his 
knowledge of the Klan, he had expected that it would have been impossible to have a 
two-hour conversation about politics with a Klan leader. He had expected that the 
meeting would have ended with violence. His experience with Kelly pushes him to 
revise his beliefs:  
I went looking for a violent man who hates people for no other reason than the 
difference in skin color. This quest failed. Roger Kelly does not hate, nor is he 
a violent man. Roger Kelly is a very opinionated man. Expecting to find that 
Roger Kelly and I had absolutely nothing in common, we found ourselves 
having some of the same concerns and sharing some of the same opinions. We 
disagreed on many things and saw humor in others, causing us both to laugh, 
thus proving that a Black man and a Klansman can stand on common ground, 
if only momentarily.125  
Here we can see Davis recognizing the dissonance between his expectations and his 
experience, and, in turn, his willingness to revise his beliefs about a person of a social 
identity he profoundly disagrees with on political issues. While acknowledging that 
                                                 
124 Davis, Klan-Destine Relationships, 44. 
125 Davis, 54-55. 
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there is deep disagreement about racial politics, he concedes that there are also points 
of agreement. This concession prevents him from fixating on disagreement as an 
obstacle to future cooperative dialogue.    
 As his friendship with Roger Kelly develops, Davis forms a friendship with 
another Klan leader named Bob White. After their first meeting, Davis observes that 
“though he seemed committed to his beliefs, he was receptive to change.”126 Since 
Davis found it significant to note this observation, it seems we should not overlook 
the importance of White’s receptivity to change as an indicator of the potential to 
revise his political beliefs. In this case, Bob White’s willingness, as a white 
Klansmen, to be friends with a black man indicated his receptivity to revising his 
political beliefs. The main reason his willingness to be friends with a black man 
should be regarded as an indication of receptivity to revising his political beliefs is 
that the Klan’s ideology condemns the association of blacks and whites; by 
befriending Davis, he is challenging the Klan’s political ideology.    
 In addition to detecting White’s openness to revising his political beliefs, 
Davis and White discover common ground between them on the most unexpected of 
political issues. Along with being a Klansmen, White had previously been an officer 
in the Baltimore City Police Department. Upon learning this about White, Davis 
inquires into White’s beliefs about the incident of police brutality involving Rodney 
King and four white LAPD officers (keep in mind, it is the 1990s when Davis and 
White begin their friendship). Given that White was a cop and Davis is an antiracism 
                                                 
126 Davis, Klan-Destine Relationships, 94.  
 129 
 
activist, we might expect disagreement between them with each siding with the 
person of their own social identity: Davis perceiving the actions of the LAPD officers 
as a violation of Rodney King’s civil rights and White believing the officers were 
justified in their use of force. Surprisingly, White and Davis agree that the LAPD 
officers were excessive in their use of force and blame their actions for the riots 
following their acquittal.127   
 However, when considering White’s recollection of his time as a police 
officer, his beliefs about the incident involving Rodney King become less surprising. 
White recalls that many white officers he worked with often resorted to the use of 
intimidation, aggression, and violence in their interactions with the black community. 
In contrast, White found diplomacy to be a more effective means for enforcing the 
law.128 Consequently, we should not be too surprised that the issue of police brutality 
would be an area of common ground between them.      
While conversing with Bob White, Davis explains why he focuses on finding 
common ground with his friends. Davis inquires, “Bob, there has to be something we 
can do jointly where we can stand on common ground, even if it’s just a small piece 
of common ground. Once this is accomplished, the fears are alleviated, and the 
                                                 
127 Davis, Klan-Destine Relationships, 102-103.  128 For example, when receiving complaints about homeless people being loud drunks 
in a back alley and leaving broken glass everywhere, White’s fellow officers would 
respond by intimidating and harassing the homeless drunks; whereas White politely 
asked them to keep the noise down and to deposit their empty bottles in the trash can. 
In exchange, White agreed to let them drink in the back alley without police 
interference. White found this diplomatic strategy to work well, as the police stopped 
receiving complaints about noise and broken glass bottles. See Daryl Davis, Klan-
Destine Relationships, 95.  
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common ground widens.”129 Davis bases the pursuit of common ground on his 
conviction that establishing common ground creates enough familiarity that fear of 
those politically different from ourselves subsides and, in turn, common ground 
enlarges. It seems plausible to suppose that Davis believes that political disagreement 
among individuals of different social identities is not as deep and intractable as many 
of us tend to believe, especially for those of us that do not regularly interact with 
people that disagree with our political beliefs. Through friendship, Davis seems to 
believe that enough similarities in political beliefs can be found to foster cooperation 
that leads to progress on resolving pressing political issues, such as racial injustice.130  
From Davis’s account of his friendships, a person’s prior experience of 
finding common ground with political opponents seems to indicate that he could find 
common ground in friendship with them. Similar to Roger Kelly’s prior experience of 
openness to working with a political enemy (the NAACP), Bob White as well 
previously displayed an openness to working cooperatively with a political enemy. 
While incarcerated at a city jail, Bob White had worked closely with an inmate that 
was a member of the Black Panthers. They helped fellow inmates unfamiliar with the 
legal system to become more knowledgeable about their legal rights.131  
                                                 
129 Davis, Klan-Destine Relationships, 114.  
130 Davis, 117.  
131 As White explains, “He was a Black Panther, and I was a Ku Klux Klansman, and 
we were working side by side down there for everybody… It seemed odd to other 
people who saw us getting along pretty good together… We became pretty good 
friends.” See Davis, Klan-Destine Relationships, 128-129. 
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This commonality between Roger Kelly and Bob White is striking because 
out of all the Klansmen that Davis writes about in his book, the two Klansmen with 
whom he develops enduring, close friendships both possess a personal history of 
reaching out to work with people with whom there is deep disagreement about 
political issues. Especially given that close friendship does not develop with every 
Klansman that Davis meets, I wonder if these personal histories are indispensable to 
their willingness to become friends with Davis.132  
Moreover, these personal histories of making connections with political 
enemies raises a significant concern: when considering the cause of Kelly and 
White’s changes in beliefs about racial politics, we can question whether it is their 
friendship with Davis or this aspect of their personal histories that can be attributed as 
the primary cause of the changes in their beliefs. As already mentioned, close 
friendship does not develop with every Klansman Davis meets, and presumably not 
every Klansman that Davis is close friends with ends up changing their beliefs about 
the Klan. As such, we can ask whether it is the close friendship that is doing the work 
here or is it this aspect of the friends that plays the decisive role in them changing 
their beliefs about the Klan.  
                                                 
132 Considering that 200 Klansmen befriended by Davis have quit the Klan, my point 
here might be better supported if we knew more about the individual stories of these 
200 former Klansmen. It could be the case that many of them do have personal 
histories of working with their political opponents before becoming friends with 
Davis, or it may be that this commonality only emerged in the Klansmen discussed in 
his book. 
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Concerning a search for existing friendships that could provide support for my 
proposal, this question presents a serious challenge. For the sake of this argument, let 
us presume for the moment that changes in political beliefs indicate a reduction in 
one’s susceptibility to engage in biased political cognition—in the next section, we 
will discuss why this presumption is problematic. It would be incredibly difficult to 
draw the conclusion that close friendship itself reduces our susceptibility to engage in 
biased political cognition, if, in fact, within the context of close friendship, it is a 
personal history of engaging with those socially and politically different from 
ourselves that plays the decisive role in ameliorating our susceptibility. 
Unfortunately, in Davis’s account of his friendships, there is not enough data to 
determine which is the case. Nonetheless, in a future search for existing friendships to 
support my proposal, there would need to be a means of determining whether close 
friendship itself or personal history plays the primary causal role in order to 
determine if close friendship can ameliorate our susceptibility to engage in biased 
political cognition. 
 
Limitations of Daryl Davis’s Friendships as Examples of My Proposal 
 By the end of Davis’s account, the reader gets the impression that, as a result 
of their friendship with Davis, Kelly and White change some of their beliefs about 
racial politics, and these changes are substantive enough to lead them to resign from 
the Klan. At first pass, we might be tempted to infer from this change in their beliefs 
that their susceptibility to engage in biased political cognition was lessened. We 
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might be inclined to conclude that, as Davis helps them to become more impartial in 
their political cognition concerning racial politics, they abandon the Klan’s inaccurate 
understanding of race and commitment to exclusively advancing the interests of 
whites. As their susceptibility to engage in biased political cognition decreases, their 
beliefs about racial politics are revised, and they decide to leave the Klan.  
Though, upon closer inspection, such an inference cannot be conclusively 
drawn. It does seem plausible to infer that some substantive change has occurred in 
the political cognition of Kelly and White, that some shift in their thinking about race 
and the Klan preceded their decision to leave the Klan. Nonetheless, there is 
insufficient evidence in Davis’s account to show that the shift in their thinking means 
their susceptibility to engage in biased political cognition was reduced.  
To draw this conclusion, we would need to know more specific details about 
their engagement in biased political cognition. As we know little about the nature of 
their engagement in biased political cognition before friendship with Davis, we do not 
know the specific motivations that had been guiding their political cognition. 
Relatedly, there is no evidence to suggest that Davis successfully assisted them with 
(1) recognizing instances of their engagement in biased political cognition and (2) 
cultivating impartiality in their political cognition. In fact, we have no evidence that 
suggests they ever discussed the psychological phenomena associated with biased 
political cognition.   
It does seem likely that they were motivated to express political beliefs that 
affirmed their membership in and loyalty to Christian, heterosexual, working-class 
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whites. Given the racist and homophobic remarks made in their conversations with 
Davis, their political cognition was likely motivated to form beliefs that protected this 
social identity at the expense of the interests of people of color and LBGTQ+ folks. 
Though, to be clear, this is a generous reading of Davis’s account and is merely 
speculation on my part.  
However, even if sufficient evidence for these claims existed, we still could 
not conclude that their susceptibility to engage in biased political cognition lessened. 
It is possible that friendship with Davis facilitated Kelly and White to shift their 
beliefs about the Klan’s effectiveness to secure the interests of their affinity group, 
but their susceptibility to engage in biased political cognition remained unchanged. It 
could be the case that they are still committed to advancing the interests of Christian, 
heterosexual, working-class whites, but doubt that the Klan’s actions advance their 
interests—in the next section, we will see this kind of shift in the thinking of 
Klansman C. P. Ellis.    
Furthermore, even if we could establish that a reduced susceptibility was the 
effect of close friendship, we still could not establish that friendship was the cause of 
this effect. We have already discussed one reason why it would be challenging to 
conclusively assert that close friendship with Davis is the cause of reduced 
susceptibility to engage in biased political cognition. One striking similarity between 
Kelly and White is that they both had personal histories of engaging with their 
political enemies. If they had reduced their susceptibility to engage in biased political 
cognition, it is quite possible that this aspect of their personal histories was 
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instrumental in achieving this effect. Without knowing more details of their political 
cognition and their friendship with Davis, it is difficult to determine whether 
friendship or their personal history was more decisive in improving their political 
cognition.  
Related concerns about the cause of the change in Kelly and White’s political 
cognition arise when considering Davis’s character. Davis is an exceptional person 
with an unusual upbringing: he was taught to seek out the inherent good in all people, 
to withhold judgment, and to be curious about those who are different from himself. 
Also, Davis has made it his life’s mission to understand racism. Further, given the 
Klan’s history of violence, it is rather remarkable that Davis, as a black man, 
undertakes the work he has done in befriending Klansmen. With all this in mind, if 
Kelly and White’s susceptibility were reduced, it seems reasonable to question to 
what degree Davis’s character was instrumental in achieving that reduction.  
Similarly, upon meeting White, Davis notes his receptivity to changing his 
beliefs. Thus, we as well can question how instrumental White’s cognitive 
dispositions proved to be in achieving a reduction in his susceptibility. All in all, there 
is not sufficient evidence to conclude that friendship was the sole or primary cause of 
a reduction in their susceptibility to engage in biased political cognition (if such 
reduction had occurred).    
These concerns about conclusively determining that a reduction in 
susceptibility to engage in biased political cognition is an effect of close friendship 
and close friendship as the primary cause of said effect pose critical challenges for 
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finding empirical evidence to support my proposal. From examining Davis’s account, 
it is clear that we cannot conclude from a significant revision of political beliefs that a 
reduction in susceptibility to engage in biased political cognition has occurred. Much 
more knowledge about the two friends’ political cognition is needed to determine if 
friendship reduces their susceptibility to engage in biased political cognition.133  
 
Ann Atwater and C. P. Ellis’ Friendship and Its Limitations As An Example  
Our examination of Daryl Davis’s friendships with Klansmen revealed 
significant challenges that we would need to contend with to provide empirical 
evidence that supports my proposal. Given that Davis’s account is written by one of 
the friends in the friendships being discussed, we might wonder if similar challenges 
regarding adequate evidence arise in an account of a friendship written by an author 
that is studying the friendship in question. It seems likely that someone purposefully 
studying a friendship might be better at gathering the relevant data needed for 
assessing whether or not the friendship aided in reducing the friends’ susceptibility to 
engage in biased political cognition. The friendship between Ann Atwater and C. P. 
Ellis provides an example that allows us to explore this possibility, as the account of 
their friendship is based off interviews and historical research conducted by award-
winning, non-fiction author Osha Gray Davidson. Through examining Davidson’s 
account, we will encounter similar challenges to those that arose in examining 
                                                 
133 The specifics of the kind of knowledge needed is detailed in this chapter’s final 
section. See page 160. 
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Davis’s account. However, Davidson’s account allows us to expand upon the 
description of the crucial challenges besetting a search for empirical evidence to 
support my proposal.   
Atwater and Ellis’ friendship provides an excellent example of political 
enemies who through working together on a common cause establish a friendship that 
leads to a significant erosion of the depth of political disagreement between them. 
When they began working together in July 1971 in Durham, North Carolina, Atwater 
was a militant black activist, and C. P. Ellis was the Exalted Grand Cyclops of the 
Durham Ku Klux Klan (meaning he was the official leader of the Klan in Durham). 
Though the Supreme Court ruled in 1954 that segregated schools were 
unconstitutional, schools in Durham were still segregated in 1971. During the 1960s, 
desegregation was a central issue in the increasing racial tensions in Durham. To 
manage the integration of schools after the Durham district court ordered the 
desegregation of schools, the city council called for a charrette, a collaborative 
process that involved ten days of town meetings to resolve issues related to the 
implementation of the court order. Participants were recruited from the different 
demographic groups comprising Durham, and Atwater and Ellis were appointed to 
co-chair the meetings.   
Charrettes bring together a diverse group of people with the explicit intention 
of working out differences. The meetings are designed to provide a controlled 
environment that generates intense reactions among participants during hours-long 
face-to-face meetings convened over subsequent nights. Osha Gray Davidson 
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describes charrettes in the following manner: “The trick was to draw out people’s 
deepest longings and fears, their frustrations, and their dreams—while preventing 
these raw and antipodean emotions, once exposed, from combusting into violence… 
and then redirect that energy toward a healthier resolution.”134 As we will see with 
the tense back story between Atwater and Ellis, such a trick will seem like magic. 
Though, before moving on to the tense back story between them, the fact that 
their friendship forms within the context of a charrette presents a challenge using this 
example as evidence supporting my proposal. For the moment, let us assume that 
there is sufficient evidence to conclude that Atwater and Ellis’ susceptibility to 
engage in biased political cognition is reduced—later, we will examine the challenges 
besetting this assumption. Given the above description of the charrette, we could 
doubt that the primary cause of the reduction in their susceptibility was the friendship 
itself. Through the charrette’s focus on participants confronting the underlying 
influences on their beliefs, it could be that the charrette cultivated the appropriate 
atmosphere for Ellis and Atwater confronting their engagement in biased political 
cognition and receiving the support they needed to become more impartial in their 
thinking about segregation. As such, it seems plausible that the charrette could have 
been the cause of the reduction in susceptibility to engage in biased political 
cognition. Unfortunately, there is not enough evidence to conclusively know the 
cause of reduced susceptibility, even if we could establish that it occurred.  
                                                 
134 Osha Gray Davidson, The Best of Enemies: Race and Redemption in the New 
South (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2018), 249-50. 
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Concerning a future search for examples of friendships that could serve as 
evidence supporting my proposal, the problem of ascertaining the cause of reduced 
susceptibility in Atwater and Ellis’ friendship serves an additional challenge to 
determining if friendship is the sole or primary cause of reduced susceptibility to 
engage in biased political cognition. When discussing Daryl Davis’s friendships with 
Klansmen, we discovered that the friends’ character and personal histories could be 
potential causes of a reduced susceptibility, as opposed to features of the friendship 
itself (such as trust and intimacy). With Atwater and Ellis’ friendship, it seems the 
context in which their friendship forms (i.e., the charrette) could as well be a potential 
cause. Thus, when studying potential examples, we need a way of determining the 
causal role played by features of the friends themselves (such as character and 
personal history) and the social context in which the friendship forms to ascertain if 
friendship reduces susceptibility to engage in biased political cognition.          
With Davis’s account of his friendships, one challenge that arose for 
determining if susceptibility to engage in biased political cognition was reduced is 
that we did not know much about the political thought of the friends before their 
friendship with Davis formed. In Davidson’s account, we get some insight into 
Atwater and Ellis’ political thought before their friendship formed. Atwater and Ellis 
did not merely profoundly disagree about political issues related to civil rights but 
instead exhibited deep-seated animosity toward one another. In the years preceding 
the charrette, both had verbally quarreled at city council, school board, and county 
meetings. As Davidson describes in his account of their friendship, “Ann and C.P. 
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sparred directly at city council meetings. The encounters were usually tense, with 
potential violence roiling just below the surface…”135 The potential for violence is no 
exaggeration: each had once intended to kill the other.136  
In light of this combative past, we might find it surprising that Atwater and 
Ellis not only were able to work together to integrate schools in Durham but develop 
a close friendship that endured until Ellis’ passing in 2005. Thus, it would be helpful 
to have a sense of their lives before the formation of their friendship to understand the 
animosity that existed between them and appreciate the depth of personal 
transformation induced by their friendship. Growing up poor, black, and female in 
mid-twentieth-century South, Ann Atwater held very different beliefs than C.P. Ellis. 
Davidson describes Atwater as holding “the conviction that all whites were simply 
and unalterably bad. Yes, some of them had a pleasant exterior. But experience had 
taught her this much: scratch the surface, and you’ll find the racist.”137  
                                                 
135 Davidson, The Best of Enemies, 230.  
136 During a city council meeting, as Ellis delivered his typical incendiary, vulgar, and 
racist rant to the city council, Atwater lost her composure. She reached into her purse 
and took out a knife. Ellis was unaware of what was going on behind him, as Atwater 
rose to her feet and headed toward him. She fixed her eyes on her target: a spot on his 
neck where she intended to shove the knife in him. Fortunately for both Ellis and 
Atwater, two of Atwater’s friends were in front of her, and they grabbed her before 
she could complete her attack. Before this incident, during a civil rights protest being 
led by Atwater through downtown Durham, Ellis waited along the planned protest 
route with a shotgun concealed under an overcoat. He had planned to assassinate 
Atwater as she walked by him. Fortunately, the protest ended up taking a different 
route through Durham, and Atwater and Ellis’ paths never crossed that day. See Osha 
Gray Davidson, Best of Enemies, 199, 233. 
137 Davidson, 4.  
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A life of hard work and poverty has contributed to Atwater developing what 
she would later describe as a “meanness—a shapeless and explosive anger that lay 
beneath the surface.”138 For Atwater, being a religious person only intensified her 
meanness: “…devotion transformed simple anger into righteous wrath. At these 
times, she resembled a biblical prophet, her face clouded over, her immense body 
trembling with holy rage, one finger thrust like a spear straight at the sinner’s 
heart.”139  This meanness and righteous anger would manifest in her participation in 
public discourse.140 Given Atwater’s propensity to exhibit anger while engaging in 
public discourse with her political enemies, we see the severity of the challenge she 
faced when she had to work with the leader of Durham’s Ku Klux Klan and how 
remarkable it is that them working together facilitated a close friendship between 
them. 
While Ellis lacks Atwater’s propensity for anger, he does have a propensity 
for volatile displays of hatred towards blacks when engaging in public discourse. 
Comparable to how the anguish of poverty gave rise to Atwater’s anger, the anguish 
of poverty played a decisive role in Ellis’ acceptance of the Klan’s ideology of hate. 
Davidson provides the following stark description of Ellis’ life prospects:  
                                                 
138 Davidson, Best of Enemies, 37. 
139 Davidson, 73. 
140 As an example, when a Durham school board official declined to listen to her and 
attempted to force her out of his office, Atwater seized the telephone from his desk 
and heaved it at his head. Though she missed, the official sensed it was in his best 
interest to sit down and talk over the issue Atwater had come to discuss with him. 
Incidents like this, where she fearlessly confronted white authorities, earned her the 
nickname “Roughhouse Annie.” See, Davidson, Best of Enemies, 174, 183. 
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C.P. and his one sister were raised in chaos and poverty, as their parents had 
been, and the future held for them nothing more than it had for those who had 
gone before: a few years of schooling and then the mills. If they didn’t die 
there, amidst the chattering machinery and cotton dust, they could look 
forward to a brief and exhausted “retirement” before returning to the red 
Piedmont soil, their lives having slipped away, trivial and unnoticed.141 
This poignant description illustrates the desperation that Ellis endures from his 
poverty, and why Ellis ardently believed in the Klan’s ideology of hate. The Klan's 
political ideology not only explained the cause of his desperation but provided hope 
that it could be overcome. Equally important, the Klan provided Ellis with a 
community that emotionally supported him in persisting in the face of such 
desperation.  
 In Chapter 2 of this dissertation, we discussed the findings of social 
psychologists that suggest our need for emotional connection and support and a sense 
of belonging within a community can significantly influence the political beliefs that 
we hold, and such needs can inhibit revision of our beliefs when they are challenged 
in public discourse. We can regard C. P. Ellis’ decision to join the Klan, adopt their 
racist ideology, and remain committed to this ideology before working with Atwater 
as consistent with these findings. When Ellis joined the Klan as an adult, he soon 
found a sense of belonging within a community. In an interview with Davidson, 
remembering his official induction ceremony at the Klan hall in Durham, Ellis 
describes,  
“he felt the old shame of poverty, failure, and purposelessness melt away. A 
lifetime of being an outsider was over. He felt blissfully submerged into a new 
and yet familiar community. The Klansmen were the descendants of failed 
                                                 
141 Davidson, The Best of Enemies, 63-4.  
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farmers and broken mill hands just like himself. C.P. knew that each one had 
his own story of struggle and disillusionment, and at that moment, he felt for 
them that deepest of all bonds, the bond of shared suffering.142     
With the Klan providing him a profound sense of belonging, we can understand why 
Ellis expresses political beliefs riddled with hatred towards blacks when engaged in 
public discourse: public expressions of such political beliefs not only maintained his 
membership within his community, but they facilitated his promotion to the top 
leadership position in the Durham Ku Klux Klan. He has much to lose personally and 
socially from significantly revising his political beliefs.   
 This description of Atwater and Ellis before their friendship allows us to track 
the changes in their political beliefs concerning racial politics throughout the charrette 
and as the intimacy of their friendship deepens. Unfortunately, this description does 
not allow us to arrive at any conclusions concerning their susceptibility to engage in 
biased political cognition. It seems possible that Ellis is motivated to express racist 
beliefs in part to maintain his status within and express his loyalty to the Klan. At the 
same time, upon further investigation of his political cognition, it would not be 
surprising to learn that Ellis consciously reasons in a racist manner, in the sense that 
he is aware of and intends to hold political beliefs that express hatred of blacks. It 
seems just as likely that dogmatism, arrogance, and close-mindedness influence his 
reasoning about segregation as does a susceptibility to engage in biased political 
cognition.  
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Similarly, Atwater may be motivated to express beliefs about whites and 
segregation that maintain her status within and express her loyalty to Durham’s 
impoverished black community. Likewise, upon further investigation of her political 
cognition, it would not be surprising to learn that Atwater is well aware of how her 
anger towards whites influences her reasoning about segregation. It could be the case 
that she consciously intends to engage in false generalizations of all whites as being 
racist as a way to rally the black community around her efforts to achieve integration. 
From the available evidence, it is not clear that she is engaged in biased political 
cognition, and thus, we cannot determine how it specifically manifests in her political 
cognition. Thus, we cannot conclusively show that their friendship reduced their 
susceptibility to engage in biased political cognition. Nonetheless, their friendship is 
intriguing and inspiring in showing us how friendship can transform two people’s 
opposing political beliefs, and in the process, change them from political enemies into 
close friends.   
Through listening to one another and members of the community participating 
in the charrette, Atwater and Ellis begin to arrive at realizations that challenge their 
prior conceptions of not only each other but of their respective social identities. Akin 
to Daryl Davis’s experiences of listening and talking with his political antagonists, 
Ellis begins to find that common ground exists between Atwater and himself and 
between the poor, black community and the poor, white community of Durham. As 
Davidson relays,  
For the first time in his life, C.P. really listened to black people, and he was 
stunned to hear, over and over, his own concerns coming from their 
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mouths. When arguments erupted among kids at school, it was the working-
class children—black and white—who were always blamed and punished. 
New supplies went to the suburban schools, while inner-city schools made do 
with worn-out equipment. Teachers spent more time with kids from “better” 
homes and believed their excuses when papers were late or assignments lost. 
The poor kids were called “liars” and “cheaters.” It had never occurred to C.P. 
that black children were treated as disdainfully as his kids were, and it puzzled 
him to hear it now.143  
It begins to dawn on Ellis that the black community did not cause the struggles 
endured by his family. Instead, there exist black families struggling amidst poverty in 
similar ways as his own family and the families of Klansmen. The charrette became 
an experience that humanized blacks for Ellis. Similarly, for Atwater, “while a layer 
of racism may be nearly inevitable among white Americans... beneath [this layer] 
Ann discovered something more profound: a recognition of our shared humanity.”144  
 As mentioned earlier, even if we had sufficient evidence to conclude that 
Atwater and Ellis’ susceptibility to engage in biased political cognition was reduced, 
we still could not conclusively determine the cause of the reduction, as their 
participation in the charrette casts doubt on their friendship being the primary cause 
of a reduced susceptibility. From participating in the charrette, they acquired new 
information about members of social identities different from their own. As we will 
soon see, this new information about similarities between working-class whites and 
blacks in their experiences of poverty will play a key role in Ellis’ decision to leave 
the Klan and to become a union organizer fighting for better working conditions for 
both black and white workers. If part of how these drastic life changes come about is 
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through a reduced susceptibility to engage in biased political cognition when 
reasoning about racial politics, then it seems plausible that his participation in the 
charrette played an essential role in improving his political cognition.      
However, even if we cannot determine the specific causal role played, it does 
seem that friendship with Atwater does play some role in shifting his political thought 
about racial politics. A crucial point that sparks the intimacy needed for close 
friendship to develop between them occurs during a private conversation following a 
charrette meeting. Ellis asks about Atwater’s children’s well-being, and Atwater 
admits that her children have been struggling at school as a result of her participation 
in the charrette. Teachers and kids tease Atwater’s children by telling them that their 
mother is a fool for working with a Klansman. Ellis is stunned, as his children are 
teased for the same reason: teachers and kids are telling his children that their father 
is a sellout for working with a black woman. Atwater attempts to reassure her 
children that she is participating in the charrette to ensure they receive a quality 
education that provides them with a better future. Ellis is incredulous, as he tells his 
children the same thing.145  
This exchange primed a candid discussion of the parenting struggles they face 
as a result of poverty and the poor conditions of their childhood. It struck them how 
familiar each other’s stories were to one another. Even more perplexing was the 
realization that they were sharing their most intimate grievances, doubts, and failures 
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with a person that they intensely despised. This deepening of intimacy between Ellis 
and Atwater culminated in the following interaction, which they recount to Davidson: 
He looked at her and it was as if he was seeing her for the first time. He was 
stunned by what he saw. Mirrored in her face were the same deeply etched 
lines of work and worry that marked his own face. And suddenly he was 
crying. The tears came without warning, and once started, he was unable to 
stop them. Ann was dumbfounded, but she reacted instinctively by reaching 
out and taking his hand in her own. She tried to comfort him, stroking his 
hand and murmuring, “It’s okay, it’s okay,” as he sobbed. Then she, too, 
began to cry. If anyone had walked into the auditorium just then, they would 
have found it hard to believe what they saw: the Exalted Cyclops of the Ku 
Klux Klan and Durham’s most militant black leader sitting together, hand in 
hand, weeping copiously and oblivious to the world around them.146   
Bear in mind, Ellis as well had shed tears during his induction ceremony. Then, he 
was overcome by the moment, as he felt the deepest of all bonds binding him to his 
fellow Klansmen: the bond of shared suffering. Here again, we see Ellis reduced to 
tears as he feels that deepest of all bonds binding Atwater and himself.  
 While this powerful moment would prove key to Ellis’ personal 
transformation, the moment itself did not single-handedly bring about the overhaul of 
Ellis’ political beliefs about desegregation. As his entire social network resides within 
the Klan, it would be unreasonable to expect him to abandon them suddenly. 
Nonetheless, Ellis’ experience with Atwater had profoundly moved him, and he 
sensed changes in how he understood the world were coming. As Davidson 
characterizes it, “…a door previously unknown to C.P. had been opened to him. But 
he had not walked through it. And he did not want to.”147 Ellis was not ready to 
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upend his life as he knew it. However, his experience with Atwater affected his 
engagement in the subsequent charrette meetings, as he found himself more open to 
listening to the perspectives of black community members and more attentive of the 
parallels between the struggles of working-class whites and working-class blacks.148  
 It is only as the charrette ends that Ellis significantly revises his beliefs about 
blacks, though not about school desegregation. He no longer believes that blacks are 
responsible for the generational poverty endured by working-class whites. Ellis now 
believes it is the middle and upper-class whites, the factory owners and 
businesspeople, that keep both working-class whites and blacks in generational 
poverty. Despite this realization, he was not confident that the desegregation of 
schools would improve the fortunes of working-class white children. Nonetheless, 
this realization was compelling enough for him to stop opposing the black 
community’s efforts towards desegregation. Friendship here did not produce an 
agreement on divisive issues, but it did lessen the tension of disagreement enough to 
bring an end to public opposition: as the leader of the Klan, Ellis would no longer be 
standing in the way of integration of Durham’s schools.149  
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149 Davidson’s telling of Ellis’ revision of his political beliefs about blacks: “Hard as 
it was for him to accept, he had come to believe that [the Klan] had been fighting the 
wrong people for years. It wasn’t that he loved blacks. He didn’t, at least not as a 
group. And he still believed in social segregation. But he now realized that blacks 
simply were not the problem. ‘How could they be?,’ he reasoned. Except for a few 
executives over at the Mutual, blacks in Durham had no money or power. They could 
barely feed their own families. Their leaders had been unable to stop urban renewal 
from rumbling through the heart of the black community like a tank overrunning an 
enemy redoubt. C.P. had toured their crumbling and ill-equipped schools. He had 
visited the bleak housing projects and seen how people there were fighting each 
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 Ann Atwater as well is transformed by the budding friendship with C. P. Ellis. 
The meanness and righteous anger that characterized her engagement in public 
discourse with members of the white community softens. She becomes more able to 
exhibit compassion to those that she profoundly disagrees with about desegregation, 
in particular, C. P. Ellis. While she does not agree with C. P. that schools should 
remain segregated, she does show compassion for the suffering he is experiencing as 
he finds himself revising his beliefs.150  
 From the depth of disagreement that erodes between them as they revise their 
beliefs about their social identities, at first pass, we might be inclined to think this is 
an indication that their susceptibility to engage in biased political cognition was 
reduced. We might think that the powerful moment that deepened intimacy between 
                                                 
day for survival. These were the people who were supposedly oppressing whites? No, 
if any group was holding poor whites down, it was the wealthy white factory owners 
and businessmen who had called the shots in Durham since the days of Buck Duke—
the same men who had been meeting behind the scenes with C.P. for years, slipping 
him a few dollars “for the cause” and telling him what a great job he was doing 
fighting the coloreds. He saw clearly now how those men had used him to keep poor 
blacks and poor whites fighting each other—while they kept control of the reins of 
power. And what, he wondered, had the Klan actually accomplished for white 
working people with the endless meetings and bitter fights against desegregation? Not 
a damned thing, he thought. All it had done was to make a miserable existence a little 
more miserable for poor and uneducated blacks—people with whom he had more in 
common than he had with the wealthy white citizens of Hope Valley and the other 
fashionable Durham neighborhoods” (Osha Gray Davidson, The Best of Enemies, 
281-2). 
150 Recalling the celebration to conclude the charrette, Atwater remembers thinking of 
Ellis, “Poor man, she thought to herself, as she had several times during the past 
week. Ever since the night they had cried together in the auditorium, she saw how 
hard all of this was on him. She saw him suffering and wanted to ease his pain, but 
knew that that was beyond her power. Poor man, she thought again” See Osha Gray 
Davidson, The Best of Enemies, 281. 
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Ellis and Atwater led them to grow closer as friends, especially since the charrette 
required that they spend much of their days working closely together. As their 
friendship developed and they worked together to resolve the issue of school 
segregation in Durham, they could have helped one another to become more aware of 
their engagement in biased political cognition and encouraged each other to be more 
motivated by accuracy and the common good in their reasoning about segregation. 
Through these efforts, their susceptibility to engage in biased political cognition could 
have lessened. We might think that their ability to find common ground and regard 
one another more compassionately attests to the improvement of their political 
cognition. We might think it is evidence that they are becoming more impartial in 
their political cognition. This increased impartiality could have, in part, contributed to 
them agreeing to integrate the schools.  
 Though, upon closer examination, such claims and inferences cannot be 
supported. The main reason they cannot be supported is that Davidson’s published 
account does not contain many details of their friendship following the powerful 
moment that deepened intimacy between Atwater and Ellis and the conclusion of the 
charrette where Ellis officially endorses desegregating Durham’s schools. I say 
published account because it may be that in the notes and tapes from his interviews 
with Atwater and Ellis that there exist more details about how their friendship 
developed during that time, but, unfortunately, none of those details made it into the 
book.  
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At the same time, whatever evidence we did find that would be suggestive of 
this hypothetical trajectory of their friendship, it is highly likely that it would lack the 
relevant details to support it conclusively. One reason for this is that, at the time of 
the events being discussed (1971), scholarship on the psychological phenomena 
associated with biased political cognition was in its infancy. It is all but certain that 
they did not discuss identity-protective cognition or confirmation bias. Thus, 
whatever evidence we find that they did help one another to improve their political 
cognition would be merely suggestive.  
 This limitation of Davidson’s account does bring up a critical challenge that a 
future search for examples of friendships would have to contend with to find 
empirical evidence in support of my proposal. A future search would need to find 
friendships where the friends possess knowledge of the psychological phenomena 
associated with biased political cognition. In Atwater and Ellis’ case, their lack of 
knowledge can be attributed to their friendship having formed before such 
scholarship had been widely available. Nonetheless, we might still think many 
friendships that at first pass seem to be suitable candidates for supporting my 
proposal would be friendships where the friends are mostly ignorant of the relevant 
psychological phenomena. Even if the friends do possess some awareness of the 
psychological phenomena (for example, many folks have heard of confirmation bias), 
how likely is it that they have sufficiently studied such phenomena to effectively help 
their friend recognize instances where such phenomena manifest in their political 
cognition? It would not be unsurprising if it turned out that most friendships that 
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strike us as suitable for supporting my proposal contained friends that were 
insufficiently knowledgeable of the psychological phenomena, and thus, they are 
unable to offer us conclusive evidence in support of my proposal.  
 
Friendships in A Divided Political Culture 
Thus far, in the examples discussed in this chapter, the friendship itself 
provides information about the very political issue for which the friends had been 
presumedly engaged in motivated reasoning. For instance, in Roger Kelly and Bob 
White’s case, their alleged motivated reasoning is about another group of people 
(blacks), a group to which their new friend, Daryl Davis, actually belongs. This is 
quite different from the kind of political issue and friendship discussed in the 
preceding chapters. In our discussions of Casey and Landry deliberating about global 
climate change, the situation is very different in that the friendship itself does not 
involve friends whose social identity itself is involved in the political issue for which 
they are susceptible to engaging in biased political cognition. In contrast, the 
examples provided in this chapter are examples where the beliefs challenged and 
changed concern a social group for which the friend belongs. As such, in this section, 
we will examine friendships of a different sort—the sort that more resemble Casey 
and Landry from earlier chapters. These will be examples of friendship where the 
political cognition being examined is not evaluative reasoning about a social group to 
which the other friend belongs. In one case, the friendships will have formed before 
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discussing politics, which contrasts with the examples thus far where it is political 
issues that are central to the friendships’ formation.   
Nonetheless, similar to the examples considered thus far, we will encounter 
comparable challenges for using them as unqualified support for my proposal. There 
will be insufficient evidence for concluding that their friendship mitigated the friends’ 
susceptibility to engage in biased political cognition. However, there will be enough 
evidence to suggest that these examples should be considered for future study, as they 
are suggestive of the kind of examples that could support my proposal.  
In the NPR podcast Next Door Strangers, journalist Andrea Smardon explores 
the theme of “finding connection in a time of division.”151 Within our current 
polarized political culture, Smardon investigates how people of different social 
identities and political affiliations interpersonally connect with one another. Similar 
to this dissertation’s aspiration, Smardon aims to inspire her listeners to form 
connections with people whose political views are drastically different from their 
own. Though she does not explicitly instruct her listeners to form close friendships, 
the podcast’s episodes do focus on friendships that have formed between people of 
different political views.  
In the second episode, Smardon interviews army veteran Jason Comstock. 
Upon returning from service in Iraq, Comstock soon found himself angry and 
depressed, and thus, he sought out therapy. During therapy, he discovered that one 
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thing he was missing in civilian life was the close friendships that he had formed in 
the army. As a result, Comstock joined his local chapter of the veterans’ support 
group Team Red, White, and Blue. According to their mission statement, their 
primary goal is “to enrich the lives of America’s veterans by connecting them to their 
community through physical and social activity.” One component for achieving this 
goal is “people: creating authentic connections (defined as genuine, quality, 
supportive relationships that generate mutual trust and accountability), reflected in an 
increased number of close relationships…”152 From this description, we can infer that 
Team Red, White, and Blue seeks to cultivate close friendships among its members 
that resemble complete friendship concerning the features of mutual intimacy, trust, 
and emotional support. We also get the sense that unlike the friendships that we have 
considered thus far, political deliberation is not central to these friendships’ 
formation. Instead, enriching the lives of veterans and providing them with a 
supportive community in their transition to civilian life is central to the friendships’ 
formation.   
Upon joining Team Red, White, and Blue, Comstock met other veterans and 
local supporters of veterans. They would go on hikes together and train for athletic 
events to benefit charitable causes. Through this time spent together, he formed close 
friendships with several of the group members. He found that his depression and 
angered lessened as he came to share his life with people that supported him daily. As 
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Comstock reports, “Because I have these friends, I know that, when things do get 
hard, I have people that are not going to ignore me or judge me, but who are going to 
drop what they are doing to help me out.”153  
As trust and intimacy deepened within these friendships, politics became a 
regular topic of discussion. Comstock discovered that his group of friends are “an 
ideologically diverse group with different political views.” He contends that this 
aspect of his group of friends has opened up his mind about politics. When they go 
running together, Comstock will raise a political issue on his mind and ask for his 
friends’ perspectives. Comstock declares,  
I hear these other points of view that I would not have otherwise heard, and it 
has formed my views and even changed some of my views. Thanks to this 
very tight group of friends, it has gotten to the point where I will wait to form 
a view until I have had a chance to visit with them. Because of these 
relationships, because of the love that I have for them, their views matter to 
me.154   
Comstock self-report seems to indicate that his friendships have aided him in forming 
political views that are responsive to viewpoints different from his own. Additionally, 
he has come to value input from those whose ideological commitments are different 
from his own when forming his political beliefs. Unfortunately, Smardon’s interview 
of Comstock does not provide any examples of this process for forming political 
beliefs. Moreover, Smardon and Comstock never discuss which specific political 
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2018, in Next Door Strangers, produced by KUER, podcast, MP3 audio, accessed 
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issues for which his beliefs have changed and which issues his beliefs have formed 
only after consulting his friends.  As such, we cannot be sure that his friends’ input 
has aided him in being better motivated by accuracy and the common good in 
comparison to when he formed beliefs without the input of his friends.  
Nevertheless, Comstock’s self-report does seem to suggest that he is striving 
to improve his political cognition and his close friendships with those politically 
different from himself are aiding him in this endeavor. With further investigation, we 
might be able to determine if his close friendships have aided his political cognition 
to become more impartial and him being better motivated by accuracy and the 
common good when forming political beliefs than he was before the formation of his 
friendships.  
The potential of this example for supporting my proposal highlights the 
limitations it currently possesses, which are similar to the examples considered 
previously. Given that no specific political belief or issue is mentioned in the episode, 
this example lacks sufficient evidence necessary to determine whether or not 
Comstock and his friends are engaged in biased political cognition. There as well is 
no evidence to suggest that he and his friends ever discussed the psychological 
phenomena associated with biased political cognition. Thus, there is no evidence 
from this example to conclude that close friendship in practice does aid in friends (1) 
becoming more aware of their engagement in biased political cognition and (2) 
reducing their susceptibility to engage in biased political cognition.  
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From the interview, we as well do not get the impression that Comstock and 
his friends are actively helping each other to improve their political cognition. 
Unfortunately, we cannot point to a specific instance that clearly shows them aiding 
each other to be better motivated by accuracy and the common good when 
deliberating about politics. The only evidence we possess is Comstock’s assertion that 
his friends have helped him to be more open-minded in his thinking about politics.  
We have to rely on his self-assessment, as he never provides evidence of how he 
became more open-minded regarding a specific political issue. Much like Davis’s 
friendships and the friendship between Atwater and Ellis, Comstock’s friendships are 
merely suggestive as evidence. Though, since these friendships are presently 
developing, it is possible that upon further investigation, we could gather sufficient 
evidence to assess whether or not my proposal works in practice. 
Another potential source of evidence that could be used to assess my proposal 
is the friendships found within the Respect and Rebellion project. In the fifth episode 
of Next Door Strangers, Smardon interviews Liz Joyner and Jacob Hess, the project’s 
leaders. This project “believes in the power of dialogue and disagreement. We 
spearhead a variety of programming centered around civility and community-building 
(especially among political opposites). Events and programs are created with the 
intent of fostering dialogue, encouraging disagreement, and ultimately, increasing 
empathy.”155  
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The main program being offered involves pairs of friends with opposing 
political beliefs engaging in a respectful dialogue in front of audiences at college 
campuses. This program aims to offer an alternative to inviting controversial political 
figures to speak on college campuses, as their presence rarely generates respectful 
dialogue between political rivals. Respect and Rebellion’s website features profiles of 
21 pairs of friends that can be invited to speak on a college campus. These profiles 
outline the basic ideological differences between the friends and some of the benefits 
of their friendship that they can speak about (when invited to a college campus).  
Like Daryl Davis, many of the individuals in these friendships intentionally 
pursued a close friendship with someone politically different from themselves. As an 
example, let us consider the friendship between Phil Nesser, who identifies as a 
conservative Mormon, and Jacob Hess (the project’s leader), who identifies as a 
Marxist atheist. They met at a National Coalition of Dialogue and Deliberation 
meeting. Upon discovering that they deeply disagreed on all the political issues they 
briefly discussed, they decided to pursue a friendship together with the goal of better 
understanding and empathizing with each other.156 On first pass, it seems possible 
that, after years of Nesser and Hess striving to understand and empathize with each 
other, their friendship has improved their political cognition. However, upon further 
investigation, it is not clear, what improvement, if any, to their political cognition has 
been achieved through their friendship.  
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From examining their profile on Respect and Rebellion and an article they co-
authored about their friendship for The Huffington Post, it seems that the primary 
benefit of their friendship is that it has taught them how to have respectful 
conversations with political adversaries.157 They do not discuss if their friendship has 
benefited their political cognition, or if it has provided evidence that has led them to 
revise their political views. If anything, the reader gets the impression that their 
friendship has not led to any significant changes in their political cognition or beliefs; 
this observation can be gleaned from listening to their radio interview and considering 
the title of the book they coauthored: You’re Not as Crazy As I Thought (But You’re 
Still Wrong).158 They claim that the benefit of their friendship is that they are more 
understanding and charitable in their view of the ideology that each represents; 
nonetheless, they are adamant that each other’s views about politics are “wrong.”  
When describing their discussions, Nesser and Hess write, “We would talk 
about our surprising discoveries in spending hours turning towards our deepest 
disagreements, including (a) Identifying what we really disagree about (vs. the 
stereotyped, soundbite portrayals of red/blue conflict), (b) Getting more clear on what 
we each believe and (c) Having a deeper shift in heart, without necessarily any kind 
of complete ideological ‘conversion.’” Unfortunately, this description is too vague to 
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tell us precisely what benefits or specific influence, if any, their friendship has had on 
their political cognition. However, it does raise important questions that could be 
investigated in a future study: how has identifying the genuine nature of their 
disagreements about politics influenced their thinking about the issues discussed? Is 
there a political issue where they see each other as having valid and sound beliefs? 
How does seeing this affect their own thinking about the political issue in question? 
What do they mean by “a deeper shift in heart”? Has this shift affected their 
reasoning about issues where there is disagreement? If so, how?    
With these questions in mind, their friendship seems like a suitable subject of 
study for finding support for my proposal. Hopefully, their work fostering respectful 
dialogue has cultivated reciprocated good will toward one another and mutual trust 
and intimacy. It could be the case that the charitability and empathy that they have 
cultivated toward each other over the past years could be the basis of the 
nonjudgmental and trusting atmosphere needed to begin the work of aiding one 
another in reducing their susceptibility to engage in biased political cognition. If all of 
this is the case, then their friendship would be useful in a future study that seeks to 
determine if close friendship can reduce susceptibility to engage in biased political 
cognition.  
 
Further Considerations for A Search for Examples Supporting My Proposal 
Thus far, the examples we have examined are merely suggestive of evidence 
for my proposal. The accounts of these friendships lack sufficient evidence to 
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conclusively prove my proposal. We need more detailed knowledge of the friends’ 
political cognition and their friendship to establish that the friends were susceptible to 
engaging in biased political cognition, their susceptibility was reduced, and that 
friendship is the cause of the reduction. In concluding this chapter, I will sketch some 
considerations for a future search of examples and a reservation I have about creating 
a psychological study to test my proposal.    
In searching for examples that could be used to empirically support my 
proposal, the accounts of the friendships would need to possess evidence of the 
friends’ susceptibility to engage in biased political cognition before the formation of 
the friendship. Ideally, for each friend, we would need to know which political issues 
their engagement in biased political cognition tends to manifest itself and how it 
specifically manifests when thinking about those issues. Then, we would need a 
means of tracking their engagement in biased political cognition throughout the 
friendship, as well as detailed knowledge of their conversations about politics. 
Mainly, we would want to know the details of their discussions about biased political 
cognition (what revelatory insights and helpful advice they provided one another) and 
the effects of such discussions on their susceptibility to engage in biased political 
cognition. The underlying idea here is that we need to collect the relevant information 
for reliably determining whether or not their susceptibility to engage in biased 
political cognition was reduced.      
In the cases where we can establish that engagement in biased political 
cognition diminished, the account would need to have collected sufficient evidence 
 162 
 
for verifying that friendship was the primary cause of that reduction. Davis’s account 
attunes us to the possibility that the character and personal histories of friends can 
play a considerable role in changing how friends think about politics. Relatedly, 
Davidson’s account of Atwater and Ellis’ friendship attunes us to the possibility that 
the social context (such as a charrette) can play a significant role in changing two 
friends’ reasoning about a contentious issue. As such, in cases where we can confirm 
that friends’ susceptibility was reduced, we would need to be able to ascertain that the 
primary cause of the reduction is friendship and in doing so rule out other likely 
causes of the reduction.  
These considerations about sufficient evidence raise concerns about a 
methodology for collection of evidence: how does sufficient evidence for assessing a 
reduced susceptibility to engage in biased political cognition get collected? Given that 
all of the examples we considered lack sufficient evidence, what could have the 
authors of the accounts done to collect sufficient evidence? One reasonable response 
to these questions is to propose a psychological study of biased political cognition 
and close friendship. It could be the case that the necessary evidence cannot be 
gathered through authors conducting interviews (Davidson) or friends’ documenting 
intriguing details of their interactions (Davis). It may be that we need pairs of friends 
to participate in a psychological study that explicitly looks to gather the evidence 
needed for determining if close friendship reduces a susceptibility to engage in biased 
political cognition.    
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While a psychological study is an intriguing proposal, it does raise some 
challenging questions. For example, how do we operationalize and measure the 
effects of friendship on susceptibility to engage in biased political cognition? 
Relatedly, how do we go about studying the shared experiences between friends to 
determine friendship as a cause of change in one’s susceptibility to engage in biased 
political cognition? Answers to these challenging questions are critical to finding 
empirical evidence to support my proposal.  
Unfortunately, providing substantive answers to these questions exceeds my 
abilities as a philosopher, and they are best answered by cognitive scientists and 
psychologists. Nevertheless, given the specifics of my proposal detailed in the 
previous chapter, I have one reservation about successfully operationalizing and 
measuring the effects of friendship and isolating friendship as a cause of decreased 
susceptibility to engage in biased political cognition. In my proposal regarding 
friendship, I contended that it is the depth of intimacy and trust that develops in a 
close friendship that is critical to its potential to decrease susceptibility to engage in 
biased political cognition. It is within the safety and comfort of a close friendship’s 
trust and intimacy that friends can be vulnerable enough to explore their engagement 
in biased political cognition without feeling threatened. It seems that it would be 
difficult for the trust and intimacy of close friendship to develop if people outside of 
the friendship knew what was going on within the intimate exchanges of close 
friends. Relatedly, if researchers knew very personal things about two friends (the 
kinds of things that the friends only intended for each other to know), then it does not 
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seem that the two friends could genuinely trust each other. Thus, if we assume that 
researchers found existing friendships to use in a psychological study measuring the 
effects of friendship on the friends’ susceptibility to engage in biased political 
cognition, it does seem that they would be intruding upon the very trust and intimacy 
that is essential to the success of my proposal. Furthermore, it is not clear how 
researchers could collect the relevant evidence without such an intrusion.  
This concern could be addressed by finding friends to volunteer to participate 
in a psychological study of their friendship. If we have pairs of friends volunteering 
to disclose the intimate details of their friendship (such as the pairs of friends in the 
Respect and Rebellion project that already disclose details of their friendship for 
audiences), then we would not be undermining the trust and intimacy between them. 
In this case, both friends will have consented to researchers knowing the intimate 
details of their friendship.   
 
 Daryl Davis’s friendships, Ann Atwater and C. P. Ellis’ friendship, Jason 
Comstock’s friendships, and the Respect and Rebellion friendships show that there 
exist suitable examples for a study that aims to provide sufficient evidence for 
assessing the viability of my proposal. With further investigation, it seems we could 
determine whether or not close friendships between people politically different from 
each other can mitigate a susceptibility to engage in biased political cognition. While 
difficult challenges beset the creation of a study that operationalizes and measures the 
effects of friendship on susceptibility to engage in biased political cognition, I am 
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confident that such challenges can be overcome with the aid of researchers that study 
the psychological phenomena associated with biased political cognition. Future 
collaboration between social psychologists, cognitive scientists, and philosophers of 
friendship could be fruitful in producing results that meaningfully extends the 
analysis of this dissertation.       
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Conclusion 
Through our exploration of the psychology of political cognition, we found 
there exists significant evidence that casts doubt on our ability to have accuracy and 
the common good be our primary motivations when processing information about 
morally significant, contentious political issues. Despite our best efforts to be 
impartial, we learned that it is plausible that without our awareness, we are 
susceptible to engaging in motivated reasoning, confirmation bias, and identity 
protective cognition, as well as falling prey to the introspection illusion. I argued that 
we should be disconcerted by our susceptibility to engage in biased cognition 
regarding morally significant political issues, such as global climate change. We 
should be disconcerted because its effects are corrosive to efforts to resolve these 
pressing issues in ways that are inclusive of the members of our pluralistic society. 
Ultimately, the manifestation of these phenomena aid in undermining a cooperative, 
equitable public discourse indicative of a flourishing democracy.     
After examining accounts of the psychological phenomena associated with 
biased political cognition from psychology and cognitive science, we considered 
recent accounts from philosophers examining the effects of biased political cognition 
on public discourse, in particular, the accounts offered by Jason Stanley and Joshua 
Greene. In my analysis of Stanley and Greene’s proposals, I contended that their 
proposals overlook a crucial feature of biased political cognition: how an individual’s 
social relationships contribute to their susceptibility to engage in biased political 
cognition. An individual is susceptible to expressing political beliefs that convey their 
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membership in and loyalty to social groups that are essential to their identity and 
well-being. Moreover, given the self-interested need to have the emotional support of 
social groups central to our sense of identity, individuals are unlikely to revise their 
beliefs in accordance with an accurate evaluation of information and the common 
good representative of the interests of all stakeholders, especially when doing so goes 
against the accepted political beliefs of their social groups.  
To build upon current philosophical accounts in a manner that adequately 
addresses the social context of a susceptibility to engage in biased cognition, I 
contended that forming close friendships with those politically different from 
ourselves can aid in mitigating a susceptibility to engage in biased political cognition. 
To support this contention, I made use of elements from the philosophical accounts of 
close friendship articulated by Aristotle and Alexander Nehemas. In these accounts, 
we found that the features indicative of close friendship lend themselves to cultivating 
a social context that alleviates a susceptibility to engage in biased political cognition. 
More specifically, the reciprocated trust, intimacy, and goodwill toward one another 
found in close friendship provides a social context where friends can aid one another 
in becoming more aware of their engagement in biased political cognition and support 
one another to reduce their susceptibility to do so.  
Lastly, we explored several real-life friendships that suggest the possibility of 
empirical support for my proposal. Though, given the authors of the accounts of the 
examples considered did not conduct their investigation of the friendships with my 
proposal in mind, there was insufficient evidence to conclude that my proposal would 
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be successful in practice. Nonetheless, those examples suggested that there exist 
suitable examples for studying my proposal’s effectiveness in practice. Thus, future 
research concerning my proposal is apt to be fruitful.  
Though in considering future research on my proposal, it is worth questioning 
the importance of empirical evidence for the value and significance of my proposal. I 
dedicated an entire chapter to empirical evidence because empirical evidence strikes 
me as the gold standard for proving a theory true. It seems that my proposal is most 
convincing and most likely to be adopted by people if it can be supported by 
empirical evidence. It seems that empirical evidence would be the sure-fire way to 
overcome many of the skepticisms people might have of my proposal. As such, it 
struck me as worthwhile to explore what empirical evidence might exist for my 
proposal and how we might go about collecting such evidence.  
However, it is as equally worthwhile to consider the possibility that empirical 
evidence cannot be gathered for my proposal. One reason that empirical evidence 
might be impossible to gather for my proposal could be because the main contention 
of my proposal is false. Empirical study might reveal that close friendship with those 
socially and politically different from ourselves does not mitigate a susceptibility to 
engage in biased political cognition. Though, a more likely reason is that the details 
of my proposal does not lend itself to scientific assessment. It may very well be the 
case that my optimism about a future study of my proposal is misplaced. Given I am 
not an expert in psychology or cognitive science, it could be the case that we could 
not operationalize and measure the variables of my proposal. For example, it might be 
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the case that it is impossible to psychologically measure the effects of friendship. If 
this is the case, we could ask, “Would this be bad for my proposal? Is my proposal 
not worth taking seriously in our everyday lives unless it can be proven empirically?” 
My sincere hope is that we would still take seriously the need to improve our political 
cognition and to explore the possibility of how close friendships with those politically 
different from ourselves can aid in this goal.  
Two reasons loom large in my mind for why I hope this would be the case. 
The first reason concerns the state of our political culture and public discourse in this 
country. Our political culture seems to grow ever more polarized. It seems that as 
disagreement deepens, the hope of finding common ground deteriorates evermore. 
Moreover, it seems that as a society, we are becoming resigned to deep disagreement 
about pressing political issues being the norm. This relates to the second reason why I 
would hope folks would take my proposal seriously. Our globalized world is beset by 
significant challenges whose ethical ramifications extend across the globe. One 
reason for using global climate change as the running example in this dissertation is 
that it is an excellent example of a political issue for which an effective response 
requires not only cooperation across political divides in our own country, but across 
social and cultural divides extending across the globe. Given the scale of the 
problems that need to be solved, my hope is that people will be willing to take an 
experimental attitude, and thus, consider surprising proposals like my own. 
Moreover, global climate change is an issue for which it seems that a lack of 
an effective response would have major ethical ramifications reverberating across the 
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globe. The modern, globalized world brings more of us into closer contact with 
people different than ourselves than ever before. Furthermore, the modern, globalized 
world requires cooperation on an unprecedented scale to address pressing political 
issues affecting our globe. Given the high stakes, it seems worthwhile to take my 
proposal seriously, or at the very least to take seriously the problems it seeks to 
address.  
Thus, even if my proposal cannot be supported with empirical evidence, it is 
worthwhile to consider the ways that close friends can help with improving our 
political cognition. It as well is worthwhile to continue to explore how our public 
discourse can be benefited from rethinking the social context in which public 
discourse takes place. A flourishing democracy that fairly represents the diversity 
within our pluralistic society and that adequately responds to the challenges that beset 
us should always remain the ultimate goal.   
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Appendix: Theoretical Considerations for Democratic Public Discourse 
Epistemic Requirements for Democratic Public Discourse 
 Seeing as democratic public discourse is the main topic of this dissertation, let 
us begin by defining the scope of public discourse under analysis here; then, we shall 
turn to what is meant by democratic. Public discourse includes the formal political 
discussions taking place within public forums that include the government itself 
(whether it be elected representatives in Congress or lawyers and judges in a 
courtroom), experts at universities, members of the press, and people gathered in 
protest—this list is not intended to be exhaustive, but to provide a sense of the range 
of public forums in which formal political discussions take place. These discussions 
often occur in a public manner, or in principle are accessible by the public, and are 
often what comes to mind when we think of public discourse. While the sense of 
public discourse discussed in this study is inclusive of these public forums, it extends 
further to include the everyday conversations about politics by members of a 
democratic society.159 Everyday conversations play a pivotal role in how we form, 
express, and refine our beliefs and attitudes that inform the decisions made in the 
voting booth. Though we tend to emphasize our casting of votes as central to a 
democracy, we should not downplay the importance of discussion beforehand. Our 
everyday conversations are just as vital as the more formal conversations by 
government officials, scholarly experts, and members of the press in determining the 
course of our society.  
                                                 
159 Jason Stanley, How Propaganda Works, 88.  
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 With this notion of public discourse in mind, let us turn to philosopher 
Elizabeth Anderson’s influential article in social epistemology, “The Epistemology of 
Democracy,” to deepen our understanding of what is meant by democratic with 
respect to public discourse. Two epistemic models of democracy Anderson considers 
are the Condorcet Jury Theorem and Dewey’s experimentalist model. She evaluates 
these models with respect to their ability to model the epistemic functions of three 
constitutive features of democracy: the epistemic diversity of participants, the 
interaction of voting with discussion, and feedback mechanisms, such as periodic 
elections and protests. Here, epistemic diversity of participants entails how a 
democracy seeks to utilize knowledge dispersed across a wide variety of perspectives 
when responding to concerns of public interest; by accounting for the variety of 
interests affected by a potential proposal, a decision is more likely (though not 
necessarily guaranteed) to be one reflective of the public’s interest. Through an 
epistemic lens, she views democracy in the following manner: “…as an institution for 
pooling widely distributed information about problems and policies of public interest 
by engaging the participation of epistemically diverse knowers. Democratic norms of 
free discourse, dissent, feedback, and accountability function to ensure collective, 
experimentally-based learning from the diverse experiences of different knowers.”160 
From this description, we get a glimpse of the democratic norms that underlie the 
                                                 
160 Anderson, “The Epistemology of Democracy,” 8.  
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epistemic requirements for public discourse. To develop this connection, let us 
consider her evaluation of both models.161  
 
Condorcet Jury Theorem 
 To better elucidate the upshot of the sense of Dewey’s experimentalist model, 
let us first explore the Condorcet Jury Theorem, which in Anderson’s analysis is the 
most popular epistemic account of democracy. This theorem holds that if voters (a) 
face two options, (b) vote independently of one another, (c) vote their judgment of 
what the right solution to the problem should be (meaning, they do not vote 
strategically) and (d) have on average a greater than 50% probability of being right, 
then as the number of voters approaches infinity, the probability of that the majority 
vote will yield the right answer approaches 1.162 The underlying assumption is that 
the higher the percentage of votes for a policy initiative, the more a democratic 
society should be confident that they have selected the correct solution to a problem 
of public interest. From this model, we see that democratic roughly translates to 
having a simple majority of votes or support, and ideally a supermajority of votes or 
support. At first glance, this model may be intuitively appealing, as having a majority 
vote/support is key to legitimating decisions in a democracy. Though when pondered 
more deeply, we should find this model to be too reductive, as it overlooks the 
importance of democratic norms mentioned earlier.  
                                                 
161 Anderson, “The Epistemology of Democracy,” 8-9.  
162 Anderson, 10. 
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With its emphasis on voting, the Condorcet Jury Theorem overlooks the 
importance of public dialogue taking place before we ever find ourselves casting a 
ballot. As Anderson explains, “Discussion is needed prior to voting to help voters 
determine what problems are genuinely of public concern.”163 Prior to voting, not 
only is public dialogue needed to determine problems of public interest, but also to 
determine what would be appropriate solutions considering such solutions affect a 
pluralistic society with diverse interests at play. Many problems our democracy faces 
are complex with unequally distributed effects on individuals based on their 
geographic location, social class, occupation, education, gender, race, age, and so 
forth. Since we are most familiar with the effects of problems and proposed solutions 
on ourselves and those close to us, knowledge about these effects is also unevenly 
distributed. The epistemic success of democracy is determined in part by its ability to 
pool the widely distributed information of its participants in determining the effects of 
problems and proposed solutions to create solutions responsive to (ideally) 
everyone’s concerns. Epistemic success is a product of engaging the epistemic 
diversity of participants. By emphasizing merely securing a majority vote between 
two voting options, the Condorcet Jury Theorem does not ensure that epistemic 
diversity of participants is genuinely engaged.164        
A further concern arises when we focus our sense of democracy on voting 
between two options and seeking a simple majority: such a limited scope of focus 
                                                 
163 Anderson, “The Epistemology of Democracy,” 11.  
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does not adequately account for dissent and feedback after policies are enacted 
following elections. Whether a policy is successful in addressing its intended concern 
is not a function of its popularity when voted upon, but rather of the consequences 
resulting from its adoption. As humans, our predictions are always fallible, as 
forecasted results do not always match actual results. In recognizing the fallibility of 
democratic decision making, we need feedback mechanisms that allow us to devise 
better solutions and correct course as new information develops about the 
consequences of polices we have enacted.165 By focusing our sense of democratic 
exclusively on the casting of votes in elections, we are less likely to be mindful of the 
fallibility of our decisions and the need for vigilance after an election to ensure 
concerns are being adequately addressed. As such, the conception of democracy 
underlying the Condorcet Jury Theorem obscures the epistemic functioning of 
democratic institutions beyond the voting booth.       
In addition to overlooking genuine engagement of society’s epistemic 
diversity and the need for feedback mechanisms, the Condorcet Jury Theorem 
presumes that voters vote independently of one another. In other words, it assumes 
we do not influence one another’s choices in the voting booth. Such a presumption is 
not tenable in our current political culture.166 Candidates and political action 
committees spend millions of dollars on campaign advertisements in the hope of 
influencing us. Through online social media, it has become a normal occurrence for 
                                                 
165 Anderson, “The Epistemology of Democracy,” 12. 
166 Anderson, 11. 
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us to engage in discussion in attempt to influence each other’s vote. The same can be 
said for those of us that go door-to-door or volunteer at phone banks on behalf of a 
candidate or policy initiative. All these efforts are examples of us seeking to influence 
each other’s vote. Additionally, there exists newspaper articles, television and radio 
shows, YouTube channels, and podcasts that feature discussion of politics—exposure 
over time to such mediums of communication have some (though we may debate the 
degree of) influence on us as voters.  
While we can disagree about the tenor of these forms of influence, hopefully 
we do not regard such attempts at influence as inherently anti-democratic. As 
Anderson contends, “Without access to public fora for sharing information and 
opinions beyond their immediate knowledge, voters are often uninformed and often 
helpless.”167 Anderson sees such attempts at influence as discussion among ourselves 
that help us determine which issues are of genuine public concern. “Without such 
discussion, they have little to go on but their private preferences. But unlaundered 
private preferences are not the best input into democratic decision making.”168 While 
the threat of manipulation and being misled exists, overall, our ability as voters to 
influence one another can broaden our political thought beyond our own private 
preferences towards a wider consideration of public interest.   
Even though we will not settle on the sense of democratic found in the 
Condorcet Jury Theorem, it is still worth considering this model and its limitations, as 
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oftentimes in public discourse we are confronted with the Condorcet Jury theorem’s 
suppositions. It is not uncommon to encounter people whose sense of democratic 
participation is confined to merely voting in elections. Similarly, we encounter folks 
in public discourse whose sense of democratic is limited to voting between two 
options and achieving a simple majority, downplaying the importance of discussion 
beforehand and feedback mechanisms afterward. For some of us, it may be rare that 
we consider whether the two options before us and the one that secures the simple 
majority came about as the result of deliberation that genuinely engaged the epistemic 
diversity of our pluralistic society. And once the election cycle is over, we may find 
ourselves and/or others inattentive to the consequences of a policy’s adoption, 
believing we have fulfilled our civic duty by voting. Though to be responsive to the 
epistemic diversity of our society and conscientious of the long-term effects of our 
votes, we should see that more than mere voting between two options and a simple 
majority is needed.    
 
John Dewey’s Experimentalist Model of Democracy 
Having considered a popular, but insufficient model of democracy, now let us 
turn to the preferred model that coheres with the preceding analysis: John Dewey’s 
experimentalist model. For Dewey, democracy is characterized by the use of what he 
terms ‘social intelligence’ to address concerns of practical interest. Social intelligence 
embodies an experimental method often practiced in science. Public discourse is a 
medium for thought experiments in which we collectively deliberate proposed 
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solutions, attempting to predict the ramifications of implementing them. At this stage, 
public discourse parallels scientists forming a hypothesis to test in an experiment. The 
adoption of policy is then regarded as an experiment. Much like how conducting 
experiments involves scientists collecting and evaluating data, enacting policy is 
regarded as an experiment whereby we collect and evaluate the data resulting from 
policy implementation. In a scientific spirit, unfavorable results—failures to 
adequately respond to the concerns intended to be addressed or an adequate response 
generating worse problems—should be taken as disconfirmation of our initial 
hypothesis. And much like scientists, disconfirmation should serve as sufficient 
reason for revision—we should aim to revise our policies to achieve our intended 
result. In Dewey’s model, social intelligence is the application of the scientific 
method to problems and concerns of public interest. As Anderson pointedly sums up,  
This requires abandoning dogmatism, affirming fallibilism, and accepting 
observed consequences of our practices as the key evidence prompting us to 
revise them. Dewey took democratic decision-making to be the joint exercise 
of practical intelligence by citizens at large, in interactions with their 
representatives and other state officials. It is cooperative social 
experimentation.169        
 Of the three models we have considered, Dewey’s model sufficiently 
represents the epistemic powers of all three constitutive features of democracy: 
diversity, discussion, and feedback. In The Public and its Problems, Dewey 
highlights the paramount importance to a vibrant democracy of bringing people from 
many diverse walks of life together to determine, through respectful discussion, what 
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they take to be problems of public interest and to develop proposed solutions. He 
regarded universal inclusion of disparate perspectives as essential to the success of 
democratic decision-making. Exclusion casts doubt that the problems and solutions 
arrived at in public discourse are ones of genuine public interest. The legitimacy of 
collective, public action in a democracy necessitates responsiveness to all of us. From 
an epistemic standpoint, exclusion also undermines the ability of collective decision-
making to take advantage of our situated knowledge—all of us come from different 
walks of life that result in us having different experiences of problems and policies of 
public interest. In a democracy, the knowledge arising from the diversity of our 
experiences is essential to developing policy proposals. Universal inclusion facilitates 
maximal use of our situated knowledge, which, as previously mentioned, is crucial to 
adequately responding to the complex problems that beset modern democracies.170   
 Dewey’s experimentalist model emphasizes the need for mechanisms of 
feedback and accountability that facilitate the institutionalization of fallibilism and an 
experimental attitude towards policies enacted. Democratic institutions aiding in this 
endeavor include periodic elections, a free press skeptical of state power, petitions to 
the government from us, public opinion polling, protests, and feedback provided by 
us in public hearings on proposed regulations of administrative agencies, such as 
town hall meetings, city council meetings, etc. Thus, for Dewey democratic 
participation in public discourse extends well beyond the voting booth, and this larger 
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sense of participation in public discourse is needed to push policy enacting 
institutions to revise policy as evidence of their effectiveness comes to light.171  
 Thus far, our discussion of democratic public discourse has exclusively 
focused on policy. While policy is indispensable to a democracy, a democracy is 
more than governmental policy, laws, and regulations. At the heart of democracy lies 
the culture of its participants; in a vibrant democracy, cultural practices embody 
democratic values. Dewey believed his experimentalist model would only succeed if 
we, when interacting with one another, welcome diversity in discussion and take an 
experimental attitude regarding our social arrangements. In “Creative Democracy: 
The Task Before Us,” Dewey argues that American political culture needs to shift 
away from dogmatism and tradition towards a more scientific ethos. If we are 
dogmatic in our political thought, believing that social arrangements should follow 
from tradition or appeal to the authority of principles laid down in historical and/or 
religious texts, we will be incapable of openly assessing the troublesome, and in 
certain cases disastrous, consequences of our current practices as evidence that 
changes need to be made. Dogmatism and tradition blind us to the failures of our 
experiments and hinder us from engaging in revision. As such, diversity in 
discussion, vigilance of our fallibility in decision-making, and willingness to make 
revisions in light of evidence need to be embodied in the cultural fabric of our civil 
society.172  
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 One means of cultivating democracy in our culture is through us organizing 
ourselves into parties, associations, and movements. In doing so, we create social 
contexts for us to share our experiences, articulate common concerns and problems, 
and develop proposals for addressing the impact the current social arrangement has 
on us. Publicly organizing ourselves in such a fashion is a necessary step to ensuring 
that governmental institutions are not blind to the systematic and significant impacts 
of its policies on certain social groups. Though for this feedback to be received, in 
addition to organizing ourselves, there must exist open channels of communication 
amongst ourselves and with our government decision makers. As previously 
mentioned, this includes a free press, public hearings (such as town halls and city 
council meetings), and, given our present age, social media as well.173  
 Effective communication of policy proposals and feedback on current 
practices not only requires open access for us to speak our minds, but just as 
importantly, it requires that we be open to listening to one another. When we 
viciously vilify, shout down, and abuse those who disagree with us, or regard 
diversity of perspectives and worldviews as a threat, we exclude others and deprive 
their voice of being heard. In doing so, we create a toxic public discourse where our 
words fall on deaf ears. Dewey makes this point quite firmly, “Merely legal 
guarantees of the civil liberties of free belief, free expression, and free assembly are 
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of little avail if in daily life freedom of communication, the give and take of ideas, 
facts, experiences, is choked by mutual suspicion, by abuse, by fear and hatred.”174  
 Let us ponder this point for a moment, as it is pertinent to our discussion in 
the preceding chapters on friendship. When it comes to respectful dialogue and 
inclusion of those that disagree with us, our political culture of late has struggled to 
embody such democratic ideals. We need only to tune into a cable news network, 
attend a public protest, or read comments posted on social media to see the serious 
challenges that beset our ability to be respectful and inclusive. Looking back to the 
chapter on the psychology of biased political cognition, it should not come as too 
much of a surprise that we struggle in this regard. If already our own social identity 
and ideological commitments bias our political cognition, and thus we struggle to be 
genuinely open-minded to ideas and beliefs differing from our own, then it is 
understandable that we find it challenging to hear out others that are different from us 
in public discourse. In this vein, we should aim to transform the underlying 
mechanisms of our political cognition to transform the quality of our participation in 
equitable, productive public discourse.  
Our current struggles to engage in respectful dialogue only highlights our 
need to habituate ourselves in both thought and action to be more open-minded and 
fair to the perspectives of others and more humble about our own convictions to 
enhance our ability to listen more openly and respectfully in public discourse. In other 
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words, if in our minds we can become fairer towards ideas disagreeable to us, then we 
can become more fair in public discourse to those who disagree with us. Understood 
in tandem with Dewey’s experimentalist model, this is the hypothesis we seek to test. 
We want to discover if we can we habituate ourselves to more fully embody 
democratic ideals that give rise to an inclusive, diverse public discourse that is more 
effective at successfully addressing problems that affect our society. To this end, we 
also need an understanding of political disagreement that coheres with this goal.   
 
The Epistemic Importance of Political Disagreement for a Flourishing 
Democracy  
Developing an inclusive and respectful public discourse entails characterizing 
political disagreement as advantageous to a flourishing democracy. For some of us, 
our initial thoughts about disagreement may be that we regard it as undesirable and 
believe that our society should strive for wide consensus on contentious political 
issues. While this may appear ideal, we should recognize that such a goal is 
incompatible with our pluralistic society comprised of diverse viewpoints. In a 
diverse society, could we reasonably expect people from very different walks of life 
to agree on political issues? But recognizing that differences are not conducive to 
agreement need not be cause for despair, rather it should encourage us to consider 
how disagreement could be beneficial to a flourishing democracy. Instead of seeing 
disagreement as an aberration, Anderson believes that diversity and disagreement are 
central features of a democracy that should be represented at all stages of deliberation 
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in decision-making: before a decision, at the point of making a decision (voting), and 
after a decision has been made. Dewey’s experimentalist account of democracy 
provides a role for disagreement at each of these stages.175  
 Before a decision, expression of disagreement in group deliberation should 
draw our attention to the diversity of perspectives on the problem under 
consideration. As mentioned beforehand, such expression of diversity is vital to 
determining the concerns and problems of genuine public interest, as opposed to 
merely private or partisan interest. Matters of genuine public interest are determined 
by comprehensive expression of how folks of different walks of life are impacted by a 
problem. Disagreements arising from expressions of diverse viewpoints serves as the 
impetus for mutual accommodation and compromise in arriving at proposed solutions 
to vote upon. When diverse interests are represented through mutual accommodations 
and compromises, it is in this sense that a collective decision is consonant with the 
autonomy of each of us. While it is impossible to be inclusive of all interests in any 
one collective decision, such a reality should remind us that no one collective 
decision completely resolves a matter of public interest, that more work lies ahead in 
making future collective decisions.176   
Turning to the significance of disagreement at the stage of decision-making 
itself, at this stage, we might wonder, “Why recognize the decision of a majority as 
the valid decision for all of us? Shouldn’t we strive for unanimity?”  An obvious 
                                                 
175 Anderson, “The Epistemology of Democracy,” 15. 
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answer is that it seems hardly anything could be decided in a pluralistic society if we 
held ourselves to the standard of unanimity, especially in a society experiencing 
deepening polarization as our own.  
A more sufficient reply factors in the epistemic costs of achieving consensus. 
When beset by pressing matters of public interest, collective decisions oftentimes are 
made from necessity and urgency. As such, requiring unanimity can easily lead to 
excessive pressure on and coercion of dissenting minorities. While coercion is itself 
objectionable, it also results in harsh epistemic costs. Consensus implies an 
agreement where all reservations to a proposal have been addressed or at least 
superseded by more salient considerations. On the pretense of this implication, all 
agreeing parties hold their peace after a decision is made. In turn, this represses public 
disclosure and responsiveness to the continuing objections dissenting individuals 
have about the collective decision. As Anderson is in favor of having open 
disagreement, she contends, “Majority rule, while it permits majorities to override 
minority objections, does not pretend to have fully answered those objections. 
Minority dissent remains open rather than suppressed, reminding us that any given 
decision remains beset by unresolved objections.”177 By allowing for minority 
opposition to keep the public aware of unanswered objections to collective decisions 
and to propose alternatives, decision makers can be held accountable and be 
compelled to reconsider their decisions. It is through continuing dissent after a 
                                                 
177 Anderson, “The Epistemology of Democracy,” 16.  
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collective decision is made that fallibialism and experimentalism can be realized in 
democratic institutions.178          
A final intriguing point that Anderson makes about disagreement and 
autonomy: “Dissent prior to decision-making is a necessary condition for the 
formation of a genuinely collective will consistent with the autonomy of each 
member.”179 This may strike us as surprisingly odd, as we may not associate our 
disagreement with group members as an expression of our autonomy. Rather, we may 
think for a collective to genuinely will something as an expression of each member’s 
autonomy that there must be agreement, that each member must individually will the 
decision. As such, how could disagreement be deemed necessary for a genuinely 
collective decision? Anderson responds to this challenge by asserting that we do not 
need consensus among all individuals, “but simply a willingness to accept the 
collective decision as authoritative for the group (even if one privately dissents), and 
to do one’s part in upholding the decision.”180  
In our present period of deepening polarization and partisanship, we should 
stop to reflect on this point. Do we honestly think that we should be willing to accept 
a collective decision, even if we privately disagree? Or should our disagreement lead 
us to regard the group decision as not representative of us? Further, if our 
disagreement with a collective decision is on the basis of deeply held moral 
convictions, once enacted, do we believe that we have a responsibility to uphold the 
                                                 
178 Anderson, “The Epistemology of Democracy,” 16-17. 
179 Anderson, 16. 
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decision? Or in dissenting, do we have a responsibility to defy and undermine the 
legitimacy of the collective decision? In asking these questions, I have in mind certain 
kinds of contributions made in public discourse: when some of us say something to 
the effect of, “Well I didn’t vote for that person (or law), they (or it) do not represent 
me,” or have bumper stickers that defiantly proclaim, “not my president.” The 
underlying implication of these gestures seems to be that for some of us that a 
collective decision is only regarded as legitimate when it accords with our private 
preferences and personal commitments. Not that all or most people view the 
legitimacy of collective decision through such a narrow lens, but, as polarization 
deepens, such sentiments are worrisome and erode a flourishing democracy. If a 
democracy is to thrive, we must be willing to accept collective decisions as 
legitimate, even when at times we personally disagree with them, believing they 
violate deeply held convictions. At the same time, accepting collective decisions as 
legitimate does not mean blind subordination—when we disagree, we should be 
involved in actions aimed at revising collective decisions.                
                                                                              
 In adopting this sense of democratic public discourse from Dewey’s 
experimentalist model, a question arises concerning whether this sense of democratic, 
and the implications entailed in the use of it, is tied to a particular conception of a 
democratic state or an overall theory of democracy itself. The intention of the 
preceding analysis is not to conceptually favor or disfavor any conception of a 
democratic state or theory of democracy. For example, the sense of democratic public 
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discourse that has been articulated here should strike us as equally relevant to a 
parliamentary system (as it is practiced in many European countries) as it is relevant 
to a presidential system (as it is practiced in the United States). While theories of 
democracy are related to the concerns discussed here—it may be that certain 
conceptions of democracy are better at diminishing the effects of cognitive bias—it is 
beyond the scope of our current discussion to account for such considerations at this 
juncture. In this study, I am most concerned with the political thinking of participants 
in public discourse and the immediate social context in which participants deliberate 
with one another. Questions concerning conceptions of the democratic state or 
theories of democracy exceed the scope of our present considerations, but nonetheless 
are warranted concerns that deserve their own extended discussion.  
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